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LANGDELL AND THE FOUNDATION OF
CLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW
DANIEL P. O’GORMAN*
ABSTRACT
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, scholars seeking to bring order
to the common law developed what has since become known as classical contract law.
Its leading architects were Christopher Columbus Langdell, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., and Samuel Williston, and their efforts involved seeking to provide an objective
foundation for contract law. Any idea, however, that these three worked in
coordination to create classical contract law would be mistaken. Holmes is considered
a relentless critic of Langdell, and even Williston distanced himself from Langdell.
This Article identifies in what ways Holmes and Williston differed from Langdell in
their approach to contract law and, to do so, focuses on the doctrine of consideration,
the foundation upon which classical contract law was built. This Article concludes
that, as a result of these differences, classical contracts scholars’ quest to create an
objective foundation for contract law that could withstand erosion was doomed to fail.
First, the leading architects did not agree on a fundamental concept—a theory of law.
The disagreement between Langdell and Holmes about the nature of law (logic versus
experience) virtually ensured they would be unable to agree on something like the
meaning of consideration and would thus be unable to agree on a foundational theory
of contract law. Second, even when the architects sought to construct principles upon
the same foundation (logic), the foundation proved unable to provide a clear answer
to the meaning of consideration.

* Associate Professor, Barry University School of Law. J.D., New York University, 1993;
B.A., University of Central Florida, 1990. I am indebted to Dean Leticia M. Diaz and Barry
University School of Law for providing me with a summer research grant, without which this
Article would not have been possible.

459

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2022

1

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

460

[70:459

CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 460

II.

CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL: A BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND
...................................................................................................................... 464

III.

LANGDELL’S THEORY OF LAW: LAW AS A SCIENCE ...................................... 469
A. Evolution (Organicism) ......................................................................... 471
B. Original Investigation (Empiricism) ..................................................... 472
C. Taxonomy (Classification)..................................................................... 478
D. Axioms (Conceptualization) .................................................................. 479
E. Back Down (Formalism) ....................................................................... 490
F.

Predicting the Future: The Ever-Tangled Skein of Human Affairs ....... 493

G. Holmes’s Legal Science: Experience over Logic and Battling the Powers
of Darkness ............................................................................................ 493
H. Williston’s Legal Science: The Uneasy Formalist ................................. 507
IV.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONSIDERATION TO THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY
...................................................................................................................... 511

V.

AN OVERVIEW OF LANGDELL’S DISCUSSION OF CONSIDERATION IN THE
SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... 521

VI.

LANGDELL’S DIFFERENCES WITH HOLMES AND WILLISTON ON CONSIDERATION
...................................................................................................................... 527
A. Promise Conditional on Past or Current Event: Communis Error Facit Jus
and the “Theory of Contract” Itself ...................................................... 528
B. The Mailbox Rule .................................................................................. 538
C. How Mutual Promises are Each Consideration for the Other: A Secret
Paradox of the Common Law and a Case of “Jumping In” .................. 548

VII.

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 559

I. INTRODUCTION
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a time of significant scholarly
interest in the law of contracts,1 and for good reason. Not only had the Industrial

1 Much of their work can be found in Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts from
American and English Legal Periodicals, published in 1931, which is over one thousand three
hundred pages and is a collection of essays from this period. See ASS’N OF AM. L. SCHOOLS,
SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS FROM AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LEGAL
PERIODICALS (1931). One commentator calls it “the single most important collection of essays
ever published on the common law of contract.” Peter Benson, Introduction to THE THEORY OF
CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 2 n.3 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
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Revolution increased the practical importance of contracts, 2 but the end of the old
forms of action3 and the rise of reported cases4 created a felt necessity to bring order
to a common law that seemed nothing more than a “ragbag” or “thick fog” of details.5
Embracing the scientific method, which was very much in the air at the time,6 and

2 See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 45 (1977) (noting that with the
Industrial Revolution contract law became more important than it had been in preindustrial
society); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 19 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that “[i]t was not until
the nineteenth century that economic conditions led contract law to its apogee, as the legal
underpinning of a dynamic and expanding free enterprise system.”).
3 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 404 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that
old technicalities in the law of contracts were abandoned long before mid-century, and “[w]hat
remained was more or less to tidy up doctrine and to express its principles as general rules.”);
Patrick J. Kelley, Holmes, Langdell and Formalism, 15 RATIO JURIS 26, 27 (2002) (noting that
“[t]he traditional way of categorizing and thinking about the common law—the forms of
action—broke down” and that “[t]his proceeded rapidly throughout the first half of the
nineteenth century in both England and the United States, culminating in the procedural reforms
abolishing the forms of action around the middle of the nineteenth century in the New York
Field Code and the English Procedural Reform Acts.”); WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND
EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 58 (1994) (noting that
Langdell’s principles of contract law would be “rules of substantive law whose formulation and
organization will create a substitute for the structure once given by the forms of action, the
absence of which Langdell experienced as a practitioner of New York law under the reforms of
the Field Code of Procedure.”); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 787, 825 (1989) (noting that “[t]he legal thinkers of Holmes’ generation confronted a
practical historical situation that impressed upon them the need for a new and perspicuous
categorical arrangement of the common law” and that “[w]ith the demise of the writ system, the
organization of cases around the traditional forms of action was breaking down.”).
4 See GILMORE, supra note 2, at 60 (noting that the increased reporting of cases called for the
simplification of doctrine).
5 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Introduction to the General Survey by European Authors in
the Continental Legal Historical Series (1913), in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 298, 301–02 (1920) (noting that “[w]hen I began, the law presented itself as a
ragbag of details.”); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Brown University—Commencement Speech
1897, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 5, at 164, 164 (noting that when he began
practicing law “[o]ne found oneself plunged in a thick fog of details”). Throughout this Article,
Holmes will be referred to without “Jr.” as he dropped the “junior” in 1894 after his father died,
except when citing in footnotes to articles before 1894. Richard A. Posner, Introduction to THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 1, n.1 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
6 See KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT
218–19 (1990) (noting that “[t]he common law as a science was reinforced by the intellectual
influences in vogue of Savigny’s emphasis on the law as a legal science and of Darwin’s
evolutionary theory.”).
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rejecting natural law as an ordering principle,7 scholars embarked on a quest to
identify a new objective foundation for jurisprudence, including contract law. 8
Their efforts with contract law started in earnest with Christopher Columbus
Langdell’s A Summary of the Law of Contracts,9 published first as an appendix to his
casebook in 187910 and then separately in 1880.11 They continued with Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s contracts lectures in 1880, which were published in 1881 in his
celebrated book The Common Law.12 And they concluded in the early twentieth
century with the work of Samuel Williston, reflected in his monumental four-volume

7 See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 28 n.99 (1983) (noting
that “[t]he classical legal scientists unanimously rejected natural law jurisprudence . . .”);
Stephen A. Siegel, Joel Bishop’s Orthodoxy, 13 LAW & HISTORY REV. 215, 253 (1995) (noting
that “Langdell and his followers were progressive scholars: they were among the first Western
jurists to adopt a wholly secular approach to law.”). “Natural law theories maintain that there is
an essential (conceptual, logical, necessary) connection between law and morality . . . .
[A]ccording to natural law theory, it is part of the very meaning of ‘law’ that it passes a moral
test.” JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO
JURISPRUDENCE 11 (Revised ed. 1990); see Siegel, supra note 7, at 253–54 (discussing the
prolific treatise writer Joel Prentiss Bishop, and his theistic strand of classical legal theory);
Mathias W. Reimann, Holmes’s Common Law and German Legal Science, in THE LEGACY OF
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 72, 80 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992) (noting that “the conviction
was widespread that the civil law provided the best guidance.”).
8 Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset of
Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1446 (1997).
9 C. C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 5 (2d ed. 2004) (1880).
10 BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION
LANGDELL, 1826-1906, at 100 (2009).

OF

MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: C.C.

11 Id. at 102.
12 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (Belknap Press 1963) (1881).
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treatise on the law of contracts in 1920,13 and then in the American Law Institute’s
Restatement of Contracts in 1932, for which Williston was the Reporter.14
These three—Langdell, Holmes, and Williston—are, at least according to Grant
Gilmore, the primary architects of what came to be known as classical contract law.15
Holmes sought to make the “bargain theory” of contract law its substantive
foundation,16 and Langdell and Williston sought to make formalism its
methodology.17 Any idea, however, that these three worked in coordination to create
the great edifice, which started to crumble under the blows of Arthur Corbin even
before it was finished,18 would be mistaken. Holmes is considered a relentless critic
of Langdell,19 and even Williston distanced himself from Langdell. 20
This Article seeks to identify in what ways Holmes and Williston differed from
Langdell in their approach to contract law and, to do so, focuses on the doctrine of
consideration. The doctrine of consideration will be the focus because, during this
period, Anglo-American jurists, including our architects of U.S. classical contract law,

13 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920) (four volumes); see also Allen D.
Boyer, Samuel Williston’s Struggle with Depression, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 37 (1994) (noting that
“Williston’s treatise on contracts was immediately recognized as a classic text.”); Benson, supra
note 1, at 2 (noting that Williston’s treatise “represents the most systemically and carefully
worked-out presentation of the legal point of view that culminates several decades of intensive
and highly sophisticated efforts by such masters of the common law as Pollock, Holmes,
Langdell, Ames, Holdsworth, Salmond, and Leake, to bring order and internal consistency to
the law of contract.”). E. Allan Farnsworth, however, has argued that the years from 1881 (after
Holmes published The Common Law) to the First World War (just before Williston published
his treatise) were in fact lean ones for contracts scholarship. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts
Scholarship in the Age of Anthology, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1406, 1407 (1987) (“[F]rom 1881 to the
time of World War I, there was a significant decline in contracts scholarship and . . . the principal
explanation for these lean years lies in the shift in scholars’ focus from an audience of
practitioners to one of students that resulted from the introduction of the case method.”).
14 See Wm. Draper Lewis, Introduction to AM. LAW INST., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS ix
(1932) (noting Williston was the Reporter for Contracts).
15 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 13–14 (1974); see also William P. LaPiana,
Victorian from Beacon Hill: Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Early Legal Scholarship, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 827 n. 99 (1990) (noting that “[t]he link between Holmes and Langdell was most
clearly made by Grant Gilmore.”). Gilmore called the results of their efforts the “HolmesWilliston construct,” GILMORE, supra note 15, at 14 and by others as the “Williston-Langdell
approach.” ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 314 (1998).
16 GILMORE, supra note 15, at 18–21.
17 Id. at 13–14.
18 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 49–51 (1992) (discussing Corbin’s attack on classical contract
law in the early twentieth century).
19 Bruce A. Kimball, The Langdell Problem: Historicizing the Century of the Historiography,
1906-2005, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 277, 307 (2004).
20 Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 240 (2005).
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were preoccupied with the meaning of consideration,21 and it was the project’s crucial
element.22 The old forms of action having gone away, scholars sought a single test of
enforcement for a promise.23 But Langdell, Holmes, and Williston simply could not
agree on what consideration was, and this, as much as anything, revealed that the
foundation of the great edifice was weak.
And it did not take long for that to become apparent. Shortly after Langdell
published the Summary, Holmes attacked not only Langdell’s general approach to
constructing a theory of contract law, but he also attacked his view of consideration.
Williston, in the early twentieth century, flip-flopped on the meaning of consideration,
but rather than signaling that the quest to create a new foundation had finally
succeeded, this showed that it had failed.
This Article maintains that there were two reasons classical contracts scholars’
quest to create an objective foundation for contract law was doomed to fail. First, the
leading architects did not agree on a fundamental concept—a theory of law. The
disagreement between Langdell and Holmes about the nature of law (logic versus
experience) virtually ensured they would be unable to agree on something like the
meaning of consideration and would thus be unable to agree on a foundational theory
of contract law. Second, even when the architects sought to construct principles upon
the same foundation (logic), the foundation proved unable to provide a clear answer
to the meaning of consideration. In the end, all that was left was for Arthur Corbin to
point out the obvious.
This Article focuses on Langdell and his theory of consideration, and how Holmes
and Williston’s views differed from his, as he was arguably the first theorist of U.S.
classical contract law. Part II provides a brief biographical sketch of Langdell. Part III
discusses Langdell’s theory of law as a science and includes discussions of how
Holmes and Williston’s theories of law differed from Langdell’s. Part IV provides a
background of the law of consideration up to the late nineteenth century, the time the
architects of classical contract law sought to give it definition. Part V summarizes
Langdell’s discussion of consideration in his Summary of the Law of Contracts. Part
VI analyzes the specific areas regarding consideration upon which Langdell and the
other leading architects of classical contract law (Holmes and Williston) disagreed
(thus dooming the project’s foundation). Part VII is a brief conclusion.
II. CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL: A BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND
Langdell’s rise started “from an impoverished and traumatic childhood on a
hardscrabble farm” in New Boston, New Hampshire. 24 He attended Phillips Exeter
Academy in Exeter, New Hampshire, from 1845 to 1848,25 and entered Harvard

21 JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF THE MODERN DOCTRINE OF CONTRACT
171 (1991).
22 LAPIANA, supra note 3, at 60.
23 TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 225–26.
24 Bruce A. Kimball, Young Christopher Langdell, 1826-1854: The Formation of an
Educational Reformer, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 189, 191 (2002).
25 KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 16–20.
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College in 1848, but left fifteen months later due to a lack of funds. 26 As an
undergraduate student, he took a natural history course where he learned botany and
zoology, the latter being taught by Louis Agassiz, the Swiss scientist who was the
field’s leading figure.27 After leaving Harvard College, Langdell spent eighteen
months clerking in a prominent law office in New Hampshire. 28 He then entered
Harvard Law School in 1851, graduated in 1853, and thereafter spent a year at the law
school on postgraduate study.29 In law school, Langdell assisted Theophilus Parsons
with research for his Law of Contracts (published in 1853), identifying the cases and
drafting notes discussing them.30 He became Parsons’s principal assistant on the
project, and Parsons directed his other assistants to provide their work to Langdell for
review and revision.31 In fact, Langdell’s work on the book might have been more
valuable than Parsons’s.32 At law school, Langdell was known for his incessant
conversations with classmates about the law, including presiding over mealtime
discussions of cases.33
Langdell left Harvard Law School in 1854 and practiced law on Wall Street in
New York City from 1855 to 1870.34 He was greatly respected by the leaders of the
bar,35 and in 1869, fellow lawyers referred to him as “[t]he highest legal ability in the
nation.” 36 But the corruption of Tammany Hall in the 1860s, which extended to judges
and lawyers, alienated him and in early 1870 he accepted a position as a professor at
26 Bruce A. Kimball, Langdell, Christopher Columbus, in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 323 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009).
27 KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 24–25.
28 Kimball, supra note 24, at 222–23.
29 Kimball, supra note 26, at 323.
30 Kimball, supra note 24, at 224; ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: A
HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN, 1817-1967, at 165 (1967). Parsons’s treatise focused more on
particular types of contracts than on a unifying theme. LAPIANA, supra note 3, at 59. Prior to
Parsons’s treatise, William Wetmore Story had published A Treatise on the Law of Contracts
Not under Seal, but it too focused on different types of contracts. Id. Francis Hilliard and Joel
Bishop published contracts treatises in 1872 and 1878, respectively, but they too focused on
particular types of contracts. Id.; see also Mark P. Gergen, Negligent Misrepresentation as
Contract, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 974 n.80 (2013) (noting, with respect to Hilliard’s treatise,
that “[t]he working part of the treatise is in the analysis of specific types of contracts.”).
31 Kimball, supra note 24, at 225; see also KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 87 (noting that
Langdell was Parsons’s chief research assistant).
32 Kimball, supra note 24, at 225.
33 KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 34.
34 Kimball, supra note 26, at 323; Bruce A. Kimball & R. Blake Brown, ‘‘The Highest Legal
Ability in the Nation’’: Langdell on Wall Street, 1855–1870, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39, 39
(2004).
35 SUTHERLAND, supra note 30, at 166.
36 Kimball, supra note 26, at 323.
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Harvard Law School.37 As a result of his experience with the corruption of the New
York legal system, Langdell came to believe in an apolitical, scientific nature of law.38
In January 1870, Langdell was named Dane Professor, and in the spring semester
he taught courses in negotiable paper and partnerships, apparently by the traditional
lecture method.39 In September he was elected the law school’s first dean,40 and at the
same time he introduced the case method of teaching law along with the first casebook,
A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts.41 The first half of the casebook was
published in time for the start of classes in October 187042 and the completed first
edition was published by Little, Brown, and Co. in October 1871,43 the latter edition
including a preface and a thirteen-page index.44 Langdell’s case method and his
casebook went hand in hand. The case method involved the use of the Socratic method
in class, an inductive method of teaching through which Langdell questioned students
about the cases, leading them to formulate and then refine principles of law derived
from the assigned cases.45 For the casebook’s title page, Langdell fittingly chose Sir
Edward Coke’s maxims, “many times compendia sunt dispendia” (“shortcuts are a
waste of time”), and “melius est petere fontes quam sectari rivulos” (“it is better to
seek the sources than to follow the tributaries” or, stated somewhat differently, “it is
better to go up to the wellsprings than to follow rivulets downhill.”).46
Langdell’s biographer, Bruce Kimball, has identified a host of factors that might
have contributed to Langdell’s decision to adopt the case method of instruction. First,
while at Exeter, Langdell read John Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education,47
which recommended that students be presented with original sources and learn by
going from the particular to the general.48 Second, in his natural history course at
Harvard, Langdell had been exposed to specimens, which perhaps influenced him to

37 Id.
38 Id.
39 2 C. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 359, 363 (1908).
40 Id. at 370–71; SUTHERLAND, supra note 30, at 167.
41 Kimball, supra note 26, at 323.
42 KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 88, 97.
43 C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871); KIMBALL,
supra note 10, at 91, 97.
44 KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 90.
45 Kimball, supra note 26, at 323.
46 LANGDELL, supra note 43, at iii; KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 89 n.28; Marcia Speziale,
Langdell’s Concept of Law as Science: The Beginning of Anti-Formalism in American Legal
Theory, 5 VT. L. REV. 1, 11 (1980).
47 KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 18.
48 Id. at 19.
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later view cases as legal specimens, so to speak.49 Third, scientific taxonomy was
emphasized during the mid-nineteenth century,50 and the induction of principles from
cases can be seen as a form of legal taxonomy. Fourth, as previously noted, in law
school Langdell had intense discussions with classmates about cases and it can thus
be assumed he had a great interest in caselaw. 51 Fifth, he had a tremendous knowledge
of the cases stemming from his work for Parsons on his contracts treatise. 52 Sixth,
New York’s shift to code pleading in 1848 involved a new emphasis on caselaw
precedent and, as noted, Langdell practiced in New York from 1855 to 1870.53
Seventh, Langdell’s law practice primarily involved cases in equity,54 which
presumably emphasized the specific facts of cases. And eighth, there was an increase
in the reporting of cases,55 and thus court opinions were becoming readily available.
By the late 1870s, Langdell’s casebook was selling out and the publisher wanted
a new edition.56 Langdell complied, and the second edition was published in the fall
of 1879.57 Although the organization and the selection of cases changed little, he
expanded the index to nineteen pages and, more importantly, added a 131-page
“summary of topics covered by the casebook.”58 The summary’s addition (ironically,
as will be seen) was in response to Holmes’s review of the first edition, where Holmes
had stated that students would find Langdell’s casebook “a pretty tough pièce de
resistance without a text-book or the assistance of an instructor.”59 Importantly, in
1880, the summary was also published separately from the casebook under the title, A
Summary of the Law of Contracts.60
The Summary was significant in that it treated contract law as a general body of
law, rather than as a collection of separate areas of law based on different types of
contracts, such as insurance, shipping, or employment contracts, which had been the

49 Id. at 87.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 87–88.
56 Id. at 100.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Book Note, 6 AM. L. REV. 353, 354 (1872) (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. reviewing C.C.
LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871)); see also Speziale, supra
note 46, at 34 (“Christopher Langdell’s Summary of Contracts may have been . . . a giving-in
to students (and scholarly critics) who yearned for a statement of ‘the law’—a response to the
uncharitable reviews of his first edition and his first year of teaching.”).
60 KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 102.
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way contract law had been previously treated.61 The Summary has thus been described
as Langdell’s “most significant scholarly contribution,” and “[i]ts essence lies less in
substantive doctrine than in [Langdell’s] originality in seeking to develop an abstract,
systematic theory of law . . . .”62 Langdell’s writings in the last several decades of the
nineteenth century thus placed him as one of the age’s leading theorists of contract
law.63 He is considered by some to be “the first theoretician of contract law in the
United States,”64 and the first person to recognize that there was such a thing as a
general theory of contract law.65
The Summary had, as noted, originally been intended as a reference guide for
students using his casebook,66 and Langdell, in the preface, implied that he only
agreed to it being published separately because the publisher saw a separate market
for it and had urged for its separate publication.67 Langdell might, therefore, have in
a sense inadvertently become the first U.S. theorist of a general theory of contract law
(thanks to Holmes and Little, Brown, and Co.), beating Holmes to the punch, whose
The Common Law was published in 1881. It is perhaps in this sense that Gilmore said
that Langdell stumbled across the idea of a general law of contract, almost
inadvertently discovering it.68
Around 1883, Langdell, his eyesight having started to deteriorate, and having
married for the first time in 1880, entered a period during which he published almost

61 GILMORE, supra note 15, at 6–7.
62 Kimball, supra note 26, at 323–24. It has been noted that it “was more theoretically
sophisticated and insightful than any contemporary work in torts.” Patrick J. Kelley, A Critical
Analysis of Holmes’s Theory of Contract, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1681, 1697 (2000).
63 Bruce A. Kimball, Langdell on Contracts and Legal Reasoning: Correcting the Holmesian
Caricature, 25 LAW & HISTORY REV. 345, 345 (2007); see also KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 84
(noting that “Langdell’s scholarship during the 1870s . . . on contracts and sales . . . exercised
seminal influence jurisprudentially” and that he was a “leading theorist of contracts during its
‘golden age’ in Anglo-American law.”).
64 LAPIANA, supra note 3, at 188 n.19.
65 GILMORE, supra note 15, at 6; see also Catharine Pierce Wells, Langdell and the Invention
of Legal Doctrine, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 551, 551 (2010) (noting that Langdell “initiated and
inspired the effort to formulate classical contract theory . . . .”). In fact, he “has long been taken
as a symbol of the new age,” GILMORE, supra note 2, at 42, though it has been argued that
“Langdell had nothing to do with creating the new age or with shaping the new approach,” but
was “the first to give a conscious, theoretical expression to the new order of things–which is
why he became the symbol of his time.” Id. at 62.
66 KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 111; see also Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 1410 (noting that
“the Summary was written mainly for students.”).
67 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at v; see also KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 111 n.145 (“The preface
of the Summary implies that Langdell did not want to issue it separately and did so only at the
urging of the publisher, which envisioned a separate market for it.”) (citation omitted).
68 GILMORE, supra note 15, at 6, 12.
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nothing. 69 He returned to writing in the late 1880s and early 1890s, before becoming
nearly blind and again ceasing to write.70 He retired as dean in 1895, wrote another
group of articles starting in 1897, retired as Dane Professor in 1900, and died in
1906.71
III. LANGDELL’S THEORY OF LAW: LAW AS A SCIENCE
Langdell is famous for considering law as a science, and his view led to an
approach to law that has been referred to as classical orthodoxy. 72 But exactly what
he meant by “law as a science” and why he adopted such an approach has been the
matter of debate.73 A variety of views have emerged, many of them related and thus
not necessarily inconsistent with all of the others. One view is that Langdell meant
law should be treated as “an intellectual discipline worthy of a place in the university”
rather than to be learned through an apprenticeship,74 and that it was meant to be a
pedagogical tool focusing on primary sources (cases) rather than secondary sources
(treatises) (recall Coke’s maxims that Langdell included at the beginning of his
casebook).75 A second, related view, is that he hoped treating law as a science would

69 Kimball, supra note 26, at 324.
70 Id.
71 Id.; Paul D. Carrington, Hail! Langdell!, 20 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 691, 691 n.1 (1995).
72 Grey, supra note 7, at 2; see also SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY
199 (1940) (“Any generally expressed belief in England or America that the everyday law of
the courts is a science, that should be studied in its completeness like other sciences, may be
fairly dated from Langdell’s appointment in 1870 as Dane Professor of Law at Cambridge.”).
The idea of law as a science was not, however, new, though Langdell can be credited with
popularizing the idea in the United States. See M. H. Hoeflich, Law and Geometry: Legal
Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 J. AM. LEGIS. HISTORY 95, 121 (1986) (“[O]ne should
praise Langdell only for his popularization efforts, not for his innovativeness or originality.”);
Juan Javier del Granado & M. C. Mirow, The Future of Economic Analysis in Latin America:
A Proposal for Model Codes, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293, 296 (2008) (“In North America, until
the last quarter of the nineteenth century, law had not been considered a science, but an art, ‘the
art of the lawyer and the art of the judge,’ until a German-inspired brand of systematic legal
science was successfully transplanted into the case method of the common law by scholars, such
as Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell . . . .”) (quoting Jerome Frank, Why not a Clinical
Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 923 (1933)).
73 See generally Kimball, The Langdell Problem, supra note 19 (providing an excellent
review of the differing views); LAPIANA, supra note 3, at 55 (“What that idea [Langdell’s idea
of legal science] was has been a source of scholarly debate for some time.”).
74 Speziale, supra note 46, at 25, 37.
75 See Anthony Chase, Origins of Modern Professional Education: The Harvard Case
Method Conceived as Clinical Instruction in the Law, 5 NOVA L.J. 323, 333 (1981) (“Langdell
was as committed as [Harvard President Charles William] Eliot to the construction of
university-based, professional legal education. If the practice of law was not a handicraft, and
systematic professional education could not be secured through apprenticeship, then it would
become necessary to regard law as a university science.”); id. at 358 (“Langdell’s [sic] principal
commitment was to the construction of a first-class professional law school which would
contribute to the standardized and centralized production of upper echelon lawyers. He seemed
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elevate law and the legal profession through such training, and that law could thereby
be saved “from the politics that he believed had invaded the bar” (recall his experience
with Tammany Hall when he practiced law in New York).76 A third (related to the
second) is that Langdell’s approach, combining a scientific aspiration with recognition
that there were no “great universal principles,” was designed to identify narrower
principles of law; rules of substantive law to fill the void left by the abandonment of
the old forms of action.77 This view also maintains his approach was organic and
Darwinian, rejecting immutable absolutes, and recognizing that the law developed.78
This view asserts that Langdell’s approach, rather than advancing a formalist approach
to law, can perhaps be viewed as the beginning of the end to formalism. 79 A fourth
(inconsistent with the third) is that Langdell viewed law as a natural science in that

willing to recruit the language of science . . . and impose them upon the ensemble of immediate
circumstances and options which Harvard confronted, always with his goals clearly in view.”);
WILLISTON, supra note 72, at 199 (“[H]e sought simply to apply to the systemic study of law
the methods habitually used by lawyers in the preparation of particular cases—namely, to study
chronologically the previous decisions that seemed applicable to the question at issue, and to
extract from the a guiding thread of principle. What was an appropriate method for a trained
lawyer, Langdell thought would be appropriate also for young students who were given such
aid as they required from an instructor.”).
76 W. Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REV. 1, 136–38 (1997); see also
KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 129 (“In 1870, upon leaving New York to return to HLS as a
professor, Langdell understood that success in legal practice, even among elite lawyers, did not
necessarily depend on legal expertise and that, absent such dependence, the legal system and
the entire polity were at risk. He therefore adopted the view that the justice and legitimacy of
the legal system depend on the quality and legitimacy of the legal profession, which require, in
turn, that lawyers acquire strong legal knowledge through a demanding legal education. This
novel view [likely] spurred . . . his commitment to legal science . . . .”).
77 LAPIANA, supra note 3, at 58.
78 LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 10–11 (1986); see also
KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 90 n.38 (noting that Langdell’s evolutionary language in the preface
of his casebook reflected the change in outlook prompted by the publication of Darwin’s The
Origin of Species in 1859); KALMAN, supra note 78, at 13 (noting that the case method’s
“scientific nature was consistent with the passion for science of the Darwinian and positivistic
late nineteenth century.”); Speziale, supra note 46, at 35 (“Langdell’s return to original sources,
his dynamic classroom style, and his references to the ‘growth’ of doctrine, when seen in their
late-nineteenth-century context, suggest organicism rather than unitary conceptualism.”).
79 Speziale, supra note 46, at 3–4 & 4 n.10; see also LAPIANA, supra note 3, at 188 n.11
(“[T]he case method teachers espoused a theory of law based on the belief that law came from
power and were opposed by thinkers who believed that law was discovered, not made, and that
its substance consisted of timeless principles . . . . I believe that the ‘formalist’ label, at least in
its most pejorative meaning, belongs not to Langdell and the other case method teachers, but to
their opponents . . . .”). Grey, however, has argued that Langdell can be considered both a
conceptualist in that he sought to structure “law into a system of classification made up of
relatively abstract principles and categories,” and a formalist in that he sought to make “law
certain by making legal reasoning deductive.” Grey, supra note 3, at 822. Grey further argues,
“[f]or Langdell, the two were integrated; formality was to be achieved through the conceptualist
enterprise itself. The general principles must serve as axioms constituting a deductive system
that would make legal reasoning exact and scientific.” Id.
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empirical analysis (of cases) could lead to the discovery of immutable legal truths. 80
In the following Subparts, an analysis of Langdell’s specific approach to law as a
science will be considered.
A.

Evolution (Organicism)

For Langdell, legal principles develop over time, just like living things develop
over time. In the preface to his 1871 casebook, Langdell, echoing scientific
evolutionary theory, wrote that “[l]aw, considered as a science, consists of certain
principles or doctrines,” and “[e]ach of these doctrines has arrived at its present state
by slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases through
centuries.”81 This, of course, is one of the principal features of the common law in
contrast with civil law.82
Langdell’s casebook shows that the historical development of the rules of contract
law were important to him. For each topic, he arranged the cases geographically and
chronologically,83 and he added to each case the court and the year of decision.84 Sir
Frederick Pollock (an English jurist) recognized Langdell’s appreciation for the

80 GILMORE, supra note 2, at 42. This led Grant Gilmore to conclude that Langdell was “an
essentially stupid man,” whose belief that law is a science was “absurd,” yet “mischievous,”
and it only became popular because it “corresponded to the felt necessities of the time.” Id.; see
also John Henry Schlegel, Langdell’s Auto-da-fé, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 149, 153 (1999)
(“Langdell is unlikely to have understood what he was doing . . . .”). However, “[t]he idea that
anyone of note ever really held such an extreme view is a myth that has now thankfully been
largely debunked by more careful thinkers.” Curtis Bridgeman, Why Contracts Scholars Should
Read Legal Philosophy: Positivism, Formalism, and the Specification of Rules in Contract Law,
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1450 (2008). The “felt necessities of the time” referred to be Gilmore
were perhaps “the elite bar’s desire for uniform laws among the states, its image of apolitical
decision making, and its accentuation of competence and learning.” Siegel, supra note 7, at 255;
see also Reimann, supra note 7, at 255 n.93 (discussing the various theories explaining the rise
of formalism in the United States).
81 LANGDELL, supra note 43, at vi; see also Reimann, supra note 7, at 108 (“Langdell’s
principles grow. Their change over time can be observed by reading the relevant cases in
chronological order. In fact, their organic nature can be understood only by tracing their
development. That is why Langdell organized his casebooks chronologically and taught cases
accordingly.”) (footnote omitted).
82 See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal
Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 75 (2001)
(“The common law is a law defined in terms of past judicial decisions. The resulting
methodology is such that the common law perpetually is in flux, always in a process of further
becoming, developing, and transforming, as it cloaks itself with the habits of past decisions,
tailored to the lines of the pending situation. The common law evolves with the ongoing
derivation of legal standards from prior judicial decisions, but it is defined by continuous
motion. This means that the common law is that which cannot be crystallized, frozen, or ever
entirely captured. It is fluid, with a suppleness that resides in its inseparability from each
discrete, concrete set of facts, the facts of the lived experiences which formed the basis of the
litigation that led to the prior relevant court adjudications.”) (footnotes omitted).
83 KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 91.
84 Id. at 88.
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growth of legal doctrine, observing that “[d]ecisions are made; principles live and
grow. This conviction is at the root of all of Mr. Langdell’s work.”85 Langdell’s view
that legal doctrines develop can perhaps be viewed in the context of
Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species, in that “[t]he idea that a species can originate
by evolution parallels the notion that laws are not immutable, but alterable and
contingent.”86 Although Langdell’s Summary sought to extract principles of law from
the cases, this too can be seen as “the outgrowth of an organic approach to law:
Langdell could have been trying to group cases and formulate the patterns of principles
without any judgment about their immutability.”87
B.

Original Investigation (Empiricism)

For Langdell, if law was a science, then the reported cases were the specimens to
be studied. In his annual report of the law school for 1873–74, he wrote: “The work
done in the Library is what the scientific men call original investigation. The Library
is to us what a laboratory is to the chemist or the physicist, and what a museum is to
the naturalist.”88 In his 1886 address at the inaugural meeting of the Harvard Law
School Association, he said:
[It] was indispensable [for me] to establish at least two things [when I became
dean]; first that law is a science; secondly, that all the available materials of
that science are contained in printed books. . . . We have also constantly
inculcated the idea that the library is the proper workshop of professors and
students alike; that it is to us all that the laboratories of the university are to
the chemists and physicists, all that the museum of natural history is to the
zoologists, all that the botanical garden is to the botanists. 89

85 Id. (quoting Frederick Pollack, Vocation of the Common Law, in HARVARD L. SCH. ASS’N,
REPORT OF THE NINTH ANNUAL MEETING AT CAMBRIDGE 17 (1895)).
86 David S. Clark, Tracing the Roots of the American Legal Education—A NineteenthCentury German Connection, in I THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION 502 (Steve Sheppard ed.,
1999); see also Kunal M. Parker, Representing Interdisciplinarity, 60 VILL. L. REV. 561, 568
(2015) (“Indeed, ‘Langdell’s legal science’ . . . was not ahistorical in its own day. Instead, it
was quite historical and intended explicitly to reveal the evolution of legal doctrine on the lines
of the dominant Darwinian-Spencerian historical temporalities of the day. This is quite clear
from the structure of Langdell’s famous casebooks, which included ‘correctly’ and ‘incorrectly’
decided cases in order for the student to see the unfolding of legal doctrine over time.”).
87 Speziale, supra note 46, at 34.
88 CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, Annual Report of the Dean of the Law School, 1873-74, in
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENT AND TREASURER OF HARVARD
COLLEGE (1870-95), quoted in KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 349.
89 Professor Langdell’s Address, in HARVARD LAW SCH. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE
ORGANIZATION AND OF THE FIRST GENERAL MEETING AT CAMBRIDGE, NOVEMBER 5, 1886, at 48,
49–51 (1887), reprinted in 3 LAW Q. REV. 124 (1887), as reprinted in 21 AM. L. REV. 123–24
(1887), quoted in SUTHERLAND, supra note 30, at 175. The event was the inaugural meeting of
the Harvard Law School (Alumni) Association commemorating the 250th anniversary of
Harvard Law School. The keynote speaker was Holmes. KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 231.
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Langdell’s approach was thus scientific in that it was “methodological in nature.”90
Cases—the specimens—are studied and principles (conclusions) are made from
careful investigation. President Charles William Eliot of Harvard, who had hired
Langdell, said at the same event:
He [Langdell] told me that law was a science: I was quite prepared to believe
it. He told me that the way to study a science was to go to the original sources.
I knew that was true, for I had been brought up in the science of chemistry
myself; and one of the first rules of a conscientious student of science is never
to take a fact or a principle out of second hand treatises, but to go to the
original memoir of the discoverer of that fact or principle. 91
The cases would be studied to trace the evolution of a legal principle and then
identify it in its current form. If law was “thought to be based on a natural and fixed
evolutionary principle not unlike what Darwin observed in his evolutionary studies of
the animal kingdom,” then “legal principles could be discovered like an empirical
fact.”92
Langdell, however, wrote that he believed that “the cases [the specimens] which
are useful and necessary for this purpose [identifying general principles] at the present
day bear an exceedingly small proportion to all that have been reported. The vast
majority are useless and worse than useless for any purpose of systematic study.”93
Coupled with his belief that “the number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less
than commonly supposed,”94 he thought it was “possible to take such a branch of the
law as Contracts . . . and, without exceeding comparatively moderate limits, to select,
classify, and arrange all the cases which had contributed in any important degree to
the growth, development, or establishment of any of its essential doctrines . . . .” 95 In
other words, some specimens yielded no important information, as their characteristics
were the same as their ancestor’s. But others had characteristics different from those
of their ancestors, a characteristic that continued in later specimens, and these were
the ones that were important to study.
Langdell’s choice of specimens is controversial. He has been criticized for
focusing solely on caselaw, and thus considering judge-made law to be the only “law.”
But for much of U.S. history the principal law was judge-made law. As Grant Gilmore
has noted, during early U.S. history “[t]he federal Congress did little; the state
legislatures did less. The judges became our preferred problem-solvers.”96 He has also

90 Dennis Patterson, Langdell’s Legacy, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 196, 200 (1995).
91 President Eliot’s Address, in REPORT OF THE ORGANIZATION AND OF THE FIRST GENERAL
MEETING AT CAMBRIDGE, November 5, 1886, supra note 89, at 60–62.
92 Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought: From Langdell and Holmes
to Posner and Schlag, 28 IND. L. REV. 353, 359 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
93 LANGDELL, supra note 43, at vi.
94 Id.
95 Id. at vii.
96 GILMORE, supra note 2, at 36.
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been criticized for focusing too much on English cases, but, as noted by Samuel
Williston, “a thorough study of any fundamental legal principle in American law
necessarily must go back to the English cases because they were the one great common
factor in the basic law of all the states.”97 If Langdell sought to show the historical
development of present rules, it would be difficult to avoid English cases, as the
English common law had exerted a considerable influence on U.S. law.98
Langdell’s use of cases as the specimens to be studied was notable in its rejection
of natural law, and is consistent with legal positivism and separating what is “law”
from what is “moral.”99 As has been observed, “the case method teachers espoused a
theory of law based on the belief that law came from power and were opposed by
thinkers who believed that law was discovered, not made, and that its substance
consisted of timeless principles.”100 Langdell’s role as a former lawyer and as a
current law professor was a key ingredient in his legal positivism. As he explained in
a letter:
The chief business of a lawyer is and must be to learn and administer the law
as it is; while I suppose the great object in studying jurisprudence should be
to ascertain what the law ought to be; and although these two pursuits may
seem to be of a very kindred nature, I think experience shows that devotion
to one is apt to give more or less distaste for the other.101

97 WILLISTON, supra note 72, at 200; see also TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 218 (arguing that
Langdell used English cases because they had “an advanced commercial law and the advantage
of a single common law jurisdiction”).
98 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 65–71 (discussing influence of English law). But see
Carrington, supra note 71, at 709 (arguing that the fact “[t]hat American public law, the
structure of American legal institutions, and the openness of the legal profession were all (at
least in part) conscious rejections of English traditions tended to escape the notice of
Bostonians.”).
99 “Those who wish to emphasize the separability of law from morality are generally called
‘legal positivists.’” NIGEL E. SIMMONDS, CENTRAL ISSUES IN JURISPRUDENCE: JUSTICE, LAW AND
RIGHTS 5 (3d ed. 2008). Legal positivism, which was given its first systematic statement by
John Austin in the nineteenth century, repudiates natural-law theory, and maintains a distinction
between analytical jurisprudence and normative jurisprudence, the former concerned with what
the law is and the latter with what it ought to be. MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 19.
Siegel has argued that Langdell’s desires to separate law from morals “was an oddity in Gilded
Age America [and that] [m]ost Gilded Age lawyers, judges, and scholars, even Langdell's
colleagues at the Harvard Law School, believed law was deeply embedded in moral
considerations and the moral predilections of the society it governed.” Stephen A. Siegel, The
Revision Thickens, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 631, 636 (2002).
100 LAPIANA, supra note 3, at 188 n.11.
101 Id. at 77 (quoting Letter from C.C. Langdell to T.D. Woolsey (Feb. 6, 1871) (on file at
Yale University Library)); see also Speziale, supra note 46, at 3 (“Nothing that [Langdell] did
or said was inconsistent with the positivist approach to law that sees rules as constructs of cases
and predictions of future decisions.”); Heidi Margaret Hurd, Note, Relativistic Jurisprudence:
Skepticism Founded on Confusion, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1417, 1426 (1988) (“Langdell’s
reluctance to admit moral argument into legal decisionmaking is . . . plausibly explained as a
symptom of skepticism about the ontology of morals. Failure to reach an agreement concerning

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss3/6

16

2022]

LANGDELL AND CLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW

475

Not only was this a rejection of natural law,102 it was also a rejection of the idea that
fundamental legal principles could be knowable simply through reason. 103 Thus, it
was more akin to positivism and empiricism than to rationalism,104 though, as will be
seen, it did have a rational aspect to it.
This legal positivism was consistent with Langdell’s view of law as akin to a
natural science, rather than to moral philosophy. As Robert Gordon describes it:
Through the generations, advocates of a scientific approach to law agreed
that the science should be a positive science based on discoverable,
observable facts—facts of nature and society, facts of history, and facts of
prior decisions. In part this commitment to facts expressed an attitude—a
‘masculine’ readiness to look brute reality unblinkingly in the face, to throw
off the crutches of religion, moral sentiment, and the stale formulae of
conventional professional wisdom, and to embark upon the strenuous, toughminded, intellectual path.105
In this sense, Langdell’s strain of classical legal theory was different from that of,
say, Joel Bishop, the great U.S. treatise writer of the nineteenth century, whose
“jurisprudence began with his belief in a transcendent Christian God who created the
universe and endowed it with a physical and moral law.”106 Classical writers such as
Langdell “viewed traditional natural law theories that lacked this positive basis as
philosophical speculation rather than legal science.”107 For example, the natural

moral issues seemingly indicated to Langdell that there was nothing about which to agree.
Morals, unlike legal rules, neither could be deduced from more general self-evident principles,
nor inductively derived from the daily transactions among persons. Thus, there could be no
science of morals.”); Kelley, supra note 62, at 1705 (noting that Langdell, in the quoted letter,
“expressed his understanding of a distinct line between the study of law as it is and the study of
law as it ought to be. He concluded that lawyers and law professors ought only to study the law
as it is. Based on the views expressed in this letter, Langdell’s notion of law as a science
probably included Austin’s rigid distinction between law and morality.”); Feldman, supra note
8, at 1426 (“Although Langdell did not often explicitly discuss positivism as a theory,
Langdellians clearly were committed positivists.”).
102 See Grey, supra note 7, at 53 n.99 (“The classical legal scientists unanimously rejected
natural law jurisprudence . . . .”); Feldman, supra note 8, at 1434 (noting that “the Langdellians
repudiated natural law.”).
103 See Hoeflich, supra note 72, at 120 (“Langdell’s major contribution to the notion of law
as science was his emphasis on the empirical dimension by his insistence that the first principles
to which deductive method must be applied could be attained not by reason or logic alone but
through empirical research in the decided cases . . ..”).
104 Rationalism is “[a]ny philosophy magnifying the role played by unaided reason, in the
acquisition and justification of knowledge.” SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
PHILOSOPHY 308 (2d ed. 2005).
105 Robert W. Gordon, The Case for (and Against) Harvard, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1231, 1240
(1995) (reviewing LAPIANA, supra note 3).
106 Siegel, supra note 7, at 233.
107 Grey, supra note 7, at 30.
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lawyers asked when a promise was morally binding; to common-law positivists the
question was when it was legally binding.108
It has been argued, however, that Langdell, in an effort to make contract law
entirely consistent, selected those cases he believed represented good law, and
reconciled cases in a way the judges would not have intended. 109 But this might have
been hard to avoid if one is writing a casebook or (as the separately published
Summary could be considered) a treatise. As even Gilmore recognized (though
disparagingly):
The function of the legal scholar, whether he is writing a treatise or compiling
a casebook, is to winnow out from the chaff those very few cases which have
ever been correctly decided and which, if we follow them, will lead us to
truth. That is to say, the doctrine—the one true rule of law—does not in any
sense emerge from the study of real cases decided in the real world. The
doctrine tests the cases, not the other way around.110
Gilmore argued that Langdell relied primarily on English cases, and often
mischaracterized those cases, to develop his ideal concept of contract law. 111 It has
similarly been argued that while Langdell claimed his work was “scientific,” it did not
follow “the rigorously positivist tradition in which [for example] Holmes was
working.”112 Gilmore derisively argued that Langdell’s Summary explained “which
cases are ‘right’ and which are ‘wrong.’”113 And Langdell’s belief that contract law
could be reduced to just a few principles meant that the system would have to make
sense logically, and thus cases that did not fit the logical structure would have to be
rejected as incorrectly decided. As one critic has written:
Langdell did not include in his base for induction all the decided cases on a
particular topic. The subsequent induction of the true rule or the true meaning
of a legal doctrine was not a scientific induction at all. It just reflected
Langdell’s preconceived notions, which led him to include some cases in the
base and to exclude others. Moreover, Langdell on some questions, such as
the effective date of acceptance by mail, included cases reaching

108 P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 9 (1981).
109 GILMORE, supra note 2, at 47–48; see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to
Frederick Pollock (Apr. 10, 1881), reprinted in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932, at 17
(Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941) (“[H]is explanations and reconciliations of the cases would
have astonished the judges who decided them.”).
110 GILMORE, supra note 2, at 47.
111 Id. at 47–48.
112 Kelley, supra note 62, at 1697. Gilmore has argued that it was Holmes, not Langdell,
who, more than anyone else, gave classical contract law its content. GILMORE, supra note 2, at
48.
113 GILMORE, supra note 2, at 125 n.3.
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diametrically different results. One cannot scientifically derive by induction
a single rule from diametrically opposed cases.114
It appears here that Langdell is damned if he does, and damned if he doesn’t. He
is accused of cherry-picking cases to support his theory of contract law, and then
accused of including inconsistent results despite arguing that law is a science based
on a few fundamental principles.115 This all shows, however, that Langdell’s
argument that “law is a science” cannot be taken too seriously, and that Langdell
himself understood it was not to be taken as something akin to a natural science.
While rejecting some cases as incorrectly decided is inconsistent with a thoroughgoing positivism, it is a necessary byproduct of a program designed to bring order to
an area of law. The architects of classical contract law in a sense stood somewhere
between legal positivism and natural-law theory, in that they divorced what is law
from what is moral, yet they also sought to bring rational order to the confused state
of the common law, the latter goal meaning some caselaw had to be rejected.
Similarly, if one believed that there were in fact just a few general principles of law,
then inconsistent cases would also have to be rejected as incorrectly decided. The point
was to make the law more certain and predictable, and “Langdell’s version of scientific
naturalism enabled legal analysts like Langdell to believe that they could, if they
employed the correct method and perspective, discover ‘right answers’ for the legal
problem at hand.”116 For example, Professor Dennis Patterson argues that under a
“geometric model” of law identified by Professor Thomas Grey:
it is the task of legal theory to identify principles basic to the subject under
scrutiny. But here normativity and rationality converge. Principles are
identified through the use of scientific method; but once identified, those
principles must be internally coherent. Formal derivability—the hallmark of
the geometric method—is not possible if there are contradictions among first
principles.117
As has been recognized, “the legal scientists themselves, if asked what they were
doing, would surely have emphasized their generalizing ambitions to produce what
Holmes called a ‘philosophically arranged’ body of law, a rational scheme or system
of abstract categories for organizing legal knowledge to replace the old forms of
action.”118 Thus, while the project had more positivism and empiricism in it than
rationalism, creating a rational scheme was one of the goals.
And Langdell’s belief that there were in fact just a few general principles of law
necessarily gives it a certain unempirical flavor. For example, it has been argued that
“[a]n article could be written about the contrast between the classical jurists’ rhetoric
of rigorous scientific inquiry and the casualness of their empiricism—their

114 Kelley, supra note 3, at 39.
115 Id.
116 Minda, supra note 92, at 359 (footnotes omitted).
117 Patterson, supra note 90, at 199.
118 Gordon, supra note 105, at 1236 (footnote omitted).
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ruthlessness in squeezing and suppressing data that did not fit . . . .” 119 But the same
commentator recognizes why, in his belief, this was so: “[T]heir justification was
surely that the generalizing feature of their project was far more important and urgent
business than the empirical or factual side.”120 Simply put, generalizing and
empiricism are, at a certain point, in tension.121
The more serious charge is that Langdell cherry-picked cases to support the
identification of axioms he wanted. Obviously, if this was the case, there is nothing
scientific about his approach.122 For example, it has been asserted that “[i]n Langdell’s
system, cases are carefully selected to serve as the building blocks of concepts that
will thereafter operate as axioms . . . .”123 It has been further argued that “[c]orrect
legal principles are discovered not in the plethora of decided cases, but in the realm of
(ideal) theory. Cases are illustrative, not instructive. Cases stand in need of
explanation. Doctrine—explanatory principles—is the (hidden) true legal
order.”124 We will return to this idea later.
C.

Taxonomy (Classification)

For Langdell, law as a science did not stop at simply reading cases and identifying
the evolution of legal principles over the past several hundred years. Langdell’s
reference to law’s “essential doctrines” hints at his belief that law as a science also
involves taxonomy (the classification of things according to their presumed natural
relationships). In fact, he made this explicit when he wrote that these essential
doctrines should be “classified and arranged that each should be found in its proper
119 Id. at 1238 n.16; see also Patterson, supra note 90, at 198 (“If the cases were to be properly
explained, the principles of law identified by Langdell would, of necessity, have to account for
all of the ‘data.’ It is at this point that the identification of ‘science’ with ‘scientific method’
founders.”).
120 Gordon, supra note 105, at 1238 n.16; see also Patterson, supra note 90, at 198 (“If the
cases were to be properly explained, the principles of law identified by Langdell would, of
necessity, have to account for all of the ‘data.’ It is at this point that the identification of ‘science’
with ‘scientific method’ founders.”).
121 This led John Chipman Gray to write privately in 1883 that “[i]n law the opinions of
judges and lawyers as to what the law is, are the law, and it is in any true sense of the word as
unscientific to turn from them, as Mr. Langdell does . . . as for a scientific man to decline to
take cognizance of oxygen or gravitation . . . . [A] school where the majority of the professors
shuns and despises the contact with actual facts, has got the seeds of ruin in it and will and ought
to go to the devil.” Letter from John Chipman Gray to Charles William Elliot, President,
Harvard Univ. (Jan. 8, 1883) (on file with Harvard Archives), quoted in MARK DEWOLFE HOWE,
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS 158 (1963).
122 See Patterson, supra note 90, at 200 (“It turns out . . . that there is very little that is
‘empirical’ in Langdell’s approach to law . . . . In science, validity (e.g., of a hypothesis) is a
function of confirmation (by the data). A confirmed hypothesis is one that has survived the
experimental tribunal. But for Langdell, validity was a function of verisimilitude—the
correspondence of case with principle. As principle (doctrine) enjoyed pre-testing validity, it
was the case that was always under scrutiny.”).
123 Gordon, supra note 105, at 1237.
124 Patterson, supra note 90, at 201.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss3/6

20

2022]

LANGDELL AND CLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW

479

place, and nowhere else.”125 The rationale behind scientific taxonomy “is that the
human mind craves order, and taxonomy (describing species, naming species,
classifying them within a system of sets and subsets) is what gives comprehensible
order to the dizzying multiplicity of living creatures.”126 And, remember once again,
that classical legal theory sought to bring order to the common law in the wake of the
abandoning of the old forms of action, and the dizzying multiplicity of legal details. It
was as if the legal scientists had decided that the old classifications were all wrong
and new ones—better ones, more accurate and logical ones—were now needed. 127 It
has thus been stated that “Langdell . . . was an amateur botanist, who classified law
much as he did plants.”128
D.

Axioms (Conceptualization)

This taxonomy, however, was not simply designed to classify; the classifications
would result in principles that could be used by judges to properly decide exactly what
they were observing when a new set of facts came before them (for example, “Oh,
you’re an unenforceable promise” or “Oh, you’re an enforceable promise”). To
Langdell, the proper study of the law, like the study of nature, “consisted in the careful
observation and recording of many specific instances, and then from these instances
derivation of general conclusions that the qualities of the phenomena or specimens
would hold constant for other instances of the same classes.” 129 While Langdell’s
Summary is not presented in a pyramid of concepts like the work of say, the German
legal theorists,130 and “there is no sense of a strictly descending order of
generality,”131 Langdell did argue that there were a limited number of principles, and,
as will be seen later, there was a pyramid of sorts lurking in the Summary.
Williston, for example, wrote that “Langdell was not much interested in the
historical development of the law except as it led to the discovery of legal
principles.”132 Thus, Langdell’s most significant contribution for jurisprudence was,
perhaps, his attempt to reduce the law of contracts to these top-level principles, i.e., a
few guiding principles, such as abstracting contract formation into offer, acceptance,

125 LANGDELL, supra note 43, at vii (noting that “[i]f these [fundamental legal] doctrines
could be so classified and arranged that each could be found in its proper place, and nowhere
else, they would cease to be formidable in their number.”).
126 DAVID QUAMMEN, THE RELUCTANT MR. DARWIN: AN INTIMATE PORTRAIT OF CHARLES
DARWIN AND THE MAKING OF HIS THEORY OF EVOLUTION 97 (2006).
127 See Boyer, supra note 13, at 19 (“Another facet of formalism was its belief in fine lines
and neat categories, distinctions which were purportedly cognizable on logical grounds.”).
128 KALMAN, supra note 78, at 11. To the extent Langdell was an “amateur botanist,” the
only apparent evidence of his practicing botany was as a college student in his Natural History
class. See Kimball, supra note 24, at 210–15 (discussing the botanical influence on Langdell).
129 SUTHERLAND, supra note 30, at 176.
130 Reimann, supra note 7, at 107.
131 Id. at 262 n.150.
132 WILLISTON, supra note 72, at 199.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2022

21

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

480

[70:459

and consideration.133 And importantly, recall that he believed that “the number of
fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is commonly supposed.”134 As Grant
Gilmore noted, “it is with Langdell that, for the first time, we see Contract as . . . an
‘abstraction’ . . . .”135 The theory aspired to have a legal system based on a “few basic
top-level categories and principles [that] formed a conceptually ordered system above
a large number of bottom-level rules.”136 The scientific nature of law meant that a few
fundamental rules and principles could be identified.137 Gary Minda has written:
[Langdell’s idea of law as a science] expresses one of the great unfulfilled
promises of legal modernism: the belief that the deep structure of law is
knowable, that fundamental principles can be discovered from an
examination of complex phenomena, and that the secrets of the law are
intellectually and rationally discoverable through the application of the
correct scientific-like methodology. These ideas are characteristic of the
scientific naturalism associated with Darwinian thought of the early
nineteenth century.138
Langdell’s scientific approach to law thus involved both induction and deduction
or, stated more colloquially, it went both up and down. It started at the bottom, with
the search for bottom-level rules. These bottom-level rules would be discovered from
an analysis of the reported cases (the specimens that had been collected in the
laboratory, so to speak).139 Once these bottom-level rules had been identified, it was
then time to derive top-level principles (axioms, fundamental principles of law) from
the collection of bottom-level rules.140 If it had been done today, one can imagine a
mass of sticky notes all over a large table, each one having a rule extracted from a
case. The sticky notes are then put into separate sections, such as “mutual assent” or
“consideration.” Taxonomy would continue, as the bottom-level rules put in each
category would then be organized into just a few top-level principles.

133 KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 93–94.
134 LANGDELL, supra note 43, at vi.
135 GILMORE, supra note 15, at 14.
136 Grey, supra note 7, at 11.
137 KALMAN, supra note 78, at 11.
138 Minda, supra note 92, at 359 (footnotes omitted).
139 Grey, supra note 7, at 20. Grey has argued that simple observation and recording of the
results was not, however, the way it worked. He argues that these bottom-level rules would be
stated in a way that led to uncontroversial results when applied to facts—objective tests that
avoided determining the parties’ subjective intentions and bright-line rules rather than
standards. Id. at 11. In other words, an agenda might have been at work, which, if true, would
distinguish Langdell’s approach from typical scientific inquiry.
140 Id. at 19; see also KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 111 (discussing the inductive nature of
Langdell’s mode of legal reasoning).
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These top-level principles could be viewed as axioms, in the sense of “an
established rule or principle” rather than a “self-evident truth.” 141 If they were
derived through induction they could not be self-evident, though critics have
argued they were more like the latter than the former in that the “correct” specimens
were identified normatively. 142 Langdell definitely had a few “top-level principle”
sticky notes that did not seem to have any sticky notes underneath them except for
ones labeled “Hugo Grotius” or “Robert Joseph Pothier,” who were neither English
nor cases, but instead civil-law jurists (but more on this later).143 If the approach was
in fact scientific and positivist, and not normative, the resulting axioms were not based
on considerations of social policy by Langdell. For example, Douglas Baird has
argued that social policy had no place in Langdell’s theory of contracts:
Langdell had a faith that the common law had an inner logic, one that rested
upon principles, as did the physical universe. These principles were like
Newton’s laws, and they had an independent existence that could be
discovered through careful study. Whether such things as the doctrine of
consideration was good or bad was not a meaningful question. It was like
asking whether gravity was good or bad.144
Holmes believed Langdell’s approach was unscientific because the attempt to reduce
a body of law to the consequences of a few fundamental principles was inconsistent
with way the legal system really worked:
As a branch of anthropology, law is an object of science; the theory of
legislation is a scientific study; but the effort to reduce the concrete details of
an existing system to the merely logical consequences of simple postulates is

141 MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 87 (11th ed. 2003).
142 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT
LAW: NEW ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 206, 208 (arguing that classical contract law’s axioms were
of the “self-evident” kind, and “[a]mong the axioms of this school were that only bargain
promises have consideration, that bargains are formed by offer and acceptance, that the measure
of damages for breach of contract is expectation damages, and that contracts must be interpreted
objectively.”); id. at 210 (arguing that classical contract law “conceived of contract law as a set
of fundamental legal principles that were justified on the ground that they were self-evident . .
. .”); Eric A. Posner, The Decline of Formality in Contract Law, in THE FALL AND RISE OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 61, 64–65 (F. H. Buckley ed., 1999) (“Holmes’s commitment to an
axiomatic system of contract law comes perilously close to Langdell’s ‘geometric’ approach to
contract law, but should not be confused with it. A formal theory like Holmes’s must be
internally consistent, or else it will produce indeterminate results. However, Holmes does not
purport to derive his theory from self-evident premises. Instead, he tried to present it as a
unification of existing cases, which themselves emerged from a long history of common law
development in response to social needs.”).
143 LAURA R. FORD, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF NATIONS: SOCIOLOGICAL
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON A MODERN LEGAL INSTITUTION 346 (2021).

AND

144 Douglas G. Baird, Reconstructing Contracts: Hamer v. Sidway, in CONTRACTS STORIES
160, 165 (Douglas G. Baird ed., 2007); see also Reimann, supra note 7, at 107 (“[T]he abstract
nature of legal concepts also makes them more or less independent of policy or convenience for
. . . Langdell . . . .”).
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always in danger of becoming unscientific, and of leading to a
misapprehension of the nature of the problem and the data. 145
Just as the critics of formalism viewed the empiricists as not empirical enough,146
Holmes viewed Langdell’s resulting axioms and the conclusions they dictated as not
empirical enough.
It has similarly been argued that trying to distill just a few governing principles
leaves no room for exceptions to those doctrines:
Langdell included in the domain of cases for his scientific analysis only those
illustrating or developing a particular legal doctrine; he excluded cases that
recognize that the doctrine is defeasible when an overriding normative
principle applicable to the facts suggests that the ordinary application of the
legal concept would be unjust. Langdell thus set up a non-normative
conceptual system of law radically at odds with the underlying phenomena.
This points to the most fundamental problem with Langdell’s methodology.
It was inconsistent with the way common law judges decided cases, then and
now.147
A reduction of exceptions based on perceived overriding normative principles was,
however, perhaps the point. Recall that Langdell, likely as a result of his Tammany
Hall experience, was seeking to make the law more predictable, and exceptions (and
the discretion to create exceptions) makes the law less predictable.
Note here that if Langdell was truly extracting top-level principles from the cases,
then he can be attacked as a legal positivist who is unconcerned with social policy and
the morality of the rules. And if he is selecting cases to fit into a logical structure
designed to bring order to the common law, he can be attacked as ignoring social
policy and the morality of the rules in favor of rational order. And if he is selecting
cases to fit a vision of the law he prefers, he can be attacked as adopting a version of
law that is immoral.
Langdell’s legal positivism did not, however, necessarily mean that policies did
not underlie the axioms he discovered through scientific inquiry. The approach would
result in axioms that were themselves based on the policies embedded in the court

145 [Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.], Book Review, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880) (unsigned
review of C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1879)).
146 MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLUTION AGAINST FORMALISM
24 (Beacon Press 1957) (1949).
147 Kelley, supra note 3, at 39.
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decisions generating the axioms,148 but at the same time the approach sought to
provide courts with a nonpolitical way of resolving future disputes. 149
Later criticism was that the classical theorists sought top-level principles based on
the economic policy of laissez-faire.150 But this misunderstands the classicists’
commitment to law as a science. The classicists viewed their work as scientific, in that
they would review the raw material—the cases—and extract legal principles through
reason.151 In fact, “[m]ost . . . were perfectly happy to see the regulatory-protective
sphere expand, so long as its actions were properly classified on the public side of the
public-private ledger.”152 Laissez-faire was more a world-view of the courts during
the era of classical contract law than an academic world-view.153

148 Movsesian, supra note 20, at 233 (“[A] jurisprudence that adheres closely to case law is
unlikely to ignore social propositions. The judges who wrote the opinions . . . were members of
American society, and one can safely assume that over the course of years on the bench they
developed a working knowledge of American commercial practice. Even discounting for
occasional bias and incompetence, one cannot assume that these judges routinely rendered
decisions at odds with that practice. A jurisprudence that builds on case law is thus at least as
likely to reflect actual social propositions as one that looks to metaphysical systems for its
justification. As Williston writes, sticking to decided decisions can protect against an academic
tendency ‘to get too far from the earth.’”) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Samuel Williston, The
Necessity of Idealism in Teaching Law, 2 AM. L. SCH. REV. 201, 203 (1908)).
149 See Gordon, supra note 105, at 1250 (“The most ambitious claim for legal science, of
course, was that even though these issues might be socially important—perhaps even the subject
of epic social struggles—common law principles, the ordinary tools of lawyers and judges,
offered techniques for resolving such issues in the courts that did not require taking positions
on any of the political, economic, and moral questions implicated in them. In view of the issues’
importance, legislators and social scientists—who unlike lawyers and legal scientists may
properly take economic, political, and moral factors into account—may wish to regulate these
activities, but that is entirely their business. The legal scientist must ignore all those
considerations. He just calls the law the way it is.”).
150 See GILMORE, supra note 2, at 13 (noting that some link “nineteenth-century legal
formalism with nineteenth-century laissez-faire economics.”); id. at 66 (“In recent years it has
become a truism to point out that laissez-faire economics and late nineteenth-century legal
theories are blood brothers.”); Movsesian, supra note 20, at 226 (quoting Richard A.
Epstein, Contracts Small and Contract Large: Contract Law Through the Lens of LaissezFaire, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, supra note 142, at 25–26) (“According
to the conventional wisdom, Williston shares the classical belief that freedom of contract is a
conceptual imperative, a principle that follows necessarily from an understanding of contracts’
true nature. This essentialism supposedly leads Williston to reject all limits on party autonomy,
even limits based on health and safety grounds—to endorse, along with other classicists,
the Lochner Court’s holding that the Constitution prohibits legislation that interferes with
parties' right to contract on terms they see fit.”); id. at 253 (noting that “liberal critics posit an
‘intimate connection between the formal doctrines’ of classical contract law—the consideration
requirement, the objective theory of interpretation, and so on—and ‘the political philosophy of
laissez-faire.’”).
151 Grey, supra note 7, at 30.
152 Gordon, supra note 105, at 1249.
153 NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 25 (1995).
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But the Langdellian law-as-a-science approach had obvious appeal to business
interests.154 First, the system was built for predictability, and businesses, rising in
power during the Gilded Age, benefitted from legal predictability. 155 Second, classical
theorists’ resulting theory of law, which involved limited liability, was consistent with
nineteenth-century individualism and laissez-faire economic theory.156 Recall Grant
Gilmore’s argument that Langdell’s theory of law was consistent with the felt
necessities of the time.157 Their legal theories thus came to be viewed as a form of
conservative ideology, and Langdellian legal science was even confused with the
laissez-faire constitutional doctrines of the Lochner era.158
Another criticism of Langdell’s approach is that identifying a few top-level
principles to which all bottom-level rules must be derived would make the law static.
Grant Gilmore, for example, argued that “[t]he jurisprudential premise of Langdell
and his followers was that there is such a thing as the one true rule of law which, being
discovered, will endure, without change, forever.”159 A view of the law based on a
“few relatively fixed and fundamental principles, was not readily adapted to a period
of rapid social change.”160 Judges were to apply common-law doctrines “without
allowing for any exceptions based upon new social propositions or the harshness of
particular results . . . .”161

154 See Schlegel, supra note 80, at 153–54 (“I do not mean to suggest that Langdell was a
conscious conspirator with the Gilded Age elites, a running dog of capitalism, as it were. He
was an essentially stupid man who felt quite honestly that he was working to elevate the
profession by educating counselors, where others merely strove to educate lawyers. But his
creation fit well with the existing ideology of the bar that maintained that it exercised neutrally
placed, professional judgment capable of mediating between capital and labor, industry and
agriculture, this at a time when there was need for such professional judgment on the part of the
capitalist industrial elites. Thus, Langdell was no heretic. Heretics do not have buildings named
for them at Harvard; heretics usually burn at the stake.”).
155 Grey, supra note 7, at 32.
156 GILMORE, supra note 15, at 95; see also KALMAN, supra note 78, at 13 (“[T]he
conceptualism behind the case method bolstered the laissez-fair economics of the age.”).
157 GILMORE, supra note 2, at 42.
158 Grey, supra note 7, at 39; see also Siegel, supra note 7, at 254 (“Beginning in the 1970s,
scholars expanded classicism’s scope by arguing that late-nineteenth-century laissez-faire
constitutionalism was the public law expression of the same jurisprudential persuasion. These
claims proved problematic because, as was subsequently observed, the private law scholars
most identified with classical thought generally advocated deferential review of legislation and
opposed the activism required to void economic and social regulatory enactments.”).
159 GILMORE, supra note 2, at 43.
160 Grey, supra note 7, at 39.
161 Movsesian, supra note 20, at 224–25.
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It has been argued, therefore, that Langdell’s enduring image is as an “amoral
natural lawyer,”162 in the sense he believed there existed “a rationally connected
scheme of preexisting and unchanging, true, rules of law that are discoverable by
judges.”163 Thanks to Holmes:
it became commonplace to call Langdell a “legal theologian” who believed
that legal principles were eternally inscribed in some “heaven of
concepts.” This conclusion, in effect, turns Langdell into some sort of
“amoral” natural lawyer . . . . [S]uch a theory apparently would picture law
as having an existence independent and prior to legal practice, but its content
would not even be based on morality but instead on something else—often
referred to by the critics of formalism as mere or pure logic. 164
It has thus been argued that Langdell’s approach was remarkably similar to the
approach of Robert Joseph Pothier (a French jurist),165 who worked in the natural-law
tradition.166 By seeking to organize the law according to rational principles, the
approach of classical legal scholars in effect continued the natural-law tradition.167
The notion that Langdell was in fact an amoral natural lawyer is based on several
things. First, Langdell’s comparison of law to natural science suggested that there were
“true” rules of law, a priori legal truths, much like there were true rules of physics,
from which subsidiary truths could then be deduced. Remember what he said in his
1886 speech to alumni:
We have also constantly inculcated the idea that the library is the proper
workshop of professors and students alike; that it is to us all what the
laboratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists, the museum
of natural history to the zoologists, the botanical garden to the botanists. 168

162 Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054, 2080 & 2081
n.112 (1995).
163 Speziale, supra note 46, at 1 n.1 (emphasis added).
164 Sebok, supra note 162, at 2080–81 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 2081–82 (“The
equation of formalism with natural law . . . had its origins in Holmes’s early antiformalist
critique of Langdell . . . . By emphasizing the role of deduction in formalism, Holmes linked
Langdell to the idea that there were a priori legal truths, and so connected Langdell–and
formalism–to natural law.”).
165 Clark A. Remington, Llewellyn, Antiformalism and the Fear of Transcendental
Nonsense: Codifying the Variability Rule in the Law of Sales, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 29, 51–52
(1998).
166 Joseph M. Perillo, Robert J. Pothier’s Influence on the Common Law of Contract, 11
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 267, 288 (2005).
167 See A.W.B. Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 91 LAW Q. REV.
247, 257 (1975) (noting that, with respect to English scholars in the nineteenth century, “they
curiously continue to present the law as consisting of rational principles which are merely
illustrated by the cases; to this extent they maintained the natural law tradition.”).
168 Langdell, supra note 89, at 50–51.
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Langdell’s approach has thus been likened to that of Joel Bishop and antebellum
science:
[A]ntebellum science was based on the idea of natural theology–that the truth
of the Bible, in the form of scriptural principles, was to be found in nature
and that the study of nature would demonstrate the truth of these
principles. The formal structure of Langdell’s science is much the same; the
truth of doctrine, in the form of principles, was to be found in cases and the
study of cases would demonstrate the truth of legal principles–that were then
used to trim the cases themselves.169
And if there were “true” rules of law, this in turn suggested that those rules were
not subject to change, any more than the rules of physics are subject to change.170
Grant Gilmore, for example, argued that Langdell’s proposition that law was a science
meant that:
legal truth is a species of scientific truth. The quality of scientific truth, as
most nineteenth-century minds understood it, is that once such a truth has
been demonstrated, it endures. It is not subject to change without notice. It
does not capriciously turn into its own opposite. It is, like the mountain, there.
The jurisprudential premise of Langdell and his followers was that there is
such a thing as the one true rule of law which, being discovered, will endure,
without change, forever. This strange idea colored, explicitly or implicitly,
all the vast literature which the Langdellians produced.171
It has similarly been argued that Langdell’s scientific approach to law was incoherent
because although based on the historical development of the law, it would then “freeze
the law at that stage in its development.”172
Louis Menand has argued that Langdell’s view of law as a science was in fact preDarwinian: “He thought that behind the variety of actual judicial opinions there was
an ideal order, just as Agassiz had taught that there was an ideal order behind the
variety of actual living organisms.”173 Edward Rubin concurs:
Agassiz was an empiricist; he believed that nature’s secrets were unlocked
by scrupulous examination of physical evidence. . . . But Agassiz could not
accept the idea that the empirical evidence he valued so highly would reveal
a stochastic, malleable world of the sort that Darwin has depicted, and indeed,
he remained a vociferous opponent of Darwin’s theory until his death in
1873. Instead, he insisted that the biological world was composed of fixed,

169 Schlegel, supra note 80, at 152 (footnote omitted).
170 See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 13 (1973)
(“There is perhaps even a hint that the common law may be nearing the end of the process of
historical growth, culminating in a final, logically complete system. However, this is not a
necessary implication of Langdell’s statement.”).
171 GILMORE, supra note 2, at 43.
172 Kelley, supra note 3, at 39.
173 LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA 341 (2001).
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unchanging forms that had been specially created, and he believed that
empirical examination of particular plants and animals would reveal the
essential features of those forms. Langdell’s conception of science reiterated
this ancient and outmoded concept. By examining cases, he believed, the
student would come to perceive the enduring principles of Anglo-American
law that lay behind them.174
There is insufficient evidence, however, to conclude that Langdell believed in a
priori, enduring legal truths, and that he was some sort of “amoral natural lawyer.”
Langdell’s emphasis on the development of legal doctrine shows that this charge goes
too far. As noted, Langdell wrote that “[l]aw, considered as a science, consists of
certain principles or doctrines,” and “[e]ach of these doctrines has arrived at its present
state by slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases through
centuries.”175
Langdell, in his annual report for 1876–77, in defending his approach to teaching
law as a science, acknowledged that arguments had been made that it could not be
taught as a science, and he acknowledged that that position “may be supported by
plausible arguments.”176 He conceded that “[l]aw has not the demonstrative certainty
of mathematics . . . nor does it acknowledge truth as its ultimate test and standard, like
natural science . . . .”177 He also opposed a bar examination, and in doing so, while
arguing that it was indispensable for an effective system of legal education to have “a
scientific course of study,”178 downplayed the identity between law and science to
argue against having to pass a “scientific” examination for bar admission.179 Langdell
was also apparently willing to reconsider the conclusions he had drawn from case
analysis, something that would be inconsistent with an “amoral natural lawyer.”180

174 Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60
VAND. L. REV. 609, 633–34 (2007) (emphasis added). Recall that Langdell was taught zoology
by Agassiz, KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 25, though he was taught botany by Asa Gray, id. at 24,
who welcomed Darwinism (which came after Langdell graduated, however). Kimball, supra
note 24, at 213.
175 LANGDELL, supra note 43, at vi; see also Grey, supra note 7, at 28–29 (noting that the
classical theorists “accepted the nineteenth-century evolutionary idea that law, even in its
fundamentals, was not unchanging but progressively evolving . . .”).
176 HARVARD UNIV., ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENTS AND TREASURER
COLLEGE, 1876-77, at 96–97, reprinted in LAPIANA, supra note 3, at 56–57.

OF

HARVARD

177 Id.; see also William Keener, The Inductive Method in Legal Education, 28 AM. L. REV.
709, 721 (1894) (acknowledging that Langdell’s case method is an applied science, not an exact
science).
178 HARVARD UNIVERSITY, supra note 176, at 95.
179 Chase, supra note 75, at 359.
180 See WARREN, supra note 39, at 457 (“Professor Langdell was always willing to reconsider
a conclusion in the light of new suggestions . . . . A student recently informed me of a course in
which Professor Langdell changed his opinion in regard to a case three times in the course of
one week, each time advancing with positiveness a new doctrine. That he could do this without
losing the respect or confidence of his students shows the esteem in which he was held . . . . To
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This suggests that Langdell saw perceived axioms as questionable, open to debate as
to whether they were supported by the cases.181 The axioms could not be tested against
some external standard and thus conclusively proven to be true or false. 182 When
Holmes criticized an attempt “to deduce the corpus from a priori postulates,” he was
aiming at the German Pandectist legal scientists and their neo-Kantianism, not
Langdell.183 A dedication to the case method is simply inconsistent with a belief in
self-evident principles of law.184 As Anthony Sebok has written:
Langdell was acutely aware of the fact that legal principle, unsupported by
the actual law found in the judgments of courts, was unlikely to be a correct
statement of the law. That some might think otherwise is a bit of a
mystery. Langdell treated the decisions of courts as results from a
“laboratory” from which all reliable conclusions about the principles of law
were drawn.185
Mathias Reimann notes that a key difference between Langdell and the German legal
scientists was that whereas the latter found principles from “speculation about human

lose confidence in him for changing his position upon a legal proposition would be as absurd as
to lose confidence in Charles Darwin if he withdrew a tentative conclusion found to be false
after more extended investigation. Professor Langdell studied the law as contained in the reports
in the same spirit in which the great scientists study the phenomena of nature.”). But see
Schlegel, supra note 80, at 152 (“That Langdell changed his mind in class does not make him
less of the formalist that Gilmore objected to.”).
181 See Speziale, supra note 46, at 20 (“For legal theory, the implication seems to have been
that law is not a superstructure of rules from which to deduce the proper results of particular
cases, but rather that law consists of sets of cases out of which multiple theories constantly
spring forth.”); Chase, supra note 75, at 359 (“Christopher Langdell would appear to be (on the
basis of the statement above) an anti-Langdellian, crypto-Legal Realist. The one idea to which
Gilmore leads us to believe Langdell will cling tenaciously, the Harvard Dean hurls to the
winds.”).
182 See LAPIANA, supra note 3, at 57 (“Langdell did not see legal science consisting of
propositions that can be easily tested like the grammatical rules of the classical languages.
Finally, and most important, it was impossible to test legal propositions against some external
standard of truth, a role that nature performs for the natural sciences.”).
183 Grey, supra note 3, at 818; see also WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL
LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937, at 92 (1998) (“American legal
science differed radically from continental, for the ‘data’ of common law legal science were to
be found in the reports of cases, whereas judicial decisions were of little significance to the
pandectist.”).
184 See Hoeflich, supra note 72, at 121 (“The need for first principles was always a part of
the deductive model of law, but the means of deriving these first principles was also always
variable. Leibniz, Wolff, Thibaut, and the Pandectists looked to natural law and natural law in
its best mundane manifestation, Roman law, for these principles. Savigny looked to the history
and society of each nation, as did Legaré. Langdell looked to cases.”).
185 Sebok, supra note 162, at 2080; see also TWINING, supra note 170, at 12 (noting that
Langdell’s “law as science” approach has as one of its roots nineteenth-century positivist
thought).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss3/6

30

2022]

LANGDELL AND CLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW

489

nature, the rules of reason, or a priori notions about the universe,” and were rooted in
Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, Langdell “finds them in the traditional common-law
manner, namely through induction in the actual cases (though he selects his cases),
and that cases are what gives them birth.”186 Thus, despite what some have argued,187
Langdell’s approach did not maintain there were a priori, self-evident legal principles.
But this does not mean that Langdell’s theory of contract law lacked any
resemblance to natural law. For example, it has been argued that under Langdell’s
approach “[e]xisting rules were elevated into the category of self-evident verities.”188
In other words, although derived from cases, the resulting axioms were then given a
status equivalent to “self-evident verities.”
This criticism has some validity. Langdell’s approach—wittingly or unwittingly—
seems to discourage innovation and exceptions. As has been argued, if “[e]xisting
rules were elevated into the category of self-evident verities . . . this meant that the
law turned a blind eye to social and economic concerns—thereby setting itself,
deliberately or unwittingly, against social change.”189 Langdellian legal science was
marked with “the intense respect for stare decisis,”190 and he had written that each of
law’s principles and doctrines had “arrived at its present state by slow degrees.”191
One commentator has observed:
For the Harvard professors, binding precedents functioned as an analog to the
facts of physical science: they were observable phenomena, which theory,
principle, and laws were developed to explain and systematize. The Harvard
school’s reliance on stare decisis for the ultimate grounding of the legal
system had a cost. It turned jurisprudence from a study of what ought to be
into a study of what is (or what used to be). It turned legal science into an
inquiry in which fidelity to precedent and legal principle outweighed concern
for achieving the socially defined just result in any given case. In short order,
law became a study that its detractors easily lampooned for fashioning a
“heaven of jurisprudential concepts,” which any contact with earthly air
would destroy.192
Positivism and predictability had their costs.
And even if a top-level principle was derived inductively from the cases (legal
positivism), once that top-level principle was identified and distilled into a general
statement (as was necessary for it to be a top-level principle), that principle could
reveal that certain bottom-level rules were incorrect, as not flowing from the top-level
principle. The desire for order trumped legal positivism, since the law was currently

186 Reimann, supra note 7, at 108.
187 See supra note 142.
188 Boyer, supra note 13, at 20 (emphasis added).
189 Id.
190 DUXBURY, supra note 153, at 15.
191 LANGDELL, supra note 43, at vi.
192 Siegel, supra note 7, at 256.
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in a state of disorder and the project’s goal was to bring order to it. This required giving
meaning to the top-level principle, and it could not simply be given meaning
inductively from existing cases, as the conclusions in them were often not wellreasoned and would twist the meaning of the top-level principle beyond what it could
bear.
As will be seen, this happened with the meaning of promise. Langdell’s desire for
an orderly, logical structure to contract law would require giving meaning to promise,
and if the caselaw was inconsistent with that meaning, the cases should be considered
incorrectly decided. After all, courts were not using the word promise to simply
designate something that was consideration; they were identifying consideration as
including a promise, the latter being a concept that was taken from outside of the law
and which pre-dated contract law. This did not mean, however, Langdell believed
there were a priori legal truths; it meant that if courts used the concept of promise,
then the concept had to be given meaning, and that meaning was often found outside
of, and prior to, the law, something not all courts remembered. And this led to the
common law lacking order, which in turn meant that in certain situations positivism
and conceptualism would be in tension.
E.

Back Down (Formalism)

Having reached the top, it was now time to go back down. Additional bottom-level
rules would now be determined deductively from the top-level principles, and these
bottom-level rules could then be used to decide future cases. 193 And what about any
existing specimens that included strange bottom-level rules, ones that did not fit
logically under any of the inductively derived axioms? What was to be done with these
illogical leftovers on the table? As noted, Langdell believed that cases inconsistent
with a top-level principle should be disregarded as incorrectly decided, essentially an
aberration who would not survive in the wild and who should be written off. 194
Again, recall that classical legal theory sought to bring order to the common law,
an order desired in the wake of the end of the old forms of action and the proliferation
of reported cases. It was impossible to create a comprehensive, orderly system of
contract law if every decision had to be accounted for. Failing to do this would leave
the common law in no better state than its current state, except for perhaps having a
better index. “By analogizing the law library to the chemistry lab, Langdell treated
judicial decisions as experiments,”195 and if they were experiments, some of them
might have gone wrong or be mutations that would disappear. “They were experiments
that had failed to apply correct logic; good law was good metaphysics.” 196
Langdell’s approach was thus empirical in its approach to discovering fundamental
principles, and then rational in its approach to deducing rules of law from those
principles.197 It was thus both descriptive and normative, normative in the sense that
193 Grey, supra note 7, at 19.
194 See id. at 21.
195 Carrington, supra note 71, at 708.
196 Id. at 709.
197 Hoeflich, supra note 72, at 119–20. This approach was followed by Williston. Movsesian,
supra note 20, at 233–34.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss3/6

32

2022]

LANGDELL AND CLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW

491

Langdell was arguing that what ought to be done was reject the precedential value of
cases whose reasoning was inconsistent with a top-level principle. The normative
aspect did not derive from any ethical theory such as Kantianism or utilitarianism, but
from a desire for order. But as Mathias Reimann observes, this approach makes
Langdell’s “notion of science highly problematical.”198 He explains:
On the one hand, the organic seemed to believe that law is a science like the
natural sciences, i.e., essentially an empirical, inductive method with the goal
of finding and classifying the true rules of the game. On the other hand, the
formalist was ready to engage in a good deal of logical speculation in
deductive form, reasoning from abstract principles, and thus regressing from
nineteenth-century positivism to eighteenth-century continental idealism . . .
Langdell needed a rather ill-defined concept of science to unite these
divergent ideas under its name, and it is never really clear whether his rules
are descriptive of what actually happens or prescriptive of what should
happen or both.199
Thus, as Reimann concludes, “we find Langdell’s approach at the borderline between
two conflicting views of law, a hybrid with parents from different ages.” 200
It appears that Langdell was seeking, in a sense, to take the benefits of legal science
and its idea of a rationally-ordered complete system of law, and adapt it to the
common-law system.201 As Michael Hoeflich notes: “Langdell’s major contribution
to the notion of law as science was his emphasis on the empirical dimension by his
insistence that the first principles to which deductive method must be applied could
be attained not by reason or logic alone but through empirical research in the decided
cases.”202 Whereas the Pandectists had looked to natural law and Roman law for first
principles, and Friedrich Carl von Savigny (a German jurist) and Hugh Swinton
Legaré (a leading American scholar of Roman law) had looked to a nation’s history
and society, Langdell looked to cases.203 Two commentators have noted:
[The Langdellians] were able to transplant legal ideas of systematic legal
science from a civil-law mould into a common-law mould. Thus, at the end
of the nineteenth century, a bright young generation of technocrats in the
United States who were well-connected and well-educated were able to pass
off the systematization (that is, the logical ordering together) of all laws—a
characteristic of the civil-law tradition—as a scientific ordering together of

198 Reimann, supra note 7, at 263 n.164.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 109.
201 See, e.g., Granado & Mirow, supra note 72, at 301 (“[L]angdell ripped apart civillaw legal science and continental attempts to rationalize whole systems of law by codification
and refashioned a common-law legal science based on the case method.”).
202 Hoeflich, supra note 72, at 120.
203 Id.
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case law, embodied in currently reported opinions of North American
courts.204
But how were the axioms to be changed over time if law was, as Langdell believed,
organic? Once the top-level principles had been identified and they took over, the
scientific deductive approach seemingly left no room for direct appeal to
“acceptability” (i.e., justice and policy, or in the language of the nineteenth century,
fairness and convenience, respectively) in formulating bottom-level rules.205 The
deductive approach from top-level principles did not seem to leave much (if any) room
for moral and policy considerations when identifying new bottom-level doctrinal
propositions.206 If the top-level principles treated the parties as an abstraction, say as
party A and party B, rather than as, say, “big business” and “consumer,” there was
little room for the bottom-level principles to take account of the parties’ unequal
bargaining power. A ragbag of details was better fitted for direct appeals to
acceptability than an orderly structure.
The criticism can perhaps be overstated, as throughout his work Langdell appealed
to policy considerations,207 but Langdell’s few discussions of policy do appear like
“casual make-weights and after-the-fact justifications that lend support but rarely, if
ever, explicitly determine the existence, shape, or scope of a legal principle, let alone
a bottom-level rule or case decision.”208 Further:
[c]onsiderations of justice and convenience were relevant . . . only insofar as
they were embodied in principles—abstract yet precise norms that were
consistent with the other fundamental principles of the system. To let
considerations of acceptability directly justify a bottom-level rule or
individual decision would violate the requirement of conceptual order, on
which the universal formality and completeness of the system depended. In

204 Granado & Mirow, supra note 72, at 299; see also Dan Priel, Conceptions of Authority
and the Anglo-American Common Law Divide, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 609, 654–55 (2017) (“The
problem was that German legal science at the time was dominated by the natural reason model,
which was alien to common lawyers’ thinking and to the dominant role they gave to cases.
Instead of the rationalistic inquiry, more geometrico demonstrata, that was the staple of
the German legal science, the common law version of legal science favored an inductive study
that started with the cases and tried to identify underlying doctrines and principles implicit in
them. This is the version of legal science championed by Langdell at Harvard at the time . . . .
The scientific analogy was less deductive geometry, more inductive botanical classification.”)
(footnotes omitted).
205 Grey, supra note 7, at 40–41; see also KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 111 (describing Grey’s
concept of “acceptability”).
206 See Eisenberg, supra note 142, at 208 (“In the strictest version of axiomatic theories, like
the school of classical contract law, no room is allowed for justifying doctrinal propositions on
the basis of moral or policy propositions.”).
207 Grey, supra note 7, at 13.
208 Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray and the Moral Basis of Classical Legal Thought,
86 IOWA L. REV. 1513, 1526 (2001).
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classical orthodox thought, acceptability was to influence decision only
subject to the constraint of universally formal conceptual order. 209
Again, there was a price for predictability and an apolitical body of law.
F.

Predicting the Future: The Ever-Tangled Skein of Human Affairs

With the axioms and bottom-level rules in place, and the leftovers (the incorrectly
decided cases and incorrect bottom-level principles) discarded, future specimens
could be more confidently predicted, provided the courts chose to play the game. In
sum, then, axioms (fundamental principles of law) would be determined inductively
by reviewing caselaw, and then theorems (rules of law) would be deduced from the
axioms, and then cases would be decided deductively from the rules.210
Perhaps counterintuitively, Langdell’s case method therefore had a certain
pragmatic spirit to it, akin to Holmes’s famous prediction theory of law, something
that is often overlooked. Langdell wrote that “[t]o have such a mastery of these
[fundamental legal doctrines] is as to be able to apply them with constant facility and
certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs [and] is what constitutes a true
lawyer . . . .”211 Writing in the 1940s, the historian Daniel J. Boorstin argued that in
the last seventy-five years the spirit of the American law school (which was the spirit
of Langdell’s case method) had been predominantly pragmatic:
The expression of the pragmatic spirit has had two phases. The first phase
was the origin, development and diffusion of the “case-method” and of the
prediction concept of law in its simplest form. “Law, considered as a
science,” Langdell explained in the preface to his influential case-book on
contracts in 1871, “consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have such a
mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and
certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true
lawyer . . . .” It has often been noted that the elaboration of the casemethod of legal instruction occurred simultaneously with the development
of pragmatism as
an
explicit
philosophy.
Despite
the
fact
that Langdell himself was not a pragmatist, the appeal of the case-method in
the United States in the late 19th and early 20th century was due in large
measure to its compatibility with the prediction concept of law. 212
G.

Holmes’s Legal Science: Experience over Logic and Battling the Powers of
Darkness

Holmes, like Langdell, viewed law as a science, at least in a sense. Holmes himself
maintained that at the bottom of his legal philosophy was the progress of midnineteenth century science, and “the influence of the scientific way of looking at the

209 Grey, supra note 7, at 15.
210 Id. at 19.
211 LANGDELL, supra note 43, at vi.
212 Daniel J. Boorstin, The Humane Study of Law, 57 YALE L.J. 960, 961 (1948).
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world.”213 Darwin’s The Origin of Species was published while Holmes was in
college (1859), and although he had not read it, he acknowledged that the difference
in science was “in the air.”214
Holmes shared Langdell’s notion of law as a science in several ways. First, he
shared Langdell’s view of the law as evolving.215 For example, Holmes, writing an
anonymous review of the 1870 edition of Langdell’s casebook, praised the book’s
historical ordering of the cases, stating: “Tracing the growth of a doctrine in this way
not only fixes it in the mind, but shows its meaning, extent, and limits as nothing else
can.”216 In 1886, in his oration before the Harvard Law School Association, he said
(referring to Langdell’s case method and its focus on “embryology and lines of its
growth”) that “there is no way to be compared to Mr. Langdell’s way.”217 And
Holmes’s famous view of law as experience (rather than logic) showed a sympathy to
the historical school of jurisprudence.218
Second, Holmes, like Langdell, believed in the slow growth of legal doctrines.
After almost twenty years on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, he wrote that:
the improvements made by the courts are made, almost invariably, by very
slow degrees and by very short steps. Their general duty is not to change, but
to work out, the principles already sanctioned by the practice of the past. No
one supposes that a judge is at liberty to decide with sole reference even to
his strongest convictions of policy and right. His duty in general is to develop
the principles which he finds, with such consistency as he may be able to
attain.219

213 Letter from Holmes to Morris R. Cohen (Feb. 5, 1919), quoted in Felix Cohen, The
Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, 9 J. HIST. IDEAS 3, 14 (1948); see also Grey, supra note 3, at
795 (“Much of Holmes’ legal thought can be explained in terms of this Victorian scientific
positivism—what Holmes himself called ‘the scientific way of looking at the world.’ From this
outlook followed his legal positivism and a version of utilitarianism tempered by skepticism
about the practical possibilities of measuring utility.”) (citation omitted).
214 Letter from Holmes to Morris R. Cohen, supra note 213, at 14; see also Reimann, supra
note 7, at 109 (noting that “Holmes and Langdell were both under the spell of the new ideas of
science and evolution.”).
215 See PHILIP P. WEINER, EVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDERS OF PRAGMATISM 182 (1949)
(noting that one thing that made Holmes’s work “‘scientific’ was his evolutionary approach to
law . . . .”).
216 Book Note, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts, 5 AM. L. REV. 539, 540 (1871)
(Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. reviewing C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS (1870)).
217 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Use of Law Schools, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra
note 5, at 35, 44.
218 Grey, supra note 3, at 805–06 & n.70.
219 Stack v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 58 N.E. 686, 687 (Mass. 1900). On Holmes’s
tenure at the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, see generally Patrick J. Kelley, Holmes on
the Supreme Judicial Court: The Theorist as Judge, in THE HISTORY OF LAW IN
MASSACHUSETTS: THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 1692-1992, at 275 (R. Osgood ed., 1992);
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And while Holmes the scholar might have tried to bring order to the common law,220
Holmes the jurist was not so ambitious,221 believing the common law should not get
ahead of society.222 While he recognized that courts can and must make law, adapting
the law to changes in society, he also recognized that courts should do so slowly,
writing:
I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate but they can
do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.
A common-law judge could not say, “I think the doctrine of consideration is
a bit of historical nonsense and shall not enforce it in my court.”223
Thus, while he recognized that courts can and do make law, he was an advocate of
judicial restraint.224 Holmes was himself skeptical of his ability to identify which rules
were best for society, which made him reluctant to depart from precedent.225
Third, and similar to his belief that the common law should develop slowly,
Holmes, perhaps more so than Langdell, was a legal positivist.226 Holmes is of course

Mark Tushnet, The Logic of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the Supreme Judicial Court,
63 VA. L. REV. 975, 1005 (1977).
220 See Douglas G. Baird, The Young Astronomers, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1641 (2007)
(noting that Holmes, as a scholar, “started as a pragmatist who made his mark by producing a
single volume that tried to make sense of the common law,” and that his “task was accounting
for the outcome of discrete cases.”).
221 See THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT 10 (2013) (Holmes, as his critics had long said,
was more of an aphorist than a system builder. He believed that legal decisions, like art, should
include only what is essential.); Kelley, supra note 219, at 276 (“Holmes on the Supreme
Judicial Court did not turn out to be a bomb-throwing dissenter. Instead, he seemed to be a
regular judge, hardly ever dissenting, writing for a unanimous court craftsmanlike opinions
remarkable only for the grace and clarity of their expression.”).
222 Kelley, supra note 3, at 44. There might have been additional factors that contributed to
his lack of judicial ambition on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, including the
workload, the role of creatively addressing legal issues being transferred to bodies outside the
court, and a tradition of unanimity for court opinions coupled with colleagues who disfavored
theory in the opinions. Kelley, supra note 219, at 276; Tushnet, supra note 219, at 978.
223 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
224 TWINING, supra note 170, at 16.
225 Grey, supra note 3, at 812.
226 See Feldman, supra note 8, at 1442 (“[I]n many ways, the early Holmes was strongly
aligned with his Langdellian contemporaries. Most important, perhaps, Holmes was a
committed positivist. He declared that natural law jurists were ‘naïve,’ and as early as 1872,
when explicitly discussing Austin’s positivist jurisprudence, Holmes wrote that ‘sovereignty is
a form of power, and the will of the sovereign is law, because he has power to compel obedience
or to punish disobedience, and for no other reason.’”).
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famous for defending the so-called separability thesis, under which a determination of
existing law is separate from a determination of what is morally right.227
Fourth, Holmes praised Langdell’s effort at taxonomy and conceptual analysis.228
In Holmes’s anonymous review of the completed 1871 first edition of Langdell’s
casebook, Holmes wrote: “There is nothing of . . . the ‘manual method.’ A contract
concerning coal is not indexed under the head Coal, nor even under the popular name
of the contract, as Charter-party or Insurance. The cases are referred to under the
general principle of the law of contracts.”229 Holmes himself, early in his career, had
focused on dividing law into proper categories,230 and in the late 1870s, while shifting
course somewhat, had merely shifted “from analytical classification to philosophical
synthesis.”231 Holmes, for example, believed that students must be aware of
principles, and that the student should have “more than a rag-bag of details” so that
they may see “how it hangs together.”232 He wrote:
The number of our predictions when generalized and reduced to a system is
not unmanageably large. They present themselves as a finite body of dogma
which may be mastered within a reasonable time. . . .
....
Even if every decision required the sanction of an emperor with despotic
power and whimsical turn of mind, we should be interested none the less, still
with a view to prediction, in discovering some order, some rational
explanation and some principle of growth for the rules which he laid down.
In every system there are such explanations and principles to be found.233

227 See BRIAN H. BIX, A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL THEORY 198 (2004) (explaining that the
separability thesis is a “tenet or dogma of legal positivism, that law and morality are
‘separate’.”); Catherine Wells, The Positivist, in THE PRAGMATISM AND PREJUDICE OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES JR. 117 (Seth Vannatta ed., 2019) (discussing Holmes’s legal positivism).
228 KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 92 (“Holmes extolled Langdell’s abstraction of general
dimensions of contract . . . .”).
229 Book Note, supra note 59, at 353–54.
230 Note, Holmes, Peirce and Legal Pragmatism, 84 YALE L.J. 1123, 1123 n.7 (1975); see
also Thomas C. Grey, Holmes on the Logic of Law, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS
INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 133, 145 (Steven J. Burton ed.,
2000) (“[Holmes] devoted his early legal career to a reclassification of the common law into
subjective categories designed to replace the rough-and-ready practical pigeonholes of the
vanishing writ system and the loose taxonomy of law into personal and property rights used by
Blackstone and Kent.”).
231 G. Edward White, The Integrity of Holmes’ Jurisprudence, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 633, 637
(1982).
232 Book Review, supra note 145, at 234.
233 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458, 464–65 (1897).
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Holmes, discussing the Summary in a letter to Sir Frederick Pollock, even wrote that
Langdell “is a noble old swell whose knowledge and ability and idealist devotion to
his work I revere and love.”234
Holmes’s approach in his celebrated book The Common Law was similar to what
Langdell did in his Summary.235 In fact, his goal was to reform the common law by
identifying its “basic principles and their rational arrangement.”236 Holmes even
claimed to identify the foundation for all common-law civil liability in an objective
standard of reasonableness.237 Thus, much of his work was similar to Langdell’s, in
that he was seeking to organize the common law into a coherent system based on
abstract and conceptual ordering.238 Even after Holmes had concluded that logic alone
could not be used to bring order to the common law, he believed that bringing order
to it remained an important goal.239 Holmes, like Langdell, sought to conceptualize
the common law to make the law more intelligible and hence more predictable.240 He
believed that an important value was that “men should know the rules by which the

234 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Apr. 10, 1881), reprinted in 1
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR
FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932, supra note 109, at 17. The phrase “great swell” was one of
Holmes’s favorite phrases. EDMUND WILSON, PATRIOTIC GORE: STUDIES IN THE LITERATURE OF
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 787 (2d prtg. 1963). A “swell” is “a person of high social position
or outstanding competence.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1263 (11th ed.
2003). Wilson notes that when Holmes referred to someone as a “great swell” he never “meant
he is socially brilliant but always that he is preeminent intellectually—a top expert in some
department or a profound or original thinker.” WILSON, supra note 234, at 787. Holmes might
not have considered Langdell a “great swell,” but he at least considered him a “swell.”
235 See Grey, supra note 3, at 817 (“This [The Common Law] is not a project obviously
different from the one Langdell stated in his much-quoted manifesto of classical legal science:
‘Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines . . . . If these doctrines
could be so classified and arranged that each should be found in its proper place, and nowhere
else, they would cease to be formidable from their number.’”).
236 Reimann, supra note 7, at 111.
237 Feldman, supra note 8, at 1442–43; see also Edward A. Purcell Jr., On the Complexity of
“Ideas in America”: Origins and Achievements of the Classical Age of Pragmatism, 27 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 967, 989 (2002) (reviewing MENAND, supra note 173) (noting that Holmes was
“a rather ‘high’ prescriptive theorist” who, in The Common Law, “referred easily and
confidently to such things as ‘the true theory of contract’ and ‘the true limits of tort’”).
238 See Grey, supra note 3, at 816 (noting that “much of Holmes’ actual work was devoted
to the abstract and conceptual ordering of doctrine into a structured and coherent system—in
other words, the kind of doctrinal legal ‘logic’ that Langdell specialized in . . . .”) (footnote
omitted).
239 See Reimann, supra note 7, at 111 (noting that Holmes “remained convinced that without
well-defined principles and a rational arrangement of the law we must forever wander
aimlessly.”).
240 Kelley, supra note 3, at 45–46.
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game will be played.”241 In fact, taxonomy and the creation of a general law of
contract would help the law evolve.242
Like Langdell, as part of an effort to reconceptualize the system of the common
law, Holmes was left no choice but to express skepticism about certain judicial
opinions.243 In his review of Langdell’s casebook, Holmes even suggested that “some
contradictory and unreasoned” decisions could have been omitted. 244 And Holmes,
like Langdell, has been accused of tampering with the data.245 Further, his unusual
reading of the celebrated case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus (involving two ships named
Peerless) arguably “shows how far he was willing to go to support his own
premises.”246
With all of the similarities, why then did Holmes, after having initially praised
Langdell’s casebook, come to believe that Langdell, despite being a “noble old swell,”
241 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Holdsworth’s English Law, 25 LAW Q. REV. 412, 414 (1909).
242 Grey, supra note 230, at 146. Morton Horwitz has argued that Holmes’s legal philosophy
changed between the publication of The Common Law in 1881 and the publication of The Path
of the Law in 1897. Horwitz argues that the early Holmes believed that shared customary norms
and common-law categories could determine judicial solutions to specific legal questions and
provide neutral constraints on judicial decision making, whereas the late Holmes believed
judicial decision making could never be anything more than direct policy analysis. Under this
theory, the source of “experience” in Holmes’s famous aphorism shifted from custom to policy.
Morton J. Horwitz, The Place of Justice Holmes in American Legal Thought, in THE LEGACY
OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., supra note 7, at 31, 51, 66–68. Hortwitz’s thesis has its
critics. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ernst, The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American Legal
History, 102 YALE L.J. 1019 (1993).
243 Feldman, supra note 8, at 1442.
244 Book Note, supra note 216, at 540.
245 See Carrington, supra note 71, at 732 (“He [Holmes] revealed a propensity to use history
in the service of policy arguments, causing Albert Dicey to compare Holmes himself to
theologians. Edward White accurately describes Holmes’s method as equally ‘breathtaking’ and
‘presentist’ as that of Langdell.”); Reimann, supra note 7, at 105 (“Holmes [in The Common
Law] proceeds in a way contrary to what he claims to do: he does not, first, gather data, then
observe, and finally draw conclusions in a truly scientific way. Instead, he starts with the result
and then produces only the information suitable to support it, quietly omitting the rest.”); Mark
DeWolfe Howe, Introduction to HOLMES, supra note 12, at vii, xx (asserting that Holmes’s
Common Law was “not primarily a work of legal history. It is an endeavor in philosophy—a
speculative undertaking in which the author sought to find the materials of legal history data
which would support a new interpretation of the legal order.”); GILMORE, supra note 2, at 128
n.19 (asserting that “The Common Law was a work of theoretical speculation, not of history.”);
id. at 53 (“On the face of things [Holmes] purports to be making a purely descriptive statement
about what the law is here and now—Massachusetts in 1880—together with an account of how,
historically, it came to be that way. But most of the time he is in fact making prescriptive
statements about what the law ought to be—at all times and in all places.”).
246 Reimann, supra note 7, at 253 n.75. Holmes argued that when two parties agreed to the
sale of cotton to be delivered on the ship Peerless, but each intended a different ship (with the
same name), “[t]he true ground of the decision was not that each party meant a different thing
from the other, . . . but that each said a different thing. The plaintiff offered one thing, the
defendant expressed assent to another.” HOLMES, supra note 12, at 309.
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represented the “powers of darkness”?247 Holmes’s change in attitude likely stemmed
from the fact that, by the late 1870s, he had come to believe that the common law’s
doctrines could not be made logically consistent.248 Although Holmes admired
Langdell’s effort to bring order to contract law, and while he did not wish to banish
logic and deduction from the law,249 by that point he had come to believe that an effort
to bring order based primarily on a system of logic—such as has been attempted by
John Austin with his analytical method—was a mistake and was unachievable.250 The
law had developed historically through struggle and not by following the dictates of
logic.251 Simply put, “[h]e did not want to see experience squeezed out by logic.”252
Holmes’s purpose in The Common Law was to discredit a particular form of legal
science, a type prevalent in nineteenth century Germany and based on Roman law,
and which had achieved fame not only among civil-law jurisdictions, but among
common-law jurisdictions as well.253 The seeds of this nineteenth century German
legal science had been Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, which had rejected natural law
and maintained that only pure reason could determine truth. 254 Holmes had a few
problems with Kant’s moral philosophy, particularly as a legal philosophy. First, Kant
concluded that pure reason dictated that the morally correct action was to always treat
persons as an end, and never as a means only, and the philosophy cherished “the
human ability to make free choices” and the protection and respect of freedom of the
will.255 Holmes rejected such a moral philosophy as a legal philosophy because he
believed it was inconsistent with the reality of how societies act and the reality of
human nature (recall Holmes’s view that law should not get ahead of society), arguing

247 Holmes is in fact considered Langdell’s “first great critic.” Feldman, supra note 8, at
1442.
248 KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 102.
249 See GILMORE, supra note 2, at 50 (“Holmes by no means rejected the ‘law is a science’
idea . . . .”); Grey, supra note 230, at 133 (“Holmes was by no means generally ‘anti-logic’ in
legal theory. He thought that logic, in its various related senses, was a significant (but not the
only) force in shaping the law, and also that it supplied important (but again not the only) criteria
for evaluating legal inquiry”) (footnotes omitted); TWINING, supra note 170, at 390 n.17 (“One
may infer from the context of [his famous] quotation that Holmes did not intend to deny any
place to logic in the law.”); WHITE, supra note 146, at 63 (“Holmes was not an opponent of
generalization, or of the deductive method, or of system. He was not motivated by any irrational
contempt for logical inference. The law, like any other empirical science, deserves and needs
the machinery of deduction and valid inference, and Holmes fully recognized this fact.”);
Reimann, supra note 7, at 113 (noting that Holmes’s critical attitude toward logic “is not at all
a condemnation of logic in general.”).
250 Howe, supra note 245, at xxii.
251 Reimann, supra note 7, at 79.
252 Speziale, supra note 46, at 33.
253 Reimann, supra note 7, at 80, 85.
254 Id. at 81.
255 Id. at 81–82.
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that “[n]o society has ever admitted that it could not sacrifice individual welfare to its
own existence.”256 For Holmes, social reality was the ultimate standard for law.257
He also believed a Kantian approach was inconsistent with the “general welfare,” and
he thus opposed it on utilitarian grounds.258
While Kant’s philosophy had (like Holmes’s view) maintained a strict separation
of law and morality,259 Holmes was concerned that Kant’s moral philosophy had
colored German scholars’ interpretation of Roman law and that this interpretation
would find its way into efforts to bring order to the common law. 260 For example, with
respect to contract law, German legal science was premised on Friedrich Carl von
Savigny’s concept that a contract required a meeting of the minds, which flowed from
Kantian moral philosophy, a requirement Holmes believed was inconsistent with the
common law’s objective approach to contract formation.261 Flowing from his rigorous
positivism, this was enough to make it unsuitable as a common-law doctrine.
Second, and similarly, Holmes opposed a Kantian, formal approach to bringing
order to the law solely through “pure reason,” an approach which left no room for
considering external factors.262 Prevailing German legal science downplayed
historical development and focused on system-building and conceptualization, and
while it resembled the old natural-law approach, it was not based on moral concepts,
but was based on classical Roman law, “which seemed to [the Germans] to contain
timeless truth needing only to be detected and explicated” (and German legal scholars
tended to interpret Roman law as resting on abstract notions such as individual
freedom).263 The approach also sought to create a comprehensive and entirely logical

256 HOLMES, supra note 12, at 41.
257 Reimann, supra note 7, at 109. Holmes believed that law’s substance was drawn largely
from “[t]he felt necessities of the time.” HOLMES, supra note 12, at xxiv.
258 Reimann, supra note 7, at 99. Politically, Holmes was a preference utilitarian, Grey, supra
note 230, at 136, who conceived of “law as a utilitarian instrument for the satisfaction of human
desires,” Grey, supra note 3, at 788. Thus, “[p]rescriptively, legal principles are to be derived
from ‘accurately measured social desires,’ with these to be approximated, in the absence of a
better measuring stick, by ‘conformity to the wishes of the dominant power’ in the community.”
Id. at 793 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law (1899), in
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 5, at 226, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Montesquieu
(1900), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 5, at 250, 258). He therefore believed that the
Kantian metaphysics of morality incorrectly maintained that “no man may be looked upon as a
means to an end,” Howe, supra note 245, at xvi, and that it was justifiable for persons to have
a self-preference. HOLMES, supra note 12, at 38. Grey argues that Holmes desired to synthesize
the precepts of the historical school with Benthamite utilitarian positivism. Grey, supra note 3,
at 806 n.70.
259 Reimann, supra note 7, at 99.
260 Id. at 84.
261 Id. at 87–88.
262 Id. at 84.
263 Id. at 83–84, 89.
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system of law,264 conflicting with Holmes’s pragmatism, which viewed law as a
means to achieving socially desirable ends.265 A comprehensive system based on logic
would also be a static system based on pre-industrial views of society, and would be
inappropriate for the industrial United States.266
When Langdell published the Summary, Holmes came to view Langdell as the
primary domestic proponent of German legal science, though really only in the second
sense (the formal approach to law), rather than in the first sense (Kantian
metaphysics).267 Referring to the second sense, Holmes wrote that “[t]he danger of
which I speak is . . . the notion that a given system, ours, for instance, can be worked
out like mathematics from some general axioms of conduct.” 268 In other words, he
opposed the belief that logic alone could provide answers to every question of law.269
He did not oppose an effort to bring order to the common law by identifying
“fundamental notions and principles of our substantial law, putting them in an order
which is a part of or results from the fundamental conceptions,” 270 and organizing the
law “logically, arranging and distributing it, in order, from its summa genus to its
infima species.”271 But he opposed an excessive indulgence in logic.272 As Mathias
Reimann notes, “[o]ne might say that Holmes’s arrangement was supposed to be
conceptual but not formal,”273 whereas Langdell’s arrangement was both conceptual
and formal.274
When Holmes reviewed the Summary in an anonymous review of Langdell’s
casebook in 1880, he wrote that the Summary revealed:

264 Id. at 85.
265 Grey, supra note 3, at 805.
266 Reimann, supra note 7, at 104.
267 Id. at 92–93.
268 Holmes, supra note 233, at 465.
269 Grey, supra note 230, at 134 (“Holmes disapproved of legal logic only in its most extreme
and exclusive sense, what he called ‘the merely logical point of view’ (Common Law 32), which
is to say a jurisprudence committed above all else to the systematically deductive decision of
every question of law.”).
270 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to James Bryce (Aug. 1879) quoted in HOWE, supra
note 121, at 25.
271 HOLMES, supra note 12, at 198.
272 Grey, supra note 3, at 815.
273 Reimann, supra note 7, at 265 n.175.
274 “Conceptual analysis” has been defined as “seek[ing] the truth about aspects of our world
through breaking down the logical structure, or the necessary and essential attributes, of ideas
and categories.” BIX, supra note 227, at 37. “Formalism” has been defined as “analysis . . . that
moves mechanically or automatically from category or concept to conclusion, without
consideration of policy, morality, or practice.” Id. at 69.
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the weak point in Mr. Langdell’s habit of mind. Mr. Langdell’s ideal in the
law, the end of all his striving, is the elegantia juris, or logical integrity of
the system as a system. He is, perhaps, the greatest living theologian . . . . If
Mr. Langdell could be suspected of ever having troubled himself about
Hegel, we might call him a Hegelian in disguise, so entirely is he interested
in the formal connection of things.275
Holmes, referring to the Summary in a letter to Sir Frederick Pollock in April 1881
(the same letter in which he wrote that Langdell “is a noble old swell whose knowledge
and ability and idealist devotion to his work I revere and love”), wrote:
A more misspent piece of marvelous ingenuity I never read, yet it is most
suggestive and instructive. I have referred to Langdell several times in
dealing with contracts because to my mind he represents the powers of
darkness. He is all for logic and hates any reference to anything outside of it,
and his explanations and reconciliations of the cases would have astonished
the judges who decided them.276
These complaints can also be seen in Holmes’s The Common Law, published in 1881:
What has been said will explain the failure of all theories which consider the
law only from its formal side, whether they attempt to deduce the corpus
from a priori postulates [German legal science], or fall into the humbler error
of supposing the science of the law to reside in the elegantia juris, or logical
cohesion of part with part [German legal science and Langdell]. The truth is,
that the law is always approaching, and never reaching, consistency. It is
forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always retains
old ones from history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or
sloughed off. It will become entirely consistent only when it ceases to
grow.277
As he later wrote in The Path of the Law:
Take the fundamental question, What constitutes the law? You will find some
text writers telling you that it is something different from what is decided by
the courts of Massachusetts or England, that it is a system of reason, that it is
a deduction from principles of ethics or admitted axioms or what not, which
may or may not coincide with the decisions. But if we take the view of our
275 Book Review, supra note 145, at 234. Holmes defined elegentia juris as “logical cohesion
of part with part.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Science of the Common Law, 9 CURRENT LEGAL
THOUGHT 387, 388 (1943) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Common Carriers and the
Common Law, 13 AM. L. REV. 609, 631 (1879)). With respect to referring to Langdell as a
“Hegelian in disguise,” Holmes “always presented Hegel simply as the ultimate logician . . . .
For Holmes, Hegel was a label for ‘logic,’ and he used it at his convenience.” Reimann, supra
note 7, at 251 n.50.
276 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Apr. 10, 1881), reprinted in 1
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR
FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932, supra note 109, at 17.
277 HOLMES, supra note 12, at 32; see also id. at xxiv (“The law . . . cannot be dealt with as
if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.”).
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friend the bad man we shall find that he does not care two straws for the
axioms or deductions, but that he does want to know what the Massachusetts
or English courts are likely to do in fact. I am much of this mind. The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious,
are what I mean by the law.278
In other words, a portrayal of the common law as based on axioms and deciding cases
with deductive reasoning from those axioms provided an inaccurate picture of what
the courts were doing in fact.
Holmes, by providing his prediction theory of law in contrast to a system of law
based on logic, thus argued that Langdell and his followers were giving a misleading
account of the law to law students and practitioners.279 In private, Holmes “ridiculed
the claim that the law is empirical science, and compared Langdell’s teaching to that
of a biology teacher who ‘would give one of his pupils a sea urchin and tell him to
find all about it he could.’”280 Holmes the legal positivist thus believed that Langdell’s
effort to construct a logical system of law necessarily led to an unrealistic account of
the law. Holmes was empirical in his approach to law, but he thought dissecting the
sea urchin could not reveal everything one needed to know about the specimen. For
Holmes, more than the library was needed to predict what the courts would say the
law was.
And, similarly, any argument that the library was all the court needed to decide a
case was a mistake. For example, Holmes “kept his own theories open-ended by his
reiterated insistence that law basically reflects social and economic conditions and
must change as they change.”281 Thus, while Holmes supported Langdell’s
generalizing aim, he believed that the resulting generalizations were only guidelines
and useful tools; they could not be used to provide correct answers to future cases. 282
Axioms and deductive logic should not prevail over experience and policy judgments,
and empiricism in the sense of using real-world experience should be preeminent.283

278 Holmes, supra note 233, at 460–61. In 1908, Holmes, after reading Langdell’s Equity
Jurisprudence, wrote in a letter to his friend Sir Frederick Pollock about that book that “[i]t has
his acumen and patient discussion of detail, but I think brings out the narrow side of his mind,
his feebleness in philosophising, and hints at his rudimentary historical knowledge. I think he
was somewhat wanting in horse sense . . . .” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick
Pollock (July 6, 1908), reprinted in HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR.
JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932, supra note 109, at 140.
279 TWINING, supra note 170, at 18.
280 Paul D. Carrington, Law as the “Common Thoughts of Men”: The Law-Teaching and
Judging of Thomas McIntyre Cooley, 49 STAN. L. REV. 495, 519 (1997) (quoting LIVA BAKER,
THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL 208 (1991)).
281 GILMORE, supra note 15, at 165 n.256.
282 Gordon, supra note 105, at 1237–38, 1250.
283 Feldman, supra note 8, at 1444–46 (footnotes omitted). Thus, while Holmes was a legal
positivist, he can at the same time be viewed as urging “an introduction of moral concepts into
the law.” WHITE, supra note 146, at 69.
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“[I]t was this elevation of logic over practicality that aroused his ire more than
anything else.”284 As one commentator has described Holmes’s view:
[J]udges who realize that all common law rules are based on social policy
may consciously improve the law by adopting rules that more effectively
implement current policies or that implement a new policy preferable to the
one underlying the old rules. These decisions can be made scientifically,
however, only after scientific studies showing the consequences of particular
rules and comparing the social advantages of different consequences.285
For example, it has been argued his goal in The Common Law “was to produce a
doctrinal restatement of the common law that was guided by the demands of
contemporary policy, using historical research primarily to identify anachronistic
survivals.”286 Thus, the rules that should be discarded were the ones that were
anachronistic, not the ones that failed to follow deductively from an axiom.
While Holmes shared Langdell’s belief in stare decisis, believing that most cases
could and should be decided based on the application of established rules, 287 he also
believed that all rules had an area of doubtful application.288 Thus, there were gaps in
existing law, a point at which the rules ran out and deduction could not provide an
answer. While general principles could be useful, they alone could not decide
particular cases.289 To believe otherwise was a logical fallacy. Holmes thus took issue
with Langdell’s apparent strong positivist belief that there was existing law to decide
every case, and that the judge could thus simply declare existing law and apply it to
the facts.290 As Thomas Grey has argued, “[p]ragmatists [like Holmes] thus tend to
be theoreticians armed with a presumptive suspicion of neat theories; this is not
because they despise neatness, but because they know how obsessively those drawn
to theorizing love it.”291
As Holmes wrote, “[l]aw is not a science, but is essentially empirical. Hence,
although the general arrangement should be philosophical, even at the expense of

284 Reimann, supra note 7, at 107.
285 Kelley, supra note 3, at 45 (citation omitted).
286 Grey, supra note 3, at 813.
287 Grey, supra note 230, at 140.
288 Id. at 137.
289 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“General
propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition
more subtle than any articulate major premise.”); see also Grey, supra note 230, at 139 (“[H]e
believed that although high-level generalizations could be very useful as presumptions and
classificatory devices, they were invariably too vague to dictate particular legal conclusions.”);
see also id. at 146 (“Holmes did not believe that principles generally dictate results in cases, but
he did give them normative force, as presumptions or guidelines that could properly incline a
judge toward one side of a case.”).
290 Grey, supra note 230, at 137.
291 Grey, supra note 3, at 815.
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disturbing prejudices, compromises with practical convenience are highly
proper.”292 As previously noted, he wrote that “the effort to reduce the concrete details
of an existing system to the merely logical consequence of simple postulates is always
in danger of becoming unscientific, and of leading to a misapprehension of the nature
of the problem and the data.”293 For Holmes, creating a general law of contract would
help identify idiosyncrasies and help determine whether policy grounds justified the
differences or whether there was no good reason for them.294 He thus believed that
Langdell was using taxonomy and a general law of contracts improperly. Langdell
was using it to provide answers to all cases, and it was appealing to Langdell and his
followers because of the human desire for “certainty and repose.” 295
As noted, to Holmes the general principles should be viewed as merely
guidelines,296 and he also believed the law was a mixture of precedent and policy.297
Because the existence of general principles meant that there would be difficult and
borderline cases, in those situations the judge would have to exercise “the sovereign
prerogative of choice,”298 taking into account “views of public policy”299 and
“considerations of social advantage.”300 As he wrote, “[t]he felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had
a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining how men should be
governed.”301 When Holmes wrote that law was experience, not logic, he meant that
law should be “policy coupled with tradition.”302 When Holmes wrote that “continuity
with the past is no duty but only a necessity,”303 he combined a positivist strain of
believing that the law at present was where you currently found yourself, and that

292 Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1870).
293 Book Review, supra note 145, at 234.
294 Grey, supra note 230, at 146.
295 Holmes, supra note 233, at 466; see also Grey, supra note 230, at 146 (noting that Holmes
believed “the generalizing impulse only served the psychological and aesthetic needs of lawyers
and jurists . . . .”).
296 Grey, supra note 3, at 819.
297 Reimann, supra note 7, at 267 n.182.
298 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law (1899), in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 5, at 239.
299 HOLMES, supra note 12, at xvi.
300 Holmes, supra note 233, at 467.
301 HOLMES, supra note 12, at xxiv.
302 Grey, supra note 3, at 807.
303 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Learning and Science, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra
note 5, at 139.
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“[t]he tree has grown as we know it,” yet recognizing at the same time that “[t]he
practical question is what is to be the next organic step.”304
To Holmes, when a case involved a doubtful application of an existing rule of law,
the interest in predictability was weak and the existing rule did not provide strong
evidence of collective preferences.305 At this point, the court should engage in what
was in effect legislating.306 Holmes believed that there could be no “exact, consistent,
and complete” system of law, whether it was based on German neo-Kantian
jurisprudence or legal positivism.307 And there was a danger in Langdellian legal
science—“its power to delude judges into thinking that their rulings on politically
charged subjects were derived by pure conceptual logic,”308 which is of course what
Langdell seemed to be seeking (neutral decision making, not delusion).
Bruce Kimball has narrowed down Holmes’s issues with Langdell to the
following:
At its core, the Holmesian critique . . . [of Langdell was] that he neglected
what Holmes called “the forces outside of” the law. Those forces have
conventionally been considered under the two categories of “justice” and
“policy”—often called “fairness” and “convenience,” respectively, in
nineteenth century writings. Taken together, justice and policy have been
labeled concerns of “acceptability.” Holmes fundamentally charged that
Langdell dismissed acceptability in determining doctrine and analyzing
decisions in cases.309
Holmes believed that logic became the master under Langdell’s version of law as
a science, and this was why Langdell represented the “powers of darkness.” Langdell
shared Holmes’s belief in the evolution of law, his belief in legal positivism, and his
belief in conceptualism, but Langdell also shared German formalism’s desire for
logical order and a self-contained structure, which Holmes rejected. In effect, Holmes
was a combination of legal historicism, legal positivism, nineteenth-century German
legal science (its conceptualist part), and the future (American legal realism), whereas
Langdell was a combination of legal historicism, legal positivism, and nineteenthcentury German legal science (its conceptualist part and its logical ordering part, and
its formalism), but he had none of the future in him. Langdell was part German (so to
speak), and the wrong type, and it was this part with which Holmes took issue. And
he only took issue with this part if it was meant to be an approach to jurisprudence,
rather than (or in addition to) a mere teaching tool, which we will never know for

304 Holmes, Jr., supra note 241, at 414.
305 Grey, supra note 230, at 137.
306 Id.; see also Grey, supra note 3, at 800 (noting that for pragmatists, “[t]he task of inquiry
is not the impossible one of building a purified structure of truths from the ground up, but rather
the practical one of making such modifications in the existing body of knowledge as will solve
the difficulty at hand.”).
307 Grey, supra note 230, at 138.
308 Id. at 140.
309 KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 111.
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sure.310 And for what it is worth, let’s not forget that it was Holmes who encouraged
Langdell to write his Summary.
H.

Williston’s Legal Science: The Uneasy Formalist

Enter Samuel Williston, another Harvard professor, who E. Allan Farnsworth
argued did not share Langdell’s conception of law as a science, 311 but who, Mark
Movsesian argues, did view “contract law as a kind of ‘science’—a system of
fundamental axioms, relatively few in number, that can provide the basis for deductive
reasoning.”312 In terms of logic versus experience, Williston falls somewhere between
Langdell and Holmes (closer to Langdell), and was—in Allen Boyer’s description—
an “uneasy formalist.”313
Williston in fact expressly said “[l]aw is a science,”314 and wrote that:
[i]t is the mark of a great scientist that he can correlate [scientific] facts and
deduce a general law. In the same way he is not a great lawyer who knows
the rule that is applicable to a large number of special situations. It is the
capacity to generalize and to see relations between the rules governing
particular states of fact, which mark the great lawyer. As a great lawyer has
said: “The mark of a master is, that facts which before lay scattered in an
inorganic mass, when he shoots through them the magnetic current of his
thought, leap into an organic order, and live and bear fruit.” 315
Consider also what Williston said in an address to the American Bar Association’s
Section on Legal Education:
[The professor] must keep his own mind and that of his students constantly
addressed to the general rule, free from arbitrary exceptions, and must use
the particular cases to bring the rule out, rather than emphasize the
importance of inconsistencies and peculiarities. For the ideal of the law
is towards a few general principles, while in practice, with the increasing
complexity of human affairs, the number of minor rules and applications is
always increasing.316

310 Reimann, supra note 7, at 110.
311 E. Allan Farnsworth, Samuel Williston, in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY
AMERICAN LAW, supra note 26, at 594.

OF

312 Movsesian, supra note 20, at 230.
313 Boyer, supra note 13, at 22.
314 WILLISTON, supra note 72, at 202.
315 SAMUEL WILLISTON, SOME MODERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAW 123–24 (1929). The “great
lawyer” was Holmes. See Holmes, supra note 217, at 37.
316 Samuel Williston, The Necessity of Idealism in Teaching Law, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE
THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION HELD AT SEATTLE,
WASHINGTON 780–81 (1908).
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And in the preface to his 1920 contracts treatise, he complained that “[t]he law of
contracts . . . tends from its very size to fall apart,” and that the focus should be on
“fundamental principles.”317 The law should not be a “wilderness of single
instances.”318 And it has been argued that the Restatement of Law project (Williston
was the Reporter for the Restatement of Contracts) “may well have represented the
final effort to realize Langdell’s ideal of a science of law. By restating the law in a
clear and simple fashion, the institute hoped to illuminate its correct principles.” 319
Williston acknowledged that identifying general principles could lead to injustice in
particular cases, but he was skeptical of how often this happened, and (presumably
like Langdell) believed that general rules helped curb judicial discretion and decisions
based on personal whim.320
Williston, like both Langdell and Holmes, had a desire for “form and structure,”
and he had “a vision of law as an organizing and stabilizing system.”321 As Boyer has
written:
To follow principle, as Williston used the term, meant to seek “logical
coherence” and “logical coordination” across the law. It meant to draw useful
analogies. It meant to achieve harmony and congruence where feasible,
rather than maintain differences based on the traditional division between law
and equity or the medieval forms of actions. In its purest form, it was
insight.322
To Williston, all other things being equal, simplicity and predictability in law is a good
thing.323 Farnsworth has concluded that Williston “was committed to rationally
uncontroversial value-free reasoning with certainty and predictability as goals. Logic
was paramount and the intrusion of moral, social, or economic notions was to be
resisted.”324 Williston (like Holmes) believed in judicial restraint, and he believed that
courts should not use the common law to decide broad social questions. 325 Learned
Hand, who had been a student of Williston’s in the 1890s, wrote of him:

317 SAMUEL WILLISTON, 1 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS iii (1920).
318 Samuel Williston, Change in the Law, 69 U.S. L. REV. 237, 240 (1935).
319 KALMAN, supra note 78, at 14.
320 Movsesian, supra note 20, at 232.
321 Boyer, supra note 13, at 23.
322 Id. at 32.
323 Id. at 23.
324 Farnsworth, supra note 311, at 594.
325 Movsesian, supra note 20, at 258; see also id. at 232 (“Like other classical scholars,
Williston takes a positivist view of law.”); Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the
Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L. REV.
94, 129 (2000) (describing Williston as “a Holmesian positivist”).
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[H]e was so secure in his thinking, so prepared to encounter dissidence and
gently dispose of it, that one wondered what was the perfect mechanism that
his skull enclosed. He seemed to be indifferent as to the effect of law,
measured by human values, so long as it was consistent and clear. 326
But Williston, while expressly maintaining that “[l]aw is a science,” believed it
was a “pragmatic science”327 (though his view might have been an accommodation to
the legal realists’ arguments of the early twentieth century).328 He explained as
follows, in language reminiscent of Holmes’s view: “It can rarely deal with the
absolute. Questions of how far and how much constantly intrude, and the questions of
degree thus introduced require for their solution determination of doubtful facts and
comparative valuing of interests, which have no mathematical equivalents.” 329
Williston, like Langdell, thus did not believe contract law’s fundamental principles
were based on self-evident truths.330 And sounding like Holmes, he acknowledged
that it was “[o]bvious” that “contractual liability, like all other liability,” is ultimately
“based on policy.”331 As Movsesian notes:
Williston does not perceive contract as a Platonic entity; for him, there is no
brooding omnipresence in the sky. Nor does Williston think of himself as
discovering, in Aristotelian fashion, contract’s immanent structure . . . .
Williston views law as a social construct that one must justify in terms of
real-world benefits . . . . Williston favors formalism precisely because of its
practical advantages.332
Thus, like Holmes, he believed that general rules should have only presumptive effect
and should not apply in exceptional circumstances.333 And also like Holmes, he
believed that rules must be consistent with the “mores of the community,” and

326 Letter from Learned Hand to A. James Casner (Nov. 10, 1959), quoted in GERALD
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 49 (1994). Hand publicly provided a more
flattering portrait of Williston. See Learned Hand, Foreword to WILLISTON, supra note 72, at
vii-ix.
327 WILLISTON, supra note 72, at 202; see also Boyer, supra note 13, at 23 (“He believes law
is a science, but not an exact science.”).
328 Kimball, supra note 19, at 304 n.98.
329 WILLISTON, supra note 72, at 202.
330 See Movsesian, supra note 20, at 231 (“Williston’s endorsement of ‘ideal rules’ does not
stem from an essentialist understanding.”).
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Id. at 232; Boyer, supra note 13, at 31.
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therefore must evolve.334 In other words, for Williston, legal principles were justified
based on their practical benefits.335
Williston believed that Langdell had adopted his approach as a method for training
lawyers, writing that Langdell:
sought simply to apply to the systematic study of law the methods habitually
used by lawyers in the preparation of particular cases—namely, to study
chronologically the previous decisions that seemed applicable to the question
at issue, and to extract from them a guiding principle. What was an
appropriate method for a trained lawyer, Langdell thought would be
appropriate also for young students who were given such aid as they required
from an instructor.336
But Williston also believed Langdell had carried things too far, and was critical of
what he perceived as an overuse of logical deduction:
When these principles were discovered he would trace their consequences
with as relentless logic as that employed by the sternest Calvinist. Decisions
inconsistent with them, he said, were wrong. He has been called in
consequence a legal theologian. How purely analytical, as distinguished from
historical, his reasoning was may be seen from reading his writings. 337
Williston was also critical of the usefulness of Langdell’s approach to the
prediction theory of law, echoing the concern that Langdell painted a picture of the
law that was too static:
In one respect, and a very important one, law [as a science] differs from
physical law. In physical law what has happened in the past will, under
similar circumstances, happen in the future. Accurate observations of the past
and present enable the scientist within the range of that observation to make
absolute prophecies as to the future. This is not so in regard to law made by
courts and legislatures. Uniform decisions of 300 years on a particular
question may be, and sometimes have been overthrown in a day, and the
single decision at the end of the series may establish a rule of law at variance
with all that has gone before. But it will not always do so. It is never quite
certain that the last decision justifies a prophecy of uniformity in the future.
Therefore, statements of rules of law are no more than prophecies of results,
never absolutely certain for the immediate future, still less for centuries to
come. It is rarely possible to go further than to say that it is highly probable
that for some time in the future courts will apply a stated rule to facts within
its scope.338

334 Movsesian, supra note 20, at 234.
335 Id.
336 WILLISTON, supra note 72, at 199.
337 Id. at 200.
338 Id. at 201.
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Williston appeared concerned that Langdell’s approach, if applied in practice,
would inhibit change:
The impulse that Langdell gave to legal thinking and teaching was primarily
towards the discovery from decided cases of the principles that apparently
had controlled them, and to apply to every variety of facts these principles,
on the assumption that they would continue to be controlling for the
immediate future. One who follows this impulse will tentatively, at least,
accept as valid the principles that he finds have been operative in the past.339
Williston, like Holmes, was also critical of Langdell’s approach to the extent
fundamental principles would lead to the overthrowing of inconsistent decisions:
“[T]he current thought during the Deanship of Langdell . . . ran not merely towards
study of original sources. Stare decisis, or follow the precedents, was the old legal
maxim. For this in effect Langdell’s followers substituted stare principiis, follow the
principles, even if they overthrow some decisions.”340 Williston was perhaps, as
Learned Hand described him publicly, one who neither worshiped for the past nor who
had “a heart open to each new-comer.”341 He was an “uneasy formalist.”342
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONSIDERATION TO THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY
In the Middle Ages, England’s common-law courts (the royal courts) saw little
interest in enforcing private agreements.343 But private agreements were being
enforced in other places, most notably in the merchant courts at the medieval fairs
(developing the so-called law merchant, the body of law applied in those courts),
church courts (for example, promises to marry and sworn promises), and by the
Chancellor (who exercised so-called equitable jurisdiction).344 Common-law courts
took notice and, more from a desire to expand their jurisdiction than to enforce private
agreements, decided to get into the game.345

339 Id. at 204.
340 Id. at 205.
341 Hand, supra note 326, at vii.
342 Boyer, supra note 13, at 22. Bruce Kimball describes Langdell similarly, portraying him
as a reluctant formalist, one who “evidently wanted to be, or felt he should be, a purely logical
formalist,” but who also considered the fairness of legal rules. KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 125.
343 JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 6 (5th ed. 2011); FARNSWORTH,
supra note 2, at 11–12.
344 MURRAY, supra note 343, at 6; FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 12.
345 MURRAY, supra note 343, at 6. A.W. Brian Simpson has argued that the common-law
courts were not primarily seeking to provide a remedy where none currently existed but were
seeking to assume jurisdiction over cases that was currently within the Chancery’s province.
A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF
ASSUMPSIT 4–5, 377 (1975).
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Having decided to play, the common-law courts needed a way to distinguish
promises that would be legally binding from those that would not.346 After all, “[n]o
legal system has attempted to enforce all promises.”347 At this point in history, the
English legal system and the common lawyers did not think in terms of, say, “contract”
or “tort.”348 Rather, there were writs, and a cause of action if the facts fit within a writ,
which was needed to get into the royal courts.349 If the facts did not fit within a writ,
there was no cause of action, at least in the royal courts.350 The writ system therefore
presented a challenge to the common-law courts if they were going to develop a
general basis for enforcing promises. 351 The writ system also meant that common-law
courts would have to start from the premise that a promise was unenforceable unless
there was a reason to enforce it, rather than vice versa.352
At the time, there was not much on the menu to choose from. There were three
writs available that could make a promise legally binding—covenant, detinue, and
debt353—but each was narrow, and even taking the three together they did not provide
much help. Covenant (birthed near the end of the twelfth century)354 was limited to
written promises under seal, and was similar to the Roman stipulatio, in that
enforceability was dictated solely by the promise’s form.355 This writ had potential,
but only if the requirement of the wax seal was ignored, but this did not happen. 356
Detinue was limited to recovering specific goods that had been transferred to the
defendant under a bailment contract,357 plus the writ came with baggage (so to speak).
The defendant could choose to pay for the goods rather than surrender them, and,
additionally, under the so-called wager of law, if the defendant could produce twelve
persons to swear they believed him then he prevailed (there was no trial by jury at this
time).358

346 MURRAY, supra note 343, at 6.
347 Id. at 4; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 11 (“No legal system has ever been
reckless enough to make all promises enforceable.”).
348 MURRAY, supra note 343, at 6.
349 Id.
350 Id.
351 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 12.
352 Id. at 11.
353 MURRAY, supra note 343, at 6–7.
354 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 13.
355 MURRAY, supra note 343, at 7.
356 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 13.
357 MURRAY, supra note 3433, at 7.
358 Id.
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Debt (like covenant, on the scene by the end of the twelfth century) was the most
useful of the three (and the most commonly used for breach of contract), applying
when a proposed exchange (a quid pro quo) had been performed by one side
(something actually given or done) and the other side owed a sum certain. 359 In other
words, “this” had been given, but “that” had not, and “that” was a sum certain, the
sum being the amount that the defendant promised to pay.360 An action for debt was
like the modern action for the price, where the duty to pay the promised sum arises
from accepting the goods, with the remedy more in the nature of specific performance
than damages.361 Debt could be seen as involving a misfeasance by the debtor, rather
than a mere nonfeasance, in that the debtor had accepted performance, 362 and was
based on unjust enrichment rather than a promise.363 Further, wager of law applied to
debt as well.364
The most glaring limitation of these three writs, with respect to the enforcement of
promises, was that they did not make informal (i.e., not under seal) promises legally
binding absent prior performance by the promisee. An executory exchange of informal
promises was not legally binding. And it turned out that modern contract law’s
ancestor would not be any of these three writs, but the law of torts (as then
conceived),365 and a writ called trespass on the case (developed in the thirteenth
century).366 This writ covered injuries caused without force or violence, such as
slander (the action of trespass covered injuries caused with force or violence, such as
battery).367
The Court of King’s Bench (one of the royal courts) started using this writ to cover
a situation in which a defendant had promised to perform a service and had then
performed it badly.368 For example, if a blacksmith had promised to shoe a horse and
did a bad job, the owner of the horse had an action under the writ of trespass on the
case, and the specific type of action came to be known as special assumpsit (he
undertook or he promised).369 The claim’s essence was a misfeasance causing harm

359 Id. at 8.
360 Id. The action of debt had originally been available to recover specific goods as well, but
detinue took over that part and debt became relegated to recovering a sum certain. Id. at 7–8.
361 U.C.C. § 2-709(1)(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1998).
362 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 13.
363 Id. at 13 n.8.
364 Id. at 14.
365 Id.
366 Elizabeth Jean Dix, The Origins of the Action of Trespass on the Case, 43 YALE L.J. 1142,
1143 (1937).
367 MURRAY, supra note 343, at 8.
368 Id.
369 Id.
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(detriment) to the promisee,370 and in this sense did not, therefore, in general make an
informal promise legally binding.
The significant move was not made until the 1530s and 1540s when the common
law courts began to extend special assumpsit to cover a promise to perform, even if
the promisor had not started performance.371 And it was not a difficult move from the
misfeasance cases to ones where the promisee had in fact detrimentally relied on the
promise.372 But by the end of the sixteenth century, the common-law courts were
allowing such claims in assumpsit on purely executory exchanges of promises without
the promisee in fact detrimentally relying,373 and with it necessarily came the measure
of damages we now call expectation damages.374 Another benefit was that assumpsit
was not subject to debt’s and detinue’s wager of law, assumpsit having been developed
after the trial by jury arose.375
The basis for enforceability was achieved through a circularity of reasoning, a
problem in reasoning that would be ignored until the late nineteenth century (stay
tuned). The reasoning was that “a party who had made a promise in exchange for the
promise of the other party had suffered a detriment since he was bound by his own
promise.”376 By considering a return promise to be a detriment to the promisee, courts
were able to justify enforcing exchanges involving purely executory promises.377 By
the end of the sixteenth century, common-law courts thus provided the primary
mechanism by which to enforce a promise.378 And although assumpsit was initially
unavailable when there was available an action of debt (something difficult on
creditors, with debt’s wager of law), in Slade’s Case in 1602 the court held that
assumpsit could be used in actions where previously only debt was available. 379 The
common-law courts and the writ of assumpsit thereby became the principal forum and
the principal vehicle, respectively, by which to enforce a promise. As A.W.B. Simpson
has noted, “[w]hat seems remarkable to a modern lawyer is the way in which the
doctrine that a promise can count as good consideration comes into the law in this
370 Id. at 9.
371 JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES 199 (1980); MURRAY, supra note 343, at 8.
372 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 15.
373 Id. at 15–16.
374 Id. at 16.
375 MURRAY, supra note 343, at 8.
376 Id. at 9; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 16 (“It was held that even if one had given
only a promise in exchange for the other’s promise, one had nonetheless suffered a detriment
by having one’s freedom of action fettered: one was in turn bound by one’s own promise . . . .
The reasoning is, of course, circular, since the conclusion that there was a detriment to the
promisee . . . assumed that the promisee was in turn bound by a promise, even though nothing
but a promise had been given for it.”).
377 MURRAY, supra note 343, at 9.
378 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 12.
379 MURRAY, supra note 343, at 8–9, 237; FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 17–18.
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quiet and unobtrusive way; contemporaries clearly did not think that this required
much explanation of justification.”380
But it did require some explanation and some boundaries, and during this time the
word “consideration” could be found in many of the lawyer’s arguments, and it “was
used to express vaguely the concept that there had to be some reason for enforcing a
promise.”381 The doctrine of consideration arose in the sixteenth century as a way to
set the boundaries for when a promise would be legally binding, 382 and it focused on
the promisor’s motive for making the promise. 383 This meant, of course, that a
promise, in and of itself, was not legally binding.384 The theory was that “a promise
which lacks any adequate motive cannot have been serious, and therefore ought not to
be taken seriously.”385 The doctrine became “the dominant validation device for the
overwhelming majority of contracts.”386
But what was a good reason for enforcing a promise? To give some type of
meaning to the doctrine of consideration, the common lawyers looked back to “their
old friends, the forms of action,”387 and the vaguer meanings of consideration “were
stripped away and ‘consideration’ was made over, from an amorphous word drawn
from common speech, into a technical requirement for contract formation.”388 By the
late 1500s the word “consideration” had become a term of art. 389 They took from the
action of debt the idea of a quid pro quo, with the defendant having received a
benefit,390 and from the assumpsit cases involving detrimental reliance, the idea of a
detriment to the plaintiff.391 The idea of exchange was, however, the central device

380 SIMPSON, supra note 345, at 461.
381 MURRAY, supra note 343, at 12; see also DAWSON, supra note 371, at 201 (“As time went
on, the something ‘for’ which the promise was made was described increasingly as ‘the
consideration,’ though the word still carried a load of vaguer meanings, suggesting other
motives for promising that might or might not be good enough.”).
382 SIMPSON, supra note 345, at 316, 318.
383 Id. at 321.
384 Id. at 321–22.
385 Id. at 322.
386 MURRAY, supra note 343, at 236.
387 Id. at 12.
388 DAWSON, supra note 371, at 202.
389 Id. at 208; FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 18.
390 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 18; MURRAY, supra note 343, at 236; see also DAWSON,
supra note 371, at 200 (“The requirement of the much older action of debt that something must
have been given ‘for’ something else, a quid pro quo, made extremely familiar the notion of
exchange, half completed.”).
391 MURRAY, supra note 343, at 238; FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 18.
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for determining enforceability, even from as early as the sixteenth century.392 As John
Dawson noted:
It became abundantly clear as the sixteenth century progressed that commonlaw courts had created the means for enforcing, and were prepared to enforce,
a great variety of exchange transactions. In the transactions that were
enforced there was one recurring element which provided the reason why
they were enforced: each party had in fact desired some act or abstention of
the other in return for which he had agreed to perform his own. 393
Thus, “pleaders were at least following a well-beaten track when they urged as a good
reason for enforcing a promise the existence of an agreement that this would be given
‘for’ that.”394 Also, stopping at exchange and not enforcing gratuitous promises was
consistent with a country entering the commercial age.395
The result? “[I]f there was an exchange resulting in either a benefit to the promisor
or a detriment to the promisee, there was a reason for enforcing the promise,” and this
became the formula for consideration.396 Note that grafted upon the idea that an
exchange of informal promises can constitute a legally-binding contract, was the
requirement of either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee as an
additional requirement for the exchange to be legally binding. As Chancellor Murray
noted, it was not “the product of a grand design,”397 and “it is clear that consideration
was not a well-planned, rationally conceived device for deciding which promises are
enforceable.”398
And the concept of the exchange also requiring a benefit or a detriment would
cause problems down the road. It has been argued that “our rules of consideration are
the vestigial survivals of procedural evolution—the product of the peculiar and
unsystematic history of the writ of assumpsit in the King’s courts in England . . . .”399
In essence, a “historical accident,” “the tyranny exercised in English law by the
medieval forms of action . . . just beginning to fade at the crucial time, the sixteenth
century, when a law of contract was emerging from the shadows cast by the law of
tort.”400 But it has also been stated that “it would be hard to find a better illustration

392 MURRAY, supra note 343, at 238; see also DAWSON, supra note 371, at 198 (noting that
“the concept of bargained-for exchange became an established feature of the English law of
contract in the decades when English lawyers were first becoming aware that a law of contract
existed.”).
393 DAWSON, supra note 371, at 203.
394 Id. at 200.
395 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 18.
396 MURRAY, supra note 343, at 238.
397 Id.
398 Id.
399 Malcom P. Sharp, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 783, 785 (1941).
400 DAWSON, supra note 371, at 197.
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of the flexibility and development of the Common Law.”401 Or, as stated by E. Allan
Farnsworth, “in view of the difficulty that other societies have had in developing a
general basis for enforcing promises, it is perhaps less remarkable that the basis
developed by the common law is logically flawed than that the common law succeeded
in developing any basis at all.”402
Although the expansion of assumpsit had made more promises legally binding than
under detinue, debt, and covenant, the doctrine of consideration was still “an
exclusionary rule preventing enforcement of promises that did not comply [with its
requirements].”403 For example, in Hunt v. Bate, decided in 1568 (a case included in
Langdell’s casebook), the court held there was no consideration for a master’s promise
to hold harmless a guarantor who had obtained the release of the master’s servant, so
that the master’s business would not go undone, because the master had made the
promise after the guarantor had secured the servant’s release. 404
For the next hundred years, the concept of consideration was not given much
thought. As Farnsworth noted, “the movement toward contract was a slow one for two
centuries.”405 Consideration rested, left alone for a long time. One interesting
development, however, which did not per se alter the definition of consideration, was
Parliament’s conclusion in the late seventeenth century that the common-law courts
had gone a bit too far in expanding the writ of assumpsit. In 1671, a jurist remarked
that two men could no longer talk together without one of them claiming a promise
had been made.406 As a result, in 1677 Parliament passed the Statute of Frauds,
requiring certain classes of contracts to be in writing to be enforceable.407
Another interesting development, which did not have the same staying power as
the Statute of Frauds, occurred in the middle of the eighteenth century. Despite the
term consideration having been in use for a couple hundred years, it still did not have
a precise meaning,408 and there was a brouhaha in 1765, when Lord Mansfield
apparently went a bit too far in asserting that consideration should be unnecessary in
transactions between merchants or if the promise was in writing.409 This view was

401 James Barr Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 53, 69 (1888).
402 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 18–19.
403 DAWSON, supra note 371, at 202.
404 Hunt v. Bate (1568) 73 Eng. Rep. 605 (CP).
405 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 19.
406 SIMPSON, supra note 345, at 603.
407 See Val Ricks, The Democratization of Contract Law: The Case of Mutual Promises, 45
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 947, 950 n.26 (2018) (“As actions on plebian mutual promises took root,
the property-owning aristocracy became so bothered at being bound on their informal promises
that Parliament passed the Statute of Frauds to cut back on their potential liability.”).
408 GILMORE, supra note 2, at 7.
409 Pillans v. Van Mierop (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1035, 1039 (KB); see also Kevin M. Teeven,
The Advent of Recovery on Market Transactions in the Absence of a Bargain, 39 AM. BUS. L.J.
289, 364 (2002) (“Mansfield boldly declared that, past consideration or not, the usage of
merchants did not require consideration for a binding contract, and further that consideration
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promptly rejected in 1778 by the House of Lords.410 The requirement of consideration
had been given a bit of a scare by the towering Scot, but that disturbance had passed
without harm.
Roughly one hundred years later, exactly what the benefit/detriment test for
consideration meant remained unclear. For example, starting in the 1580s, conflicting
opinions arose regarding whether part payment of a debt was consideration for
complete discharge, and the issue was not resolved in England until 1884 in the case
of Foakes v. Beer (it was held not to be sufficient consideration).411 The architects of
classical contract law would have their work cut out for them. But this brings us to
where we started this Article—the nineteenth century.
A significant development in the nineteenth century was superimposing the
requirement of offer and acceptance on the requirement of consideration.412 This
development occurred primarily because of the problem of contracts being formed by
mail, and was imported from the civil law concept that a promise does not become a
promise under law until it is accepted by the promisee, though the legal concept of
“offer” replaced the Roman term pollicitation (a promise that has not been
accepted).413 In Langdell’s casebook, the first chapter is titled “Mutual Consent,” and
it begins with the following quote from Ulpian, the Roman jurist: “Est autem pactio
duorum pluriumve in idem placitum consensus” (“A pact is the consensus of two or
more parties that a party shall do or not do some particular thing.”).414
The requirement of an offer and acceptance did not, however, fit neatly over the
requirement of consideration. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for promises
to be consideration for each other they must have been made at the same time.415 In
Cooke v. Oxley, the court held that a contract did not form when an offeror gave an

was not required in an unsealed written contract subsequent to the passage of the Statute of
Frauds in 1677.”).
410 MURRAY, supra note 343, at 237; see Rann v. Hughes (1778) 2 Eng. Rep. 18, 32 (HL).
411 Foakes v. Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605 (HL); see also DAWSON, supra note 371, at 208–
09.
412 Alfred William Brian Simpson & Brian A. Simpson, Legal Theory and Legal History
(1987) at 187. The case of Payne v. Cave (1789) 3 T.R. 148, 149 (KB), is often cited as
introducing the requirement of offer and acceptance (“[T]he assent of both parties is necessary
to make the contract binding[.]”).
413
Simpson,
supra
note
167,
at
260;
see
also
Parviz
Owsia,
The Notion and Function of Offer and Acceptance under French and English Law, 66 TUL. L.
REV. 871, 873 (1992) (“The modern doctrine of offer and acceptance is a rather late
development in both the civil- and common-law systems. Roman law lacked a formulated
mechanism of offer and acceptance. Under French law, it took shape in the eighteenth century
at the hand of Pothier. Offer and acceptance then worked its way, apparently under Pothier’s
influence, into the English law of contract around the close of the eighteenth and into the
nineteenth centuries.”).
414 LANGDELL, supra note 43, at 1. For the translation, see WILLIAM FREDERICK HARVEY, A
BRIEF DIGEST OF THE ROMAN LAW OF CONTRACTS 77 (1878).
415 Simpson, supra note 167, at 261.
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offeree a certain time within which to accept the offer because the offeree did not
allege that the offeror assented to the deal when the offeree sought to accept.416
This idea ran into further difficulties when offers and acceptances started to be
made by mail. The court in Adams v. Lindsell recognized the problem, believing that
the requirement that the promises be made at the same time, if taken literally, would
mean no contract could ever be formed by mail.417 The court thus held that an offeror
“must be considered in law as making, during every instant of the time their letter was
travelling, the same identical offer to the plaintiffs; and then the contract is completed
by the acceptance of it by letter.”418
This brings us to the late nineteenth century. In 1848, New York had adopted
David Dudley Field’s Code of Civil Procedure, abolishing the forms of action, and,
by 1870, twenty-seven states had followed New York’s lead.419 As a result, in the
place of the ancient formulary system there was now “a formless action based on the
facts of the contractual transaction.”420 Although the abolition of the old forms of
action was not meant to disturb existing substantive law, “the old classifications
provided by the forms of action to save the law from chaos were gone, and judges had
to fill in by continuing to develop general principles.” 421 Around the same time that
the forms of action were disappearing, a reevaluation of consideration was undertaken,
as its present state was one of fragmentation, and there was a desire to refine it more
narrowly.422 The result would be the gradual supplanting of the benefit/detriment test
with a test that the consideration be “bargained for,”423 though the former test
remained the measure of what could qualify as “consideration.”
The bargain theory appeared somewhat in Langdell’s Summary, in which he stated
that “[e]very consideration is . . . the promisor’s sole inducement to make the
416 Cooke v. Oxley (1790) 100 Eng. Rep. 785 (KB); see also Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins
of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427,
436 (2000) (“The case . . . meant that no offer is binding unless immediately accepted because
there is no consideration to make it binding. It was so understood by the legal profession for the
next two decades and the case itself was argued and decided on the basis of consideration.”).
417 Adams v. Lindsell (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250, 251 (KB).
418 Id. This idea might have been new to the English courts, see LANGDELL, supra note 9, at
18 (noting that this idea was a “new one”), but Pothier, in his Treatise on the Contract of Sale,
had proposed the idea, see ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, TREATISE ON THE CONTRACT OF SALE 18
(L.S. Cushing trans., Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1839) (1762) (“[I]n order that
the consent of the parties may take place . . . it is necessary that the will of the party who makes
a proposal in writing should continue until his letter reaches the other party, and until the other
party declares his acceptance of the proposition. The will is presumed to continue, if nothing
appear to the contrary.”), though the court in Adams did not cite to Pothier. Simpson, supra
note 167, at 261.
419 TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 198–99.
420 Id. at 200.
421 Id.
422 Id. at 223.
423 Id.
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promise.”424 It was, however, Holmes’s statement of the bargain theory that is usually
credited with its rise,425 when he wrote in The Common Law that “the root of the
whole matter is the relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other,
between consideration and promise.”426 Detriment to the promisee would suffice, but
only if the parties had “dealt with it on that footing” (as consideration).427 Thus, under
the bargained-for test, a benefit or a detriment had to be bargained for if it was to count
as consideration.428 Also, according to Holmes, whether the benefit or detriment was
considered bargained for was to be determined objectively, based on the parties’ overt
acts.429 The bargain requirement as the test for consideration would be carried forward
by Williston.430 As Allen Boyer has written: “Williston’s favorite principle, of course,
was bargain consideration. The presence of consideration, as if it were a chemical
tracer, was an infallible indicator of an enforceable agreement. The absence of
consideration was so notable a failing that it precluded many reasonable
arrangements.”431
As John Dawson has shown, a recurring element in those transactions enforced by
English common-law courts in the sixteenth century had been that “each party had in
fact desired some act or abstention of the other in return for which he had agreed to
perform his own.”432 Thus, while bargain consideration was not a revolutionary
invention by Holmes,433 what happened during the era of classical contract law was
that the consideration requirement was imposed upon matters for which it was not
originally designed, such as whether a discharge or modification of a contract duty
was binding, or whether a promise to keep an offer open was binding.434 In Grant
Gilmore’s words, it was “[t]he balance wheel of the great machine,” and was “put to

424 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 78; see also Kimball, supra note 63, at 369 (arguing that
“Langdell introduced the bargain theory of contract.”).
425 TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 224.
426 HOLMES, supra note 12, at 293–94.
427 Id. at 292.
428 TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 224.
429 Id.
430 Id.
431 Boyer, supra note 13, at 24. Williston, however, did “not argue that the doctrine is
essential to contract’s ‘true’ nature or that it is consistent with a ‘correct’ theory of the parties’
rights. Rather, he argues that consideration is a necessary evil, a concession to reality. Courts
simply cannot enforce every promise, he reasons; the law needs some screening mechanism.”
Movsesian, supra note 20, at 238.
432 DAWSON, supra note 371, at 203.
433 Id.
434 Id. at 198, 207–21.
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some hitherto unsuspected uses.”435 It was an axiom that would, through deductive
reasoning, provide the correct answer to many questions.
V. AN OVERVIEW OF LANGDELL’S DISCUSSION OF CONSIDERATION IN THE SUMMARY
Interestingly, Langdell did not regard the doctrine of consideration as necessary
for a rational system of contract law,436 and even thought that not requiring
consideration might have been “the more rational course.”437 In fact, Langdell argued
that the belief—among lawyers and some courts—that certain types of promises—
including bills of exchange and policies of insurance—required consideration “is
irreconcilable with the nature of these contracts, even when judged by our law, still
more when judged by the custom of merchants, and that the decisions by which it is
supported, if they cannot be pronounced erroneous, must at least be deemed
anomalous.”438 He believed, however, that “whatever may have been the merits of the
question originally, it was long since conclusively settled” in favor of the doctrine of
consideration.439 Langdell the legal positivist conceded the issue.
Langdell was bothered more, however, by the doctrine of moral consideration,
which he believed would involve “judicial legislation.”440 But Langdell thought there
was an even more significant objection from a “scientific point of view, that it could
only succeed at the expense of involving a fundamental legal doctrine in infinite
confusion.”441 Langdell, who sought to bring an apolitical order to the common law,
could not advocate for such an amorphous concept.
Consistent with the bargain theory, he also rejected the argument that unbargainedfor detrimental reliance on a promise could furnish the consideration for the promise,
even when:
the promise was made with the expectation that the promisee would act or
refrain from acting on the faith of it, and with the intention of inducing him
to do so, and with the full knowledge that a failure to perform the promise
might place the promisee in a worse position than if the promise had never
been made.442
Langdell argued that it could not be consideration because the promisee’s detrimental
reliance was not in fact a condition to the promise, the promise in fact being “absolute
in its terms, and its only condition was the condition (implied by law) of its

435 GILMORE, supra note 15, at 18.
436 Grey, supra note 7, at 26.
437 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 60.
438 Id. at 63.
439 Id. at 61.
440 Id. at 89.
441 Id.
442 Id. at 98–99.
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acceptance.”443 Thus, such a promise, if held legally binding, would really be binding
based on the notion of moral obligation, the moral obligation not based on a prior legal
duty but being created by the promise.444 Langdell wrote that:
[a]s to the moral obligation created by the promise, that is even more delusive
as a ground of decision than an antecedent moral obligation; for every
promise which excites in the promisee an expectation of performance creates
such an obligation, and every binding promise is supposed to excite such an
expectation, the only difference between one promise and another in this
respect being one of degree.445
To Langdell, recognizing unbargained-for detrimental reliance as making a promise
binding “would render a consideration unnecessary in any case, and thus destroy all
distinction in that respect between our law and the civil law.” 446
Thus, with respect to moral obligation and promises inducing unbargained-for
detrimental reliance (the latter currently dealt with under the doctrine of promissory
estoppel), Langdell, the positivist, sought to accurately identify the distinction
between the common law and the civil law, and Langdell, the system builder, sought
to avoid axioms that would make the law too unpredictable.
But what of mutual promises? Was a promise consideration? The law was clear
that an exchange of promises were each consideration for the other—recall that
assumpsit moved beyond debt’s requirement of the receipt of a tangible benefit. As
Langdell noted:
when it had become established that anything of value given or done by the
promisee might be made the consideration for a promise, the courts were not
long in perceiving that the making of a binding promise was giving or doing
something of value, and hence that such promises were entitled to be
admitted into the category of sufficient “considerations.”447
Langdell, the positivist, followed well-established law, though the circularity of the
reasoning (the making of a binding promise was consideration because it was binding,
and it was consideration because it was binding) did not yet seem apparent to him.
But what promises or acts would be considered a good or sufficient consideration?
Langdell gave a broad definition of such consideration, but he included an important
parenthetical qualification: “If anything whatever (which the law can notice) be given
or done in exchange for the promise, it is sufficient; and therefore, if one promise be
given in exchange for another promise, there is sufficient consideration for each.”448
Thus, in an exchange of promises, each promise would be supported by consideration,
assuming it was a promise “which the law can notice.”
443 Id. at 100.
444 Id.
445 Id.
446 Id. (footnote omitted).
447 Id. at 103.
448 Id. at 59.
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The first issue was whether that which was exchanged had to be adequate in value.
Langdell noted that there was no such requirement, and that the reason was because
the objective theory “shut its eyes to the inequality between them”:
[T]he law has never in theory abandoned the principle that consideration
must be commensurate with the obligation which is given in exchange for it;
that, though the smallest consideration would in most cases support the
largest promise, this is only because the law shuts its eyes to the inequality
between them; and hence any inequality to which the law cannot shut its eyes
is fatal to the validity of the promise.449
The reason the law typically shuts its eyes to the inequality between them is because:
[t]he value of most considerations, as well as of most promises, is a thing
which the law cannot measure; it is not merely a matter of fact, but a matter
of opinion. If, therefore, the promisor thinks the consideration is equal to the
promise in value (i.e. if he is willing to give the promise for the sake of getting
the consideration), the consideration will be equal to the promise in value for
all the purposes of the contract. From this it is but an easy step to the
conclusion that, whatever a promisor chooses to accept as the consideration
of his promise, the law will regard as equal to the promise in value, provided
the law can see that it has any value.450
Thus, typically the law considers there to be “in theory . . . a perfect equality in value
between the consideration and the promise.”451 The theory necessarily included a
rejection of the concept of a mixed motive for making the promise—part bargain, part
gift:
That such equality always exists in theory seems pretty clear. In other words,
the promise is in legal contemplation given and received in exchange for the
consideration, and for no other purpose. Therefore, a promise can never
constitute a gift from the promisor to the promisee as to any part of it. 452
One situation in which the law could not ignore the inequality, however, was an
agreement to simultaneously exchange a larger sum of money for a smaller sum.453
No theory could view this as involving an exchange of equivalents.
From the theory that the law presumes an equal exchange, the law could also not
consider the promisor’s actual motive for entering into the agreement, beyond simply
deciding whether the promisor’s apparent motive was to obtain the consideration.
Because the law presumed an equal exchange and presumed that the promisor’s sole
motive was to receive what the other side provided, as long as the promisor’s apparent
motive was to receive what the other side provided, it was irrelevant if the promisor

449 Id. at 70–71.
450 Id.
451 Id. at 71.
452 Id.
453 Id. at 108.
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might have had other motives for making his promise. Langdell thus emphasized the
difference between consideration and the defendant’s actual motive for making the
promise, writing that “the consideration need not in fact constitute the whole, or even
any part, of the motive for making the promise.” 454 He thus rejected the idea of
nominal consideration not being consideration, and believed that the parties could set
up a consideration for the purpose of making the promise binding. He wrote that
“whatever a promisor chooses to accept as the consideration of his promise, the law
will regard as equal to the promise in value, provided that the law can see that it has
any value.”455 As an example, he relied on Thomas v. Thomas, writing that:
the consideration for the defendant’s promise was the plaintiff’s promise, but
a desire to comply with the will of the defendant’s testator was clearly the
defendant’s inducement to make the promise. So a promise may be made for
a nominal consideration, i.e. the consideration may be given and received for
the mere purpose of making the promise binding; and in all such cases there
must of course be some motive for the promise besides the consideration.456
He concluded:
It must not be supposed . . . that motive, as distinguished from consideration,
can constitute any element of a contract, or that it is a thing of which the law
can strictly take any notice. On the contrary, as every consideration is in
theory equal to the promise in value, so it is in theory the promisor’s sole
inducement to make the promise. As the law cannot see any inequality in
value between the consideration and the promise, so it cannot see any motive
for the promise except the consideration.457
Langdell also discussed the difference between consideration and a condition. He
argued that “[a]ny act of the promisee . . . which may constitute a consideration, may
also constitute a condition only; and hence, whether it constitutes one or the other, in
a particular case, depends upon the intention of the parties.” 458 In this respect
(distinguishing consideration from a promise of a gift subject to a condition), the
promisor’s intention had to be taken into account. Langdell (like Holmes)459 believed
the decision in Shadwell v. Shadwell was incorrect—that the uncle’s promise was a

454 Id. at 77.
455 Id. at 71.
456 Id. at 78. Holmes agreed that nominal consideration could be sufficient consideration, see
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1107, 1112–
13 (1984) (noting that Holmes embraced the doctrine of nominal consideration), but he
disagreed with the holding in Thomas v. Thomas, though only because he believed the parties’
agreement “expressly stated other matters as the consideration.” HOLMES, supra note 12, at 292
& n.10.
457 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 78.
458 Id. at 83.
459 HOLMES, supra note 12, at 492 (discussing why he believed Shadwell v. Shadwell was
incorrectly decided).
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gratuitous promise subject to the condition of marriage, rather than marriage being
consideration for the promise.460
There might appear to be some tension between Langdell’s view of nominal
consideration and his view on conditions, but his views can be reconciled. To
Langdell, the question is always whether there is consideration for a promise, and if
there is, the promisor’s actual motive for making the promise will not change that.
And to have consideration, the promisor must have simply manifested an intention to
treat the return promise as consideration, meaning that he manifested an intention to
make his promise in exchange for what the other party was providing. Even if the
promisor’s motive was to obtain what the other was providing simply to make the
promisor’s promise legally binding, there was still an intention to receive what the
other was giving. The motive for wanting to receive it was irrelevant. The question
was whether the promisor had “in fact” made it consideration.461 But if the promisor
did not treat it as consideration—did not make his promise to receive what the other
party was giving—then it was merely a condition, and not consideration. It was a fine
line, but a line nonetheless.
Langdell, seeking to bring order to the common law, argued that for something to
be consideration for a promise it need not benefit the promisor. 462 In fact, he argued
that “benefit to the promisor is irrelevant to the question whether a given thing can be
made the consideration of a promise, though it may be very material to the question
whether it has been made so in fact.”463 To demonstrate that benefit to the promisor
was irrelevant, he argued that “[t]here may be a clear benefit to the promisor, and yet
no consideration, e.g. where the benefit does not come from the promisee.”464 Rather,
the sole test was whether there was a detriment to the promisee: “[D]etriment to the
promisee is a universal test of the sufficiency of consideration; i.e. every consideration
must possess this quality, and, possessing this quality, it is immaterial whether it is a
benefit to the promisor or not.”465 The reason for this was that in debt the debtor had
to receive the consideration before the debt became an obligation, i.e., the debtor had
to receive a benefit, but assumpsit was designed to provide a remedy where debt would
not, and thus benefit to the promisor is unnecessary.466 In assumpsit, the defendant’s

460 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 86. Holmes too considered the parties’ intentions relevant in
distinguishing between consideration and a condition of gratuitous promise, but staying true to
his emphasis on the objective theory, maintained that intent must be determined objectively.
See Daniel P. O’Gorman, Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Theory of Contract Law at the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 13 NE. L. REV. 73, 87—88 (2021) (discussing Holmes’s
approach).
461 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 82.
462 Id.
463 Id.
464 Id.
465 Id.
466 Id.
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promise creates the obligation, not the receipt of a benefit. 467 Langdell, the system
builder, was seeking to scrub the common law of the residue of the old writs,
something very Holmesian indeed. Consideration was being clarified, and as things
became clearer, the bargain theory was emerging as the principal test for
enforceability.
And consistent with the bargain theory, because the promise must be given in
exchange for consideration, the consideration could not have already been provided at
the time the promise is made.468 So-called past consideration was not consideration at
all, and was nothing more than a form of moral consideration.
But Langdell’s effort to formulate a principle for consideration ran into difficulty
precisely because of the old legal benefit/detriment test, the former (detriment)
presumably what he was referring to when he referred to consideration being sufficient
as long as it is that “which the law can notice.” And recall that while he sought to
cleanse the doctrine of consideration of the benefit test, he had held on to the detriment
test, as it seemed consistent with the bargain theory. Here, Langdell, the positivist,
seemed unwilling to go so far as to get rid of both the benefit test and the detriment
test so he was left with explaining when a detriment was sufficient consideration and
when it was not.
Langdell recognized the problem, and he sought to explain it by historical
development. For example, Langdell acknowledged that a promise to pay an existing
debt was not treated as consideration. But why not, if any promise was typically
sufficient consideration? Langdell traced the limitation to the purpose of assumpsit.
Assumpsit arose to relax the requirements of debt, but despite Slade’s Case, Langdell
believed that the preexisting-duty rule was a holdover from the notion existing before
Slade’s Case that assumpsit was designed to provide a remedy where debt would
not.469 Langdell was thus a supporter of the preexisting-duty rule, but apparently for
historical reasons. Here Langdell was the positivist, not the conceptualist. Holmes
would likely have disapproved of such an unquestioning devotion to the past.
Importantly, Langdell also concluded that a legal principle was that “a verbal
surrender of a thing which is by law incapable of being surrendered (e.g. an estate at
will) will not be a consideration.”470 Thus, not all promises that were bargained for
were sufficient consideration, like, for example, promises including something “which
is by law incapable of being surrendered.” If this was a top-level principle that had
been derived from the caselaw, then it had to be thrown back down upon the cases (the
specimens) and any inconsistent cases declared incorrectly decided (illogical
aberrations). This of course required that it then be determined when the law says
something is incapable of being surrendered. Langdell wrote that:
the doing of a thing which the promisee is already bound to the promisor to
do is clearly no consideration. Thus, payment of a judgment by the judgment
creditor is no consideration for a promise by the judgment creditor. And the
same principle seems to apply when the promisee is under an obligation to a
467 Id.
468 Id. at 87.
469 Id. at 61.
470 Id. at 68.
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third person to do the thing in question; for there is then a conclusive
presumption of law that he does it in discharge of his previous obligation,
and not as a consideration of a new promise. 471
In essence, a person does not surrender a right when the person performs a preexisting
duty owed to the promisor, and such performance is therefore not a detriment incurred
for the promise. And even if the duty is owed to a third party, there is a conclusive
presumption that when the person acts and discharges the duty, he is doing it solely to
discharge the duty, and not as a consideration for the new promise. Contrary decisions
were therefore incorrectly decided.472 Again, while consideration should be
distinguished from actual motive, presumed motive determined if there was
consideration (a detriment).
Here we see Langdell, the logician (one is incapable of surrendering a right to a
promisor when he performs a preexisting duty to the promisor), and then seeking to
extend that logic to what is a different situation (the duty is owed to a third party),
even to the extent of declaring contrary decisions incorrect. Langdell, the
conceptualist/formalist, is fully on display here, and we will return to this important
issue of law in more detail in the next Part.
In sum, we see Langdell, in his discussion of consideration in the Summary, as
both the legal positivist and the conceptualist/formalist. The legal positivist recognizes
that the doctrine of consideration is an established part of the common law even if
there was a more rational course that could be taken, and should be retained if the
common law is to remain distinct from the civil law. Langdell the positivist also
recognized and accepted the historical reason for holding that the payment of a
preexisting debt was not consideration. Langdell the conceptualist/formalist expressed
concern about recognizing exceptions to the bargain test for consideration that would
make it difficult to predict future cases, such as the doctrine of moral consideration
and detrimental reliance. The conceptualist/formalist also believed that a person’s
performance of a preexisting duty could not be consideration for a promise by the
right-holder because the former was not, in performing, surrendering any right, and
extended this principle to performing a duty owed to a third party, through a legal
presumption that the person is acting solely to discharge the duty.
VI. LANGDELL’S DIFFERENCES WITH HOLMES AND WILLISTON ON CONSIDERATION
Having shown how Langdell’s view of consideration displayed both his positivist
side and his conceptualist/formalist side, this Part now discusses three instances in
which Holmes or Williston or both disagreed with Langdell on an issue regarding the
doctrine of consideration. The first involves a promise that is conditional on a past
event; the second involves the so-called mailbox rule; and the third involves the issue
of whether a promise to perform a duty owed to a third party is consideration. As will
be shown, these disagreements highlight how Langdell and the other leading architects
of classical contract law could not agree on the nature of consideration because they
had differing concepts of law and, even when they applied the same concept (logic),
the concept proved unable to provide an answer.

471 Id. at 69.
472 Id.
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Promise Conditional on Past or Current Event: Communis Error Facit Jus
and the “Theory of Contract” Itself

If a fundamental principle of consideration was that a promise, in general, was
sufficient consideration for a return promise (and it had been, since the late sixteenth
century), the definition of promise would play a key role in any unified theory of
consideration, even if everyone agreed on the bargain test for consideration.
Langdell’s legal definition of promise, however, differed from, and was narrower than,
that of Holmes and Williston, and in an important way. Langdell maintained that a
promise to pay a sum of money conditional on the existence of some past or present
fact was not truly a promise if the fact had not existed, or did not exist. 473
In Langdell’s Summary, he provided a hypothetical in which two parties wager on
the result of a race that has already taken place.474 He acknowledged that precedent
held that each party’s promise was supported by consideration,475 but he considered
this to perhaps be a situation of communis error facit jus (common error makes
law).476 For example, he believed March v. Pigot477 was wrong on principle.478 In
that case, the court upheld a wager between two sons as to whose father would live
longer, even though unknown to the parties, one of the fathers had already died.
Langdell, citing as support a 1761 treatise by the French jurist Robert Joseph Pothier,
argued that “if a wager be made by mutual promises upon a race which has already
taken place, but the result of which is unknown to the parties, it is the losing party
alone who promises, and he really receives no consideration for his promise.” 479
Langdell, unlike, say, Joel Bishop, arrived at this result through an application of the
definition of promise, and not because wagers were in some sense immoral.480
Pothier, for example, had written:
For a condition to have the effect of suspending an obligation, it is necessary,
1. That it should be a condition of something future; an obligation contracted
under the condition of anything that is past, or present, is not properly a

473 Id. at 31–32.
474 Id. at 111.
475 Id.; see also Val D. Ricks, In Defense of Mutuality of Obligation: Why “Both Should Be
Bound, or Neither,” 78 NEB. L. REV. 491, 506–07 (1999) (“Courts decided conclusively at least
by the mid-1600s that assumpsit based on mutual promises lay for wagers even though only one
party could win and no mutual remedy could exist.”).
476 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 111.
477 March v. Pigot (1771) 98 Eng. Rep. 471, 472 (KB).
478 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 111.
479 Id.
480 See Siegel, supra note 7, at 258 (“Bishop . . . prefaces his elaboration of common law
principle with a disquisition on the moral impropriety of wagers. For Bishop, then, the
conclusion that wagering contracts fail for want of consideration illustrates the wondrous
coincidence between an exacting understanding of common law principle and moral
principle.”).
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conditional obligation. For instance, if after the lottery has begun to be drawn,
and before an account of it is received, I promise a person to give him a
certain sum in case I have the first drawn ticket; or if I promise a certain sum
in case the Pope is now living, these obligations are not conditional, but they
have at first their full perfection, if it appears that I really have the first drawn
ticket, or that the Pope is living; or on the contrary no obligation is
contracted if it appears that I have not the first drawn ticket, or that the Pope
is dead.481
The idea was that if there had already been the nonoccurrence, then at the time of
contract formation there was, in fact, no duty to perform and hence no detriment. If
the condition was to occur or not occur in the future, there was at least a conditional
promise, which Langdell considered a detriment because the promisor could possibly
suffer a detriment, and the possibility of having to perform could be considered a
detriment.482
This view had potentially broad-ranging implications for the doctrine of
consideration. Anytime a party’s promise was subject to a condition, and the condition
already failed at the time of the promise, Langdell believed there was in fact no
promise and thus there was no consideration for the other party’s promise. 483 This
meant that the other party could not be held liable for breach because his promise was
not supported by consideration. No contract ever formed. Thus, if the condition was a
future event, a contract still formed and the other party was obligated to perform, but
if it was a current or past event that did not exist or had not happened, then the other
party was not obligated to perform.
The issue extended beyond wagers. For example, prospective heirs might agree to
share in their bequests from the decedent’s will, making the agreement before the
contents of the will are known. Such an agreement is a form of insurance, designed to
reduce risk. Under Langdell’s theory, any heir who was in fact (but unknowingly) not
giving up anything (such heir’s share being smaller than the others’ shares), had not
made a promise. Hence, that heir could not enforce the other heirs’ promises. Langdell
in fact recognized that this doctrine would frequently make charter-party contracts
unenforceable.484 Langdell’s argument was significant in that it applied even when
the parties understood there was doubt about whether the event had occurred, and were
contracting on that understanding, a situation much different from when the parties
had contracted based on a mistaken assumption.
Three things are notable about Langdell’s position. The first is that he states this
is perhaps an example of communis error facit jus, which is an acknowledgment that
this is “law,” reflecting his positivist side, though his conceptualist/formalist side feels
compelled to point out that it appears inconsistent with a top-level principle, here that
being the definition of promise.

481 1 ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS OR CONTRACTS 199
(Philadelphia, William David Evans trans., 3d ed. 1853) (1761) (emphasis added).
482 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 104–05.
483 Id. at 105.
484 Id. at 33.
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The second is that despite courts having rejected his position, he does not discuss
whether his narrow definition of promise should be expanded to accommodate the
results reached by the courts. If the courts are concluding that there are mutual
promises in such cases, and hence consideration, presumably they believe there is no
basis to treat them as unenforceable. Langdell does not express any interest in
considering whether his definition of promise should, for policy reasons, be expanded
to accommodate the decisions and any policy justifications for those decisions.
The third is that Langdell relied on Pothier, a French civil-law jurist, over the
common-law precedent for the substance of his conceptualist (not positivist) definition
of promise.485 Had there not been common-law precedent on the issue, his reliance on
Pothier’s treatise would not be particularly surprising.486 Pothier’s treatise on the law
of obligations was the most famous of the French jurist’s many works, 487 and it is
considered his primary contribution to legal science.488 And it was the type of book
that would appeal to someone like Langdell, who sought to bring order to the common
law, while still respecting its historical development. As one commentator has written:
In Pothier we see a lawyer who saw that there were three aspects of law that
must enter the legal mind: the great bases which he found in Roman law
partly, but also largely in the Law of Nature; the great realm of practice; the
great and varying systems of customary law. He laboured like a Titan to bring
together into one perfect whole these aspects of law, and performed a task of
inconceivable labour and difficulty when he produced what was practically a
code of French substantive and procedural law.489
Further, Pothier, like Langdell (and Holmes), distinguished between moral obligations
and legal obligations, in the tradition of the pre-modern civil law jurists.490 Thus,
while Pothier strongly believed in the natural-law tradition,491 he also “granted that

485 Id. at 1.
486 See Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1235 (2001) (“American
legal writers had long promoted the study of Roman and civil law on the ground that it supplied
a more logical and elegant arrangement than the common-law writ system. So when in the midnineteenth century the abolition of the forms of action required a new arrangement based on
substantive law categories, it was natural to look to the civil law . . . .”) (citation omitted).
487 J.E. de Montmorency, Robert-Joseph Pothier and French Law, 13 J. SOC. COMP. LEG.
265, 280 (1913).
488 Id. at 484.
489 Id. at 287.
490 See Perillo, supra note 166, at 283 (“Typically, these jurists examined both the morality
and the legality of conduct, distinguishing the ‘forum of conscience’ from the ‘exterior forum.’
The former involves an examination of conduct through the lens of moral philosophy; the latter
is an examination of how a court would rule on the conduct in question.”). Perillo argues that
“American scholars with some frequency mistake Pothier’s philosophical comments for
statements of law.” Id. at 283 n.133.
491 See Francesco Parisi, Alterum Non Laedere: An Intellectual History of Civil Liability, 39
AM. J. JURIS. 317, 348 (1994) (noting that Pothier “stressed the fact that natural law provides
the conceptual foundation for every obligation. According to this view, if contracts or torts give
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positive law could override the natural law, writing that ‘the civil law can restrict that
which natural law only permits.’”492
Pothier’s treatise had been translated into English in 1802 by a U.S. publisher
(Martin and Ogden) and then in 1806 by an English publisher (William David Evans),
and was well known in the United States by at least the 1830s.493 The translation came
at an opportune time, for as we have seen, there was a belief at this time that the
common law lacked a formal congruity, and its disorder was often contrasted with the
order of the civil-law treatises.494 The French treatises, such as those by Pothier,
“presented the example of an elaborate system of laws reduced to order and congruity
and set forth clearly and intelligibly in scientific treatises.” 495
The popularity of Pothier’s contracts treatise in the common-law world in the early
and mid-nineteenth century is shown by the preface to the 1839 translation of his
treatise on sales, wherein it was noted that his “treatise on obligations . . . has become
a standard work without which even a moderately sized law-library would scarcely be
considered complete.”496 Joseph Perillo observes that “[i]n America, Pothier was the
Blackstone of Contract Law,” and that “[r]eading Pothier was part of the education of
many apprentice lawyers.”497 Pothier was thus quite influential in England and the

rise to obligations, it is because natural law itself prescribes that people fulfill their promises
and compensate others for the harm caused by their faulty activities.”).
492 Perillo, supra note 166, at 288 (quoting Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 524 (1896)).
493 Perillo, supra note 166, at 270; see also Roscoe Pound, The French Civil Code and the
Spirit of Nineteenth Century Law, 35 B.U. L. REV. 77, 83 (1955) (“[The] reading of French
treatises on the law of nature was part of the training of the well read American lawyer down to
the time of the Civil War.”); Peter Stein, The Attraction of Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary
America, 52 VA. L. REV. 403, 412–13 (1966) (discussing Pothier’s influence in the U.S.).
494 Roscoe Pound, Influence of French Law in America, 3 ILL. L. REV. 354, 360 (1908–1909);
see also P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 351 (1979) (noting, with
respect to England, that “[w]hen Pothier’s Law of Obligations appeared in English translation
in 1806 it was avidly seized upon by English lawyers and judges, partly . . . because, in this age
of principles, lawyers were beginning to think in terms of general principles of jurisprudence.”).
495 Pound, supra note 494, at 362.
496 L.S. Cushing, Preface to POTHIER, supra note 418, at v, v–vi.
497 Perillo, supra note 166, at 268.
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United States,498 and not only had Langdell studied Roman civil law at Harvard Law
School,499 his fondness for Pothier has been recognized.500
In fact, a third edition of Evans’s English edition was published in the United
States in 1853,501 just two years before Langdell started practicing law on Wall Street.
Interestingly, Roscoe Pound commented that “[o]ne who reads the older American
reports, particularly those of the State of New York, cannot fail to notice the unusual
number of references to the writers and authorities of the civil law which they contain
and the great deference which appears to be paid to such authorities.”502 Further,
“counsel, so far as their arguments are reported, cite civilians (mostly French)
repeatedly.”503
This did not mean, however, that civil law was considered more persuasive than
English law, and “[c]ases may be found in the reports in which Pothier and Domat
498 Jan Vetter, The Evolution of Holmes, Holmes and Evolution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 343, 355
(1984) (noting that Pothier’s “writing on contract was influential in nineteenth century . . .
America . . . .”); M.H. Hoeflich, John Austin and Joseph Story: Two Nineteenth Century
Perspectives on the Utility of the Civil Law for the Common Lawyer, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 36,
58 n.92 (1985) (“Robert Joseph Pothier was one of the most important civilian private law
theorists of the eighteenth century. His works on contract laws were of immense importance in
the development of Anglo-American contract doctrine.”); Val D. Ricks, American Mutual
Mistake: Half-Civilian Mongrel, Consideration Reincarnate, 58 LA. L. REV. 663, 686–87
(1998) (“Other than the Roman law itself, however, by far the most prominent among civilian
sources influencing early American and contemporary English authorities is Pothier. Robert
Joseph Pothier published his Treatise on the Law of Obligations or Contracts in French in
1761. The work had a lasting influence on the common law in England and America. At one
time a British commentator opined that Pothier’s contract doctrine was ‘law at Westminster as
well as Orleans.’”) (citation omitted).
499 KIMBALL, supra note 10, at 36.
500 See Samuel J. Stoljar, The False Distinction Between Unilateral and Bilateral Contracts,
64 YALE L.J. 515, 515 n.3 (1955) (noting “Langdell’s fondness for Pothier whose continental
ideas he drew on wherever possible.”).
501 Perillo, supra note 166, at 270 n.23. Evans’s English edition had been published in
Philadelphia in 1826, 1839, and 1853. Simpson, supra note 167, at 255 n.29.
502 Pound, supra note 494, at 354; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 66 (noting that
“French civil law, . . . particularly after the French revolution, had a certain attraction for
American liberals” that in the “[i]n the early nineteenth century, the Napoleonic Code was a
model of clarity and order,” and that the “[c]ommon law, to some jurists, seemed feudal,
barbaric, uncouth, at least in comparison to the neatness of some features of civil law.”).
503 Pound, supra note 494, at 354. Pound identified four possible reasons for the civil law
influence in the United States during the first half of the nineteenth century: (1) The rise of the
law merchant; (2) the hostility toward England and English institutions that prevailed in the
latter part of the eighteenth century and the early part of the nineteenth century and the feelings
of friendship for France on the part of a large portion of the country at the same time; (3) the
great influence in the first half of the nineteenth century of Chancellor Kent and Judge Story,
who were learned civilians and cited the civil law in their opinions and books very freely; and
(4) the movement for reform in practice and pleading which created great dissatisfaction with
the common law at a time when the effects of the other causes were making themselves felt. Id.
at 355 (footnote omitted).
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[another French jurist] were cited by counsel but the court took a different view upon
the basis of English decisions.”504 In fact, the actual influence of Pothier in the United
States is a matter of contention, and, whereas Joseph Perillo believed it was
significant,505 Pound believed it was not:
If a matter came up in a common-law court to be settled for the first time, the
court often cited the civil law to fortify its own conclusion,—which
nevertheless amounted simply to declaring its own ideas of the law and
fortifying them by showing that others had reached the same result. When
the ideas of the judges on new points differed from those of the civilians, they
did not hesitate to follow their own. This is enough to show that they were
engaged in building up the common-law, not in receiving another system in
its stead.506
Pound concludes: “Men admired and sometimes quoted the civilians, but they adhered
to the common law.”507
In any event, whatever the extent of Pothier’s influence in the United States, it
came to an abrupt halt in the mid-century, just as Langdell started to practice law.508
“The common law came to be taught in law schools, an educated profession came into
existence, and soon it was seen to be a mistake to suppose the civil law in substance
wiser than our own.”509 But Langdell seemed to hang on to Pothier, well after Pothier
had gone out of vogue in the United States. And what is more surprising is that
Langdell, in 1880, in the Summary, used Pothier as support for a position contrary to
the position taken in the common law, something that U.S. courts avoided even when
Pothier’s influence was at its height. To make matters more puzzling, this was a
position of Pothier’s that seemed to run contrary to Pothier’s famous will theory of
contract. As Roscoe Pound has observed, a feature of the will theory of contract was
that “one could contract that a future event should come to pass over which he had
only a limited or even no power.”510
Langdell obviously believed Pothier’s concept of promise was correct, and the
formalist in Langdell followed that conclusion down. Langdell asserted that even
though the parties intended to be bound, it would be difficult to argue that there was

504 Id. at 356.
505 Perillo, supra note 166, at 267.
506 Pound, supra note 494, at 361–62; see also Franklin G. Snyder & Ann M. Mirabito, The
Death of Contracts, 52 DUQ. L. REV. 345, 361 n.68 (2014) (arguing that Pothier’s works “were
eagerly received, in our view, in the way that a man with a nail eagerly looks around for anything
that might be used to hammer it in . . . . [T]he treatise writers seem to be the carts, not the
horses.”).
507 Pound, supra note 494, at 361.
508 Id. at 354; see also Stein, supra note 493, at 432 (noting that “by 1850, [civil law] had
probably ceased to be a real force in the development of American law.”).
509 Pound, supra note 494, at 363.
510 Pound, supra note 493, at 92.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2022

75

534

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[70:459

consideration for the agreement.511 For Langdell, following Pothier, something could
not be a promise if there was no chance the promisor would have to perform. Or,
similarly (in the language of the common law), how could it be a detriment to the
promisor to promise to perform when there was no chance they would have to
perform? What was one giving up? A promise of nominal consideration might involve
a very small amount of consideration, but it was at least a promise to do something,
not a promise to do nothing.
Langdell seems to believe that it had not occurred to the common-law courts that
their decisions were inconsistent with the proper meaning of promise, an error that had
been avoided by Pothier. Langdell wrote that the question had not arisen in the
cases,512 courts having “assumed” there were mutual promises, and that in March v.
Pigot the court failed to notice the issue.513 Here, Langdell displays a desire for logical
cohesion based on first principles, here the first principle being a proper definition of
promise, even if it is at odds with the prevailing common law. And for Langdell, there
was nothing wrong with relying on Pothier to point that out, even if it was 1880 and
civilian authority was no longer in vogue. Good logic was good logic, and, after all,
the French were known for their logical minds.514
This was a big issue for Holmes, one that he believed concerned the “theory of
contract” itself.515 In The Common Law, he expressed his disagreement with Langdell
(and thus Pothier), and adopted a more expansive view of promise than in vogue at
the time. In particular, he was critical of the definition of promise that had been
included in the Indian Contract Act of 1872. The Act had defined a proposal as
“[w]hen one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to abstain from doing
anything . . . .”516 Holmes took issue with this definition because it would mean that
a person could not promise, in a legal sense, that an event outside of his control would
occur. For example, under this definition, a person could not promise that it would not
rain tomorrow.
Holmes saw this definition as unsound for two reasons. First, many promises of
future action are subject to events outside of the promisor’s control. For example, a
promise to pay a sum of money is subject to the promisor having the means to pay the
money when the money is due. Some promisors have greater control over the
occurrence of the promised event, but Holmes saw this simply as differences in degree.

511 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 41.
512 Id.
513 Id. at 111.
514 See Guy Canivet, French Civil Law Between Past and Revival, 51 LOY. L. REV. 39, 45
(2005) (noting that the French Civil Code continues to be praised for “its internal logic, which
is generally associated with the French logical mind . . . .”); Josef L. Kunz, Book Review, 105
U. PA. L. REV. 130, 130 (1956) (reviewing THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON LAW
WORLD (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1956)) (“In France not only was the influence of Roman law
strong, but the French spirit and language had inherited from Rome the love for precision, clarity
and logic.”).
515 HOLMES, supra note 12, at 235.
516 Id. at 233.
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Once this was recognized, and it was recognized that the law did not concern itself
with the degree of control (the general rule being strict liability in contract law), there
was no reason to believe that a promisor could not promise an event wholly outside of
their control, it simply being a difference in degree of control.517 Holmes believed that
“[a] promise, then, is simply an accepted assurance that a certain event or state of
things shall come to pass.”518 Holmes distinguished what should be included in the
legal definition of promise from what might be the more restrictive meaning of
promise in the “moral world,” acknowledging that “[i]n the moral world it may be that
the obligation of a promise is confined to what lies within the reach of the promisor .
. . .”519 Holmes supported his view of the legal meaning of promise by pointing out
that the general remedy for breach of contract was an award of damages, not an order
of specific performance, and thus it was incorrect to consider a promise as somehow
subjecting the promisor’s will (future action) to that of another. 520
Second, and most importantly (and flowing from the first reason), a promise under
law was simply a person agreeing to a risk, a risk that the promised event would not
occur.521 He thus viewed a contract, and the “true theory of contract under the
common law”522 as “the taking of a risk,”523 and having nothing to do with the
morality of promising.
Having rejected the Indian Contract Act’s definition of promise (technically, the
definition of “proposal”), and having identified the true nature of contract under the
common law (an assumption of risk), Holmes’s rejection of Langdell’s (and Pothier’s)
argument regarding past events was a foregone conclusion, and Holmes found
Langdell’s (and Pothier’s) argument “unsound.” He did not see how a past
nonoccurrence that was unknown to the parties could be meaningfully distinguished
from a future nonoccurrence, as both were uncertain, and that a promise to pay in
either situation was a detriment for purposes of consideration.524 If a promise that it
would not rain tomorrow was a promise despite the promisor having no control over
the event’s occurrence, there was no meaningful distinction between that type of
promise and a promise to pay if a prior event had not occurred. And Holmes pointed
out that Langdell of course acknowledged that “[i]t is no objection to a promise as a
consideration for another promise, that it is conditional upon some future and
uncertain event . . . .”525 Langdell’s argument seemed to be based on a distinction that,

517 Id. at 234.
518 Id. at 235.
519 Id. at 234.
520 Id. at 235.
521 Id.
522 Id. at 238.
523 Id. at 236.
524 Id. at 239.
525 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 111.
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while having superficial logical appeal, could not be supported. Remember, Holmes
did not wish to banish logic completely from the development of the law.
But Holmes also objected to Langdell’s argument on practical grounds, relying on
his theory that a contract was simply an agreement to assume risks. 526 Holmes wrote
that “[c]ontracts are dealings between men, by which they make arrangements for the
future,” and “[w]ere this view unsound, it is hard to see how wagers on any future
event, except a miracle, could be sustained.”527 Holmes saw no meaningful distinction
between lack of knowledge about the past or present and lack of knowledge about the
future. Take, for example, an insurance contract. If the parties agree that the insured
will pay a specified amount if his house does not burn down, and in exchange the
insurance company promises to pay a specified amount if it does, only one party will
end up benefiting and only one will suffer a detriment. But if a contract was simply an
agreement to assume risks, there should be no reason why parties could not agree to
assume the risk of whether a present or past fact existed, and the legal definition of
promise should be made to accommodate that.
Williston, in a 1914 article, agreed with Holmes, and like Holmes, emphasized that
“law is made for man, not man made for the law,” and criticized Langdell as seeking
to construct the law based on “universal intelligence.” He wrote:
Professor Langdell regards these decisions as inexplicable on principle and
only to be accounted for by the maxim communis error facit jus; but when a
decision is founded on common sense it seems better to seek an underlying
reason than to ascribe the result to common error, and I think it evidence that
the law looks at the matter not from the standpoint of universal intelligence
but from the standpoint of the parties; and as the law is made for man, not
man made for the law, this is the only proper attitude. From the standpoint of
the parties in the cases referred to above, the risk is as real where the
contingency has already happened, but is unknown, as is the case where the
contingency has not yet happened. This is not saying that anything is
detrimental which the parties think detrimental, but only that where on the
facts known at the time of the bargain any reasonable person would think
performance of the promise might require an act or forbearance, which the
law (not the parties) regards as detrimental to the promisor or beneficial to
the promisee, the promise is sufficient consideration.528
Williston agreed with Holmes that there was no logical distinction between a promise
subject to a future condition (which might never occur) and a condition that was a past
event. He thus proposed the following test:
[W]here on the facts known at the time of the bargain any reasonable person
would think performance of the promise might require an act or forbearance,

526 HOLMES, supra note 12, at 236.
527 Id. at 239.
528 Samuel Williston, Consideration in Bilateral Contracts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 503, 527
(1914).
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which the law (not the parties) regards as detrimental to the promisor or
beneficial to the promisee, the promise is sufficient consideration.529
Williston in his 1920 treatise reiterated his position, writing that “these decisions are
sound in principle.”530 The Restatement of Contracts (with Williston as its reporter),
took the same position,531 and provided the following illustration:
A promises B to pay him $5000 if B’s ship now at sea has already been lost,
the fact being, though unknown to the promisor, that the ship has not been
lost. This is sufficient consideration for a return promise, since it reasonably
seems to the promisor that keeping his promise may involve payment of
$5000.532
What we see, then, is that Langdell and Holmes had a fundamental disagreement
about consideration, one that was not simply about the definition of promise, but one
that went to the true theory of contract. Each took a position that they believed
appropriate for their conceptual framework. Holmes’s principle was that contracts are
simply assumptions of risk and, hence, the second-level principle that flowed from
this was that parties could contract to assume the risk of the occurrence or
nonoccurrence of a past event.533 Holmes, part logician, sought to demonstrate that
Langdell’s position was illogical.
Holmes’s view was also pragmatic in that the true conception of the legal meaning
of promise should be based on whether the conception was useful. Some of the things
that the pragmatists of the time had in common was “[a] distaste for verbalism, and an
approach to meaning in terms of ‘practical’ or ‘pragmatic’ consequences” and the
“[i]dea that meaning shifts and changes, growing as our knowledge grows.” 534 And
recall that, to Holmes, a comprehensive system based solely on logic would be a static
system built on pre-industrial views of society, which was inappropriate for the
nineteenth-century industrial United States.535 To Holmes, the legal definition of
promise should be made to accommodate the use to which contract law should be put
(particularly in the industrial age), irrespective of how promise might be defined
outside of law, including by moral philosophers. Hence, the appropriate legal
definition of promise was “simply an accepted assurance that a certain event or state
of things will come to pass,” or “that a certain event or state of things has come to
pass.” This definition was driven by what he believed was the true theory of contract

529 Id.
530 WILLISTON, supra note 317; see also James Barr Ames, Two Theories of Consideration,
13 HARV. L. REV. 29, 34–35 (1899) (agreeing with Holmes and Williston, and noting Langdell’s
disagreement).
531 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 84(f) (AM. LAW INST. 1932).
532 Id. § 84 cmt. F, illus. 11.
533 HOLMES, supra note 12, at 235–39.
534 Susan Haack, The Pragmatist, in THE PRAGMATISM AND PREJUDICE OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES JR., supra note 227, at 169, 172.
535 Reimann, supra note 7, at 104.
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under the common law. What Pothier, a civil jurist, believed, seemed irrelevant to
Holmes, who did not even acknowledge his argument.
Langdell, in contrast, fell into the trap of trying to define promise outside of its
purpose in contract law. For Langdell, contract law flowed from the true concept of
promise, not the other way around. And his reliance on Pothier was instructive, as the
French approach to law has been contrasted with the common-law approach as
follows:
[A] contrast not between logic and the lack of it, but between an approach
which treats principles as having an immutable meaning (or at least is
unwilling to re-examine the established interpretation in the light of its
consequences) [the French approach], and one which acknowledges that
meanings and interpretations change with the circumstances [the commonlaw approach].536
Langdell’s approach does, however, have a certain appeal when one remembers
that he apparently hoped to make contract law apolitical. If that is to be done, a judge’s
discretion should be limited. One way to do this is to apply preexisting notions of
whether a promise has been made, rather than let the definition be driven by the
judge’s concept of contract law’s purpose. Langdell’s desire for an apolitical,
comprehensive, and logical structure to contract law made him feel compelled to call
out those courts for failing to recognize the illogical nature of their decisions. He did
not even feel compelled to consider the practical effects this would have on the
enforceability of charter-party contracts, being seemingly unconcerned about the
matter.537 There is no reason to believe that Langdell was taking the position he was
on this issue because it fit within some general theory of contract law that he had, and
was instead simply trying to make the second-tier rules consistent with the first-tier
principles. The problem was that this first-tier principle was not derived from the
common-law cases, but from civil law. Langdell, the conceptualist and formalist,
prevailed over Langdell the positivist.
B.

The Mailbox Rule

Langdell’s definition of promise also left no room for the so-called mailbox rule
(the rule that an acceptance is effective upon dispatch, not receipt), again being
influenced by the civil law. Langdell, the positivist, acknowledged that it was
“supposed to be pretty well settled” in the common law that an acceptance by mail
formed a contract upon dispatch,538 but he went to lengths to show that the matter had

536 BARRY NICHOLAS, THE FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 21 (2d ed. 2005).
537 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 40–41.
538 Id. at 15. But not completely settled. See Grey, supra note 7, at 3
(“When Langdell confronted it, the question had not yet been settled. The courts of England and
New York had adopted the mailbox rule, but those of Massachusetts had rejected it.”); Sebok,
supra note 162, at 2078 (“[W]hen Langdell wrote his treatise on contracts, the ‘mailbox rule’
had not yet become settled law in American jurisdictions.”); Note, Limitations on the
“Acceptance on Mailing” Theory, 17 HARV. L. REV. 342, 342 (1904) (“All jurisdictions, except
possibly Massachusetts, hold that a letter accepting an offer completes the contract when
mailed.”) (footnote omitted). The Massachusetts case was M’Culloch v. The Eagle Insurance
Co., 1 Pickering 278 (Mass. 1822), which was arguably overruled by Brauer v. Shaw, 46 N.E.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss3/6

80

2022]

LANGDELL AND CLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW

539

not been resolved conclusively (consistent with his positivism),539 and argued that the
“nature of the question has been misunderstood” (consistent with his
conceptualism/formalism).540
Langdell maintained that in law a promise did not become a promise until it was
accepted by the promisee.541 He thus argued that a promise was in effect an offer,542
what Roman law had called a pollicitation (an offer that was not yet accepted).543 This
was a civil-law concept that had been imported into English law in the eighteenth
century,544 and Langdell in his Summary cited as support Hugo Grotius (the Dutch
natural-law jurist) and Pothier.545 From there, Langdell pointed out that an acceptance
of an offer for a bilateral contract necessarily included a counter-promise,546 and as a
promise it was a mere offer until accepted by the promisee. 547
This, however, did not itself warrant a rejection of the mailbox rule. According to
Langdell, the requirement that a counter-promise be itself accepted by the offeror did
not require the offeror to expressly accept the offeree’s counter-promise; his
acceptance of the counter-promise was implied in his offer as long as his offer
continued.548 In fact, Langdell seemingly believed that an acceptance of a promise
required a mental act only.549

617 (Mass. 1897) (Holmes, J.); see also Lennox v. Murphy, 50 N.E. 644, 645–46 (Mass. 1898)
(Holmes, J.) (“There is no universal doctrine of the common law, as understood in this
commonwealth, that acceptance of an offer must be communicated in order to make a valid
simple contract . . . .”); Ian R. Macneil, Time of Acceptance: Too Many Problems for a Single
Rule, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 947, 944 n.20 (1964) (arguing that Brauer rendered M’Culloch
“dubious authority.”).
539 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 16–20.
540 Id. at 16. Catherine Wells has argued that Langdell’s position on the mailbox rule “can
be found nowhere in the cases” and “it must be regarded as solely his creation.” Wells, supra
note 65, at 584.
541 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 4.
542 Id.
543 Simpson, supra note 167, at 260.
544 Id.
545 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 1. With respect to Grotious, it has been recognized that “[b]y
some accounts, Grotius achieved similar feats in the law as Galileo had accomplished in natural
science . . . . He believed that you could begin with fundamental, universal principles and reason
outward.” John A. Powell & Stephen M. Menendian, Remaking Law: Moving Beyond
Enlightenment Jurisprudence, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1035, 1054 (2010).
546 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 15.
547 Id. at 1.
548 Id. at 14.
549 Id. at 1.
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But what was also required to make a promise effective, in addition to acceptance
of it by the promisee, was communication of the promise to the promisee.550 The
offeror’s acceptance of the offeree’s counter-promise might be a mental act only
(effective in advance of the offeror’s knowledge of the counter-promise), but when an
acceptance included a counter-promise, the counter-promise itself could not be
effective against the offeree unless and until the offeror obtained knowledge of it. 551
This flowed from the requirement that a promise, to be effective, had to come to the
knowledge of the promisee.
Langdell derived this top-level axiom—a promise must come to the knowledge of
the promisee before it can be effective as a promise—inductively from the caselaw
that held that an offer cannot be accepted by the offeree unless the offeree is aware of
it.552 Langdell wrote: “[C]ommunication to the offeree is of the essence of every
offer.”553 And “the letter of acceptance must come to the knowledge of the [offeror]
for the same reason that the letter containing the original offer must come to the
knowledge of the offeree.”554 Thus, “[t]he acceptance . . . must be communicated to
the original [offeror], and until such communication the contract is not made.” 555 In
other words, if an offer must be known to the offeree for the offeree to have the power
to accept it (an established rule at the time),556 it logically followed that an acceptance
was ineffective until the offeror was aware of it as the acceptance included a counterpromise. This meant that “in contracts inter absentes the letter [of acceptance] must
be received and read.”557
Langdell’s belief that logic dictated this result is shown by reviewing the two
arguments in its favor he seemed to consider the most persuasive—one by Merlin de
Douai, who had been the procureur-général at the French Court of Cassation from
1801 to 1814, in the case of S. v. F. (included in Langdell’s casebook), which Langdell
called a “powerful argument;”558 and the other by the Scottish judge John Marshall,
550 Id. at 15.
551 Id. at 14.
552 Id. at 15.
553 Id.
554 Id. at 19.
555 Id. at 15.
556 See LANGDELL, supra note 43, at 1019 (noting that “[a]n offer has no efficacy until
communicated to the offeree” and providing page citations to the cases in the casebook
supporting the proposition).
557 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 15; see also Wells, supra note 65, at 580 (explaining that
according to Langdell, “the acceptance contains not just an explicit acceptance of the original
offer, but also an implied counter-offer. The counter-offer proposes the same contract as the
original offer and it is accepted by the acceptance that was implied in the original offer. Thus,
each contract represents two sets of offer and acceptance: (1) the explicit offer made in the
original offer with the explicit acceptance contained in the acceptance; and (2) the implied
counter-offer made in the acceptance with the implied acceptance made in the original offer.”).
558 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 18.
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Lord Curriehill, dissenting in Thomson v. James (also included in his casebook).559
Langdell again turned to the civilians for good logic.
Merlin believed that the argument that an acceptance was effective upon dispatch
was contrary to “good sense.”560 He argued that spoken words can only bind the
speaker if the words are heard by the addressee before they are retracted, and it is the
same with a written letter, a conclusion that flowed from the very definition of a letter
missive, which until received and read by the promisee is nothing more than words
fixed upon paper.561 Merlin also argued that each party’s consent to a contract was of
the same nature, and thus if an offer was ineffective until received, an acceptance
cannot be effective until received:
[T]he consent of him who accepts the proposed bargain is of no other nature
than the consent of him who makes the proposal; both consents are equally
necessary for the completion of the contract. If, therefore, he who proposes
is not bound by the proposition, when he retracts it before it has reached its
address, he who accepts can no more be bound by his acceptance, when he
retracts it before it has reached the author of the proposition. 562
Merlin’s argument, however, went beyond a mere argument for symmetry between
the effective time of an offer and the effective time of an acceptance. He pointed out
that if an acceptance was effective upon dispatch, that would mean that an offeree
could not retract the acceptance, even if the retraction was communicated to the offeror
before the offeror received the acceptance,563 something he obviously believed did
not make sense. To emphasize the point, he proposed a hypothetical involving an
acceptance by means of an acoustic vault in a cabinet, one with winding tubes through
which a communication takes five minutes to travel. In the hypothetical, the offeree
says into the vault that he accepts the offer, but then changes his mind and runs to the
offeror and rejects before the offeror heard the acceptance through the tubes. Would
the offeree be bound? To his own question, Merlin replied, “No; emphatically no; a
hundred times no.”564
Lord Curriehill’s argument was similar. He argued that:
The writer of the letter might have destroyed it so long as it remained in his
own hands. After despatching it by his clerk or servant, or any person in his
employment, he might have recalled it before it arrived at its destination, and
have still destroyed it. Or after so despatching it, he might still have sent an
express with a refusal of the offer, and if it had been first delivered, he would
still have been free, and the treaty would have been at an end. In short, until
the acceptance reached the offerer, there was not that convention in idem

559 Id.
560 LANGDELL, supra note 43, at 158.
561 Id. at 159.
562 Id. at 161.
563 Id. at 161–62.
564 Id. at 162.
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placitum which is necessary to constitute a mutual contract. Until then the
pursuers had not conferred upon the defendant that power of exacting
performance of the counterpart of the offer, which was essentially necessary
to constitute a binding obligation upon them, and to render their acceptance
effectual; and their consent was merely a resolution, which has no such effect
. . . . It remaineth, then, that the only act of the will which is efficacious, is
that whereby the will conferreth or stateth a power of exaction in another,
and thereby becomes engaged to that other to perform.565
Until the promisee receives the promise, the promisee can have no “power of exaction”
upon the promisor. And without a power of exaction, neither party is bound. Curriehill
considered this a principle of the “law of mutual contracts.” 566
In sum, logic dictated that a promise could not bind the promisor unless the
promisee was aware of the promise, as the point of communicating something to
someone was for them to be aware of the communication and understand it. This was
shown by the rule that an offer was ineffective unless and until learned of by the
offeree, something no one seemed to dispute. And to be clear, this meant not only that
the promise must be delivered to the promisee, but that the promisee was in fact aware
of it; thus a promise in a letter required not only that the letter be received, but that it
be read by the promisee.567 If an acceptance included a counter-promise (which no
one seemed to dispute if the offer was for a bilateral contract), logic further dictated
that the acceptance could not bind the offeree until it was received by the offeror. And
the logic that a promise could not bind the promisor until the promisee was aware of
the promise was demonstrated by what would otherwise be the strange result that an
offeree could not avoid the contract by notifying the offeror of a rejection prior to the
offeror receiving a previously dispatched acceptance. And if the acceptance could not
bind the offeree to the counter-promise until it was received by the offeror, no contract
could arise until that point, as both parties must be bound before either is bound, a
principle established in 1789 in Payne v. Cave.568 The consideration for a bilateral
contract was the exchange of promises, and until each party had given a promise, there
was no consideration and hence no contract.569
565 Id. at 143–44.
566 Id. at 144.
567 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 15.
568 Payne v. Cave (1789) 100 Eng. Rep. 502 (KB).
569 See Grey, supra note 7, at 3–4 (“According to Langdell, the issue between the alternatives
was not merely a practical one. In his view, fundamental principles dictated that the acceptance
must be received before the contract could be formed. This followed from the doctrine that a
promise could not be binding unless it was supported by consideration. The consideration for
the offer was the offeree’s return promise. But a promise by its nature is not complete until
communicated; a ‘promise’ into the air is no promise at all. Since there was no promise, there
was no consideration and could be no contract, until the letter of acceptance was received and
read. The mailbox rule could not be good law.”); Wells, supra note 65, at 581 (“[E]very
acceptance contains an implied offer. It is this implied offer which, when accepted by the
original offeror, creates a binding promise for the original offeree, and without this binding
promise there is no consideration for the contract. Because the acceptance contains an implied
counter-offer, it must be communicated to the original offeree before any contract is formed.
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Various arguments had been advanced as to why an acceptance should be
considered binding upon mailing, but Langdell rejected each of them. 570 First, it had
been argued that the receipt rule was based on the idea that the parties must manifest
assent at the same time, and under this reasoning the offeree must in turn be aware of
the offeror’s acceptance of the counter-promise and ad infinitum.571 Hence, no
contract could ever be formed at a distance.572 Langdell argued that it was untrue that
each party must be aware of formation at the same time, as this was impossible for
contracts formed inter absentee.573 Rather, the requirement that the offeror be aware
of the acceptance was not because both parties must be aware of formation at the same
time, but because a bilateral contract is made at the time the counter-promise is made,
and it is not a promise until it comes to the promisee’s knowledge.574
Second, it had been argued that the offeror, by making his offer through the mail,
impliedly authorizes the offeree to use the mail as well.575 But, argued Langdell, this
simply means the mail is a permissible medium of acceptance, and does not change
the fact that a promise is ineffective until it is communicated to the promisee.576
Langdell even went as far to say that “[i]f . . . the offer should expressly declare that
the contract should be complete immediately upon mailing a letter of acceptance, such
a declaration would be wholly inoperative.”577 A promise was ineffective until
communicated to the promisee, and there was nothing the parties could do to change
this fact (any more than they could change a scientific truth).
Third, it had been argued that the offeror, by making his offer by mail, makes the
post office his servant or messenger to receive an answer, and thus providing it to the
post office is delivering it to the offeror.578 (Note that such an argument assumes the
correctness of the requirement that a promise be received to be effective, and simply

Thus, there is no contract until the acceptance that implicitly contains the counteroffer is
received by the original offeror. This means that despite the fact that acceptances need not be
communicated in order to be effective, the implicit counter-offer contained in the acceptance
must be communicated.”).
570 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 17–20.
571 Id. at 18.
572 Id. at 19.
573 Id.
574Id.; see also Wells, supra note 65, at 581 (noting that Langdell’s formulation “avoids the
inevitable regress noted in Adams v. Lindsell. Once there is an exchange of letters, the contract
has been formed. The first party has made an offer and has received an acceptance. The second
party has made an offer (implied in his acceptance) and received an acceptance from the first
party (implied in his offer). Thus, at that point there are two promises, each supported by the
consideration provided in the other. There is no need for further communication.”).
575 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 19.
576 Id. at 19–20.
577 Id.
578 Id. at 20.
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seeks to fiddle with defining “received.”) Langdell rejected this, arguing in effect that
the agent was simply authorized to receive the acceptance letter, and it would not be
considered received by the offeror (although it became the offeror’s property), though
the result would be different if the agent had been given authority to receive a verbal
acceptance on the offeror’s behalf.579
This brings us to the fourth argument and Langdell’s notorious response. Langdell
noted that “[i]t has been claimed that the purposes of substantial justice, and the
interests of the contracting parties as understood by themselves, will best be served by
holding that the contract is complete the moment the letter of acceptance is mailed.”580
Langdell famously replied, “The true answer to this argument is, that it is
irrelevant.”581 Langdell has been taken to task for this statement, and it does reflect a
line that Langdell decided could not be crossed, even if the substantial justice or the
parties’ understanding was otherwise. Langdell was unwilling to budge on the concept
that a promise, to be a promise, must be communicated to the promisee, just like he
was unwilling to budge on his definition of promise with respect to conditions that did
not exist at the time the promise was made.
And he argued that even if matters of justice were considered, either rule would
cause harm to one of the parties, as making the acceptance effective upon dispatch
makes the offeror subject to a contract of which he is unaware and making it effective
upon receipt means the offeree is deprived of a contract he believes he has made.582
Langdell argued that it was better to maintain the status quo (no contract) and deprive
someone of an expected benefit, than to impose a possible unlimited liability on the
offeror.583 Also, the offeree has a measure of control over whether the acceptance will
reach its destination and reach it in timely fashion, more so than the recipient. 584
Langdell, however, believed that any possible merit to these arguments was
“irrelevant.”585 The definition of promise was a top-level principle, and if an offer and
an acceptance each contained a promise (as they did in a bilateral contract), the
meaning of promise could not differ based upon whether it was included within an
offer or within an acceptance. If it was correct that an offer was ineffective until
received by the offeree, that must be because a promise was ineffective until received.
And if that was so, then a counter-promise in an acceptance was ineffective until
received, and until then the consideration for the offeror’s promise had not been
provided. The truth of this axiom could be shown by the absurd results that would
arise if it was untrue.
Holmes took issue with Langdell’s argument, and their competing arguments are
a study in contrasts (in addition to a study in contracts). Whereas Langdell had argued

579 Id.
580 Id.
581 Id. at 21.
582 Id.
583 Id.
584 Id.
585 Id.
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that substantial justice was irrelevant, Holmes wrote that “[i]f convenience
preponderates in favor of either view, that is a sufficient reason for its adoption.”586
But Holmes was (once again) more than willing to show that Langdell’s argument,
presumably based on logic, was “unsound.”587 First, he took issue with Langdell
referring to an acceptance as a “counter-offer,” arguing that an initial offer includes
within it an implied acceptance of the counter-promise in advance and thus at no point
was the acceptance a counteroffer.588 But that was really just a semantic disagreement,
as they agreed that the offer included an implied acceptance of the counter-promise,
and it did not dispose of Langdell’s principal argument that a promise is ineffective
until communicated to the promisee.
From there, Holmes again challenged Langdell’s top-tier principle and his concept
of promise. Holmes the conceptualist was on display, and he was eager to show that
Langdell’s top-tier principle was inconsistent with what was truly the top-tier
principle. This was a particularly important top-tier principle for Holmes, as it
involved the objective theory, which Holmes had asserted was the general principle
of both civil and criminal law. Holmes saw Langdell’s approach as implementing a
will theory of contract. Langdell rejected the will theory of contract, 589 but his toptier principle seemingly injected a subjective element that was inconsistent with
Holmes’s notion of contract law.
Holmes set out to show that Langdell’s argument was unsound because it was
premised on the notion that communication of a promise to the promisee required that
it not only be put into possession of the promisee, but be “brought to the actual
knowledge of the promisee.”590 Langdell did seem to take the position that the
promisee must actually be aware of the promise, arguing that an offer was ineffective
“until it comes to the knowledge of the person to whom it is made,”591 and therefore
“the letter of acceptance must come to the knowledge of the offeror,”592 and “in
contracts inter absentes the letter [of acceptance] must be received and read.”593

586 HOLMES, supra note 12, at 305.
587 Id.
588 Id. at 305–06.
589 See LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 244 (“As to the rule that the wills of the contracting
parties must concur, it only means that they must concur in legal contemplation, and this they
do whenever an existing offer is accepted, no matter how much the [offeror] has changed his
mind since he made the offer. In truth, mental acts or acts of the will are not the materials out
of which promises are made; a physical act on the part of the promisor is indispensable; and
when the required physical act has been done, only a physical act can undo it. An offer is a
physical and a mental act combined, the mental act being a legal intendment embodied in, and
represented by, and inseparable from, the physical act.”).
590 HOLMES, supra note 12, at 306.
591 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 197.
592 Id. at 19.
593 Id. at 22; see also Wells, supra note 65, at 580 (explaining that according to Langdell,
“the acceptance contains not just an explicit acceptance of the original offer, but also an implied
counter-offer. The counter-offer proposes the same contract as the original offer and it is
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Holmes argued that Langdell’s position was contrary to law, as, for example, “[a]
covenant is binding when it is delivered and accepted, whether it is read or not.”594
He argued that the counter-promise was effective as consideration as soon as the
“tangible sign” of it was “sufficiently put into the power of the promisee.” 595 To
support this, he wrote, “I cannot believe that, if the letter had been delivered to the
promisee and was then snatched from his hands before he read it, there would be no
contract.”596 If it be conceded that the counter-promise would be effective if the letter
was delivered to the promisee but snatched from his hands before he read it, then
Langdell’s major premise must be incorrect. The promise must be capable of being
effective before it was actually known by the promisee, and Holmes believed it was
when it was put into the “power of the promisee.”597 And it could be considered within
the power of the promisee when dispatched. Holmes explained:
The offeree, when he drops the letter containing the counter-promise into the
letter-box, does an overt act, which by general understanding renounces
control over the letter, and puts it into a third hand for the benefit of the
[offeror], with liberty to the latter at any moment thereafter to take it . . . .
[T]he making of a contract does not depend on the state of the parties’ minds,
it depends on their overt acts. When the sign of the counter promise is a
tangible object, the contract is completed when the dominion over that object
changes.598
For Holmes, a contract was formed by the parties’ overt acts, and if mere delivery of
an acceptance could be considered an effective acceptance, it must be because the
offeree was considered to have renounced control over his letter. From there, it could
logically be concluded that dispatching the letter was an effective acceptance because
by such an overt act the offeree also renounced control over the letter. Holmes believed
that Langdell’s belief that a promisee must be aware of the promise for it to be a
promise was inconsistent with enlightened (objective) theory, writing in a letter in
1896 that (ironically) he never dispatched (it was found in his papers):
I think that in enlightened theory, which we now are ready for, all contracts
are formal, and that a tacit assumption to the contrary sometimes has led Mr.
Langdell astray. I had this definitely in view in what I said . . . in my Common
Law . . . . There never was a more unfortunate expression used than “meeting

accepted by the acceptance that was implied in the original offer. Thus, each contract represents
two sets of offer and acceptance: (1) the explicit offer made in the original offer with the explicit
acceptance contained in the acceptance; and (2) the implied counter-offer made in the
acceptance with the implied acceptance made in the original offer.”).
594 HOLMES, supra note 12, at 306.
595 Id.
596 Id.
597 Id.
598 Id. at 306–07.
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of the minds.” It does not matter in the slightest degree whether minds meet
or not . . . .599
Holmes did not, however, directly address Langdell’s argument that knowledge of
the acceptance flowed from the requirement that an offeree have knowledge of the
offer. But for Holmes the question was what the offeror was seeking as the
consideration for his promise. Holmes believed that “[a]cceptance of an offer usually
follows by mere implication from the furnishing of the consideration.”600 When the
offeree gives the tangible sign, the consideration has been provided. Again, Holmes
would not let the moral concept of a promise determine the appropriate legal rule, and
he sought to show that Langdell’s concept of promise led to results inconsistent with
an objective approach to contract law. Even more importantly, however, Holmes,
unlike Langdell, remained flexible, writing about the mailbox rule that “[i]f
convenience preponderates in favor of either view, that is a sufficient reason for its
adoption.”601
With respect to Williston, in his 1920 treatise he acknowledged the logical flaws
in the mailbox rule, writing the original English decision adopting the mailbox rule
“failed to consider that since the proposed contract was bilateral, as is almost
invariably any contract made by mail, the so-called acceptance must also have become
effective as a promise to the offeror in order to create a contract.” 602 Williston
recognized that the “question is, when has the offeree made the promise requested in
the offer?”603 Williston acknowledged that:
[i]t may be forcibly argued that making a promise is something which
necessarily requires communication, and that sending a letter which never
arrives is no more making a promise to the person addressed than talking into
a telephone where there is no connection with the person addressed; and the
rule that a bilateral contract is completed by mailing acceptance has been ably
criticized, and contention made that actual communication should be
required [citing Langdell].604
But Williston supported the mailbox rule, apparently because by that point it was
so well-established.605 Like Holmes, Williston felt the need to also address the logical
argument made by Langdell. Following Holmes’s lead, he noted that whether a
promise had been made should be based on an “outward indication . . . rather than the

599 HOWE, supra note 121, at 233 (quoting unsent letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to E.A.
Harriman, 1896).
600 HOLMES, supra note 12, at 303.
601 Id. at 305.
602 WILLISTON, supra note 317, at 141.
603 Id. at 143.
604 Id. at 143–44.
605 Id. at 141–42.
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actual communication which is necessary for mental assent.”606 For Williston, the
question was—what is the best indication that a promise has been made? Williston
believed receipt was a better indication than mailing that a promise had been made,
but once Langdell’s top-level principle had been rejected, all that was left for Williston
was a non-principled decision of which event was the better indication that a promise
had been made, and not one based on any top-level principle. Williston thus seemed
to view his criticism of the mailbox rule as little more than a quibble. The Restatement
of Contracts adopted the mailbox rule, without comment.607
The mailbox rule debate highlighted the difference between Langdell’s and
Holmes and Williston’s theories of consideration. For Langdell, the rules of
consideration flowed from general principles, which were inflexible. For Holmes and
Williston, even though the rules of consideration flowed from general principles (such
as, particularly for Holmes, the objective theory), the second-tier rules should or could
be adjusted based on matters of convenience, even if at odds with perceived general
principles. Logic shouldn’t be everything.
But Holmes and Williston’s disagreements with Langdell on the issues of wagers
and the mailbox rule did not seem to deal a fatal blow to the hope that logic could
provide for a comprehensive set of rules for contract law. After all, Holmes argued
that Langdell had misconceived the nature of a promise, the true theory of contract,
and the nature of consideration. It would not be until the turn of the century that the
fatal blow to using logic as a theory for contract law would be dealt.
C.

How Mutual Promises are Each Consideration for the Other: A Secret
Paradox of the Common Law and a Case of “Jumping In”

Twenty years would pass after the Summary before Langdell was woken from his
contracts scholarship slumber. And when he was (around 1900), it was because it came
to his attention that Williston, in a law review article six years earlier, had accused
him of having made an illogical argument in the Summary. He chose to defend himself,
but he would find he was entering a debate where logic would give out and his theory
of consideration would crumble.608
The issue had been lurking for some time. It was whether a promise to perform a
preexisting duty owed to a third party was a detriment to the promisor sufficient for it
to be consideration for a return promise. The problem was that Langdell had
considered the promise to be a detriment because it created a legal duty to perform,
but of course it only created a legal duty to perform if it was considered a detriment,
so the reasoning was circular. If “detriment” was the test to determine when a promise
was legally binding, whether the promise was legally binding could not be the test to
determine if there was a detriment. Something else had to be the test of “detriment.”
And the issue raised an even more fundamental question—why informal, mutual
promises were ever binding, and it would come to test the usefulness of the
benefit/detriment conception of consideration as a top-level principle. Ultimately, the
question would be whether logic could provide an answer to the question, and the

606 Id. at 144.
607 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 64 (AM. L. INST. 1932).
608 C.C. Langdell, Mutual Promises as a Consideration for Each Other, 14 HARV. L. REV.
496, 497–98 (1901).
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difficulty it presented led Sir Frederick Pollock to call it “one of
the secret paradoxes of the Common Law.”609 If logic could not provide an answer,
any model of contract law premised solely on logic could not be sustained. The stakes
were high.
At the time Langdell wrote his Summary, the law in England was that a promise
or its performance was sufficient consideration, even if the promisor was under a duty
to a third party to perform.610 The leading English authorities were Shadwell v.
Shadwell, decided in 1860 by the Court of Common Pleas, and Scotson v. Pegg,
decided in 1861 by the Court of Exchequer.611
In Shadwell, the testator, learning of his nephew’s engagement, promised his
nephew £150 per year to assist him at “starting,” payments to continue during the
testator’s life until the nephew’s annual income as a barrister reached a certain
level.612 The nephew sued, alleging that the testator had not paid all that was
promised.613 The defendant argued, among other things, that “the consideration on
which the testator’s promise was based [i.e., going through with the marriage], was a
consideration that the plaintiff should do what he was already bound to do [i.e., he was
already engaged]; and that is not sufficient.”614 Two judges, without addressing the
preexisting-duty issue, found that the consideration was sufficient.615 A dissenting
judge argued, among other things, that:
a promise, based on the consideration of doing that which a man is already
bound to do, is invalid . . . and it is not necessary, in order to invalidate the
consideration, that the plaintiff’s prior obligation to afford that consideration
should have been an obligation to the defendant. It may have been an
obligation to a third person [citations omitted]. The reason why the doing
what a man is already bound to do is no consideration, is not only because
such a consideration is in judgment of law of no value, but because a man
can hardly be allowed to say that the prior legal obligation was not his
determining motive.616
In Scotson v. Pegg, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached its promise to
unload the defendant’s goods (coal) from a ship within a certain time, if the plaintiff

609 Book Review, 30 LAW Q. REV. 128, 129 (1914) (Frederick Pollock reviewing J.G. PEASE
& A.M. LUTTER, THE STUDENT’S SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT (2d ed. 1913)).
610 WILLISTON, supra note 317, at 281.
611 Shadwell v. Shadwell (1860) 142 Eng. Rep. 62, reprinted in LANGDELL, supra note 43,
at 229; Scotson v. Pegg, (1861) 158 Eng. Rep. 121, reprinted in Langdell, supra note 43, at 236.
612 LANGDELL, supra note 43, at 229.
613 Id. at 230.
614 Id. at 231.
615 Id. at 233–34.
616 Id. at 236 (Byles, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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delivered the goods to the defendant.617 The defendant argued that the plaintiff was
under a legal obligation to the prior owner of the goods to deliver the goods to the
defendant (the prior owner had sold the goods to the defendant and directed the
plaintiff to deliver them to the defendant), and thus there was no consideration for the
defendant’s promise.618 One judge wrote: “The defendant gets a benefit by the
delivery of the coals to him, and it is immaterial that the plaintiffs had previously
contracted with third parties to deliver to their order.”619 Another judge wrote:
[T]o say that there is no consideration is to say that it is not possible for one
man to have an interest in the performance of a contract made by another.
But if a person chooses to promise to pay a sum of money in order to induce
another to perform that which he has already contracted with a third person
to do, I confess I cannot see why such a promise should not be binding. Here
the defendant, who was a stranger to the original contract, induced the
plaintiffs to part with the cargo, which they might not otherwise have been
willing to do, and the delivery of it to the defendant was a benefit to him. I
accede to the proposition that, if a person contracts with another to do a
certain thing, he cannot make the performance of it a consideration for a new
promise to the same individual. But there is no authority for the proposition
that where there has been a promise to one person to do a certain thing, it is
not possible to make a valid promise to another to do the same thing.
Therefore, deciding this matter on principle, it is plain to my mind that the
delivery of the coals to the defendant was a good consideration for his
promise, although the plaintiffs had made a previous contract to deliver them
to the order of other persons.620
Note that, at least in the above-quoted passage from Scotson, the judge focuses on the
promisor’s interest in obtaining the promisee’s performance, whereas the dissenting
judge in Shadwell focused on the promisee’s motive in performing.
Langdell included both cases in his casebook, summarizing them in the index as
follows:
But it is no objection to a consideration that it consists in doing something
which a third person could have compelled the promisee to do; e.g., marrying
a woman to whom promisee is already engaged; or delivering a cargo of coals
in the same manner that promisee is already under contract with another
person to deliver them.621
Langdell, the legal positivist, thus reported their holdings as the law.
But in his Summary, he took issue with the results, relying on reasoning from the
meaning of “detriment.” He argued that a promise to perform a preexisting duty owed

617 Id. at 236–37.
618 Id. at 237.
619 Id. at 239.
620 Id. at 240.
621 Id. at 1012.
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to a third party was a detriment whereas performing the duty was not. 622 Langdell
argued that a promise to perform the preexisting duty owed to a third party gave the
promisee the right to compel him to do it or to recover damages for nonperformance,
which was an additional detriment to the promisor, as now two parties rather than one
had the right to the promisor’s performance.623 In contrast, performing the preexisting
duty was not a new detriment.624 Thus, according to Langdell, if the alleged contract
was unilateral then the consideration was insufficient, whereas if it was bilateral it
would be sufficient. Langdell noted that the contracts sued upon in Shadwell and
Scotson were unilateral, and thus if the judges had borne this distinction in mind the
decisions might have been different.625 Recall that Langdell rejected the benefit test
for consideration and argued that the only question was whether the promisee suffered
a detriment.626 Thus, whether the promisor benefitted from the promisee’s
performance of the preexisting duty owed to the third party was irrelevant.
Sir Frederick Pollock, in the first edition of his 1876 treatise, had adopted the same
reasoning as Langdell.627 He wrote:
In a case where the party is already bound to do the same thing, but only by
contract with a third person, there is some difference of opinion. But there
seems to be no solid reason why the promise should not be good in itself, and
therefore a good consideration. It creates a new and distinct right, which
must always be of some value in law, and may be of appreciable value in
fact. There are many ways in which B may be very much interested in A’s
performing his contract with C, but yet so that the circumstances which give
him an interest in fact do not give him any interest which he can assert in law.
It may well be worth his while to give something for being enabled to insist
on his own right on the thing being done. This opinion has been expressed
and acted on in the Court of Exchequer, [citing Scotson v. Pegg] and seems
implied in the judgment of the majority of the Court of Common Pleas in a
case [citing Shadwell v. Shadwell] decided some weeks earlier.628
The question was whether the promisee was giving up anything, which was necessary
under the requirement of consideration. Langdell (and Pollock) did not see a promisee
who performed a preexisting duty as giving up anything, including any “right to
breach,” but a promisee who promised to perform gave up the right not to be sued by
the third-party promisor for nonperformance of the preexisting duty.

622 LANGDELL, supra note 9, at 104–05.
623 Id. at 105.
624 Id.
625 Id.
626 Id. at 82.
627 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 158–59 (1st
ed. 1876).
628 Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
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At this point, the strains on a logical structure of contract law caused by retaining
an additional requirement (a detriment or perhaps either a benefit or a detriment) for
purposes of determining what would count as bargained-for consideration were
unapparent. An additional requirement on top of a mere bargain was necessary, as no
one seemed to want a promise to perform (or the performance of) a preexisting duty
owed to the other party to be consideration for a new promise by that party (even if
simply for historical reasons, like Langdell). The problem, however, was that a
conceptualist and formalist would then need to account for such a second-tier rule
within the logical structure of contract law if the rule was not going to be discarded.
And that required a first-tier principle of consideration from which the preexistingduty rule could flow. The principle adopted by Langdell—consideration required a
detriment to the promisee—seemed to work well enough, making a promise to
perform (or performance of) a preexisting duty owed to the promisor insufficient
(clearly not a new detriment). And when applied to a situation involving a preexisting
duty owed to a third party, the top-tier principle meant performance of a duty owed to
a third party was insufficient (no new detriment) but a promise to perform such a duty
was sufficient (a new detriment, because the promisor was now subject to a claim by
the promisee as well as the third party). If this was the second-tier rule that logically
flowed from the top-tier principle, then whether it was a good rule from a policy
standpoint was irrelevant. So far, so good.
But in 1879, Sir William Anson (an English jurist) pointed out a fallacy in
Pollock’s (and thus Langdell’s) deductive reasoning from the first-tier principle that a
detriment is sufficient consideration, writing:
[I]t has been said [citing to Pollock] that the promise [to perform a preexisting
duty owed to a third party is consideration because it] is based on the creation
“of a new and distinct right” for the promisor, in the performance of the
contract between his promise and the third party. But this is in fact to assume
that a right is created which would not be the case if the consideration for the
promise were bad . . . . If we say that the consideration for it is the detriment
to the promisee in exposing himself to two suits instead of one for the breach
of his contract, we beg the question, for we assume that an action would lie
for such a promise. If we say that the consideration is the promisor’s desire
to see the contract carried out, we run the risk of confounding motive and
consideration.629
Both Pollock and Anson downplayed the promisor’s interest in having the promisee
perform (the chance of which was presumably increased if the promisor’s promise was
enforceable), seemingly following Langdell’s lead that detriment to the promisee, not
benefit to the promisor, was the relevant question, as otherwise motive would be
incorrectly confounded with consideration. Of course, if everyone agreed that a
promise to perform a preexisting duty owed to the promisor was not (or should not be)
consideration, then relying on the promisor’s interest in performance to make the
promise enforceable when the duty was owed to a third party was problematic. The
promisor had an interest in performance in the former situation too. So detriment to
the promisee must be the test, but why was a mere promise a detriment? Why did it

629 SIR WILLIAM REYNELL ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LAW
(Oxford, 1879).
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have value of which the law would take notice? At this point, the discussion was
limited to promises to perform a preexisting duty, and the can of worms had not yet
been opened.
In 1894, Williston opened the can of worms. In an article titled “Successive
Promises of the Same Performance,” he discussed promises to perform a preexisting
duty, including those when the duty was owed to the promisee and when it was owed
to a third party.630 With respect to the former, Williston believed that a promise to do
what one was already obligated to the promisee to do, or doing it, was neither a
detriment to the promisee nor a benefit to the promisor (assuming a benefit would be
sufficient consideration).631 The lack of a detriment was perhaps obvious, but the lack
of a benefit was not. Here, Williston distinguished between an actual benefit and a
legal benefit, writing that “[g]ranting that a benefit or advantage moving from the
promisee to the promisor is a good consideration, surely nothing can be regarded by
the law as a benefit to the promisor unless it is something more than what he was
already entitled to.”632 Accordingly, it was not good consideration, even if a benefit
to the promisor was sufficient consideration.
Turning to the latter situation (preexisting duty owed to third party), Williston
started by agreeing with Langdell that “what the promisee gives—that is, the detriment
suffered by him—[was now] the universal test for consideration . . . .”633 If doing (not
promising) what one was already bound to do was not a good consideration, then,
following this to its “logical conclusion,” a benefit to the promisor could not be
sufficient for consideration.634 Williston then addressed Langdell’s argument that a
promise to perform a preexisting duty owed to a third party was a detriment because
the promisor became legally bound to an additional party, whereas performance of the
duty was not.635 Williston asserted that “[i]t seems impossible to dispute Anson’s
criticism of the theory advanced by Pollock and Professor Langdell”636 and it “must
be deemed sound.”637 But Williston, opening the can of worms, pointed out that this
objection brought into issue the very question of why any bilateral contract was
binding.638 If there was no detriment unless the promise was binding, it begged the
question to say that an exchange of promises was binding because each promisor was

630 Samuel Willison, Successive Promises of the Same Performance, 8 HARV. L. REV. 27, 27
(1894).
631 Id.
632 Id. at 30.
633 Id. at 33–34.
634 Id. at 34.
635 Id.
636 Id. at 35.
637 Id. at 36.
638 Id. at 35.
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bound.639 The first promise is binding because the counter-promise is binding, and the
counter-promise is binding because the first promise is binding. For three hundred
years an informal, mutual exchange of promises had been considered binding because
each promise had been given in exchange for the other, without anyone questioning
the reasoning. But once Williston asked the question, there was no turning back.
Williston, the conceptualist/formalist (even if an “uneasy” one), thus turned to
defining consideration in a way that could be induced from the second-tier principles.
Courts in the United States, unlike those in England, had held that a promise to
perform a preexisting duty owed to a third party was not good consideration,640 and
thus Williston the legal positivist wanted a definition of consideration that would
account for those results. Williston saw the answer in “revis[ing] slightly the test of
consideration in a bilateral contract, seeking the detriment necessary to support a
counter-promise, in the thing promised, and not in the promise itself.” 641 Williston
wrote:
If the test of the sufficiency of consideration be made whether the promisee
has incurred a detriment at the request of the promisor (which would
constitute a unilateral contract), or has promised something the performance
of which will be, or may be, a detriment (which would constitute a bilateral
contract), a logical consistency is attained. Nor is it attained at the expense of
disregarding the authorities.642
Looking to the act that was promised, the circular reasoning was avoided. Promises as
such were not consideration. The act was the detriment, not the promise. Under this
new definition, a promise to perform a preexisting duty owed to a third party was not
sufficient consideration because the promised act was not a detriment to the promisee.
This test also explained why a promise to accept a gift was not consideration (the act
of accepting a gift was not a detriment to the promisor).643
Williston’s solution was very much a hybrid of Langdellian legal positivism and
Langdellian conceptualism/formalism. Like Langdell, he was willing to alter the
received definition of consideration, but Williston did it to account for the actual
decisions, whereas Langdell was less concerned with tailoring first-tier principles to
actual decisions. Like Langdell, Williston gave matters of policy no attention in
providing a revised definition of consideration. By ignoring benefit to the promisor,
whether the promisor would want the promise or the performance was not considered
relevant.
Langdell was unaware of Williston’s article until around 1900, and the following
year wrote a response titled “Mutual Promises as Consideration for Each Other,”
which was published in the Harvard Law Review.644 While Williston’s solution was
639 Id.
640 Id. at 32–33.
641 Id. at 35.
642 Id. at 36.
643 Id. at 35.
644 See generally Langdell, supra note 608.
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Langdellian, Langdell’s ire was up, apparently because he was being accused of a
logical error.645 Langdell’s response correctly pointed out that a weakness in
Williston’s argument was that if consideration for a promise was what was given in
exchange, the promisor in a bilateral contract seeks in exchange the return promise,
not the promised performance.646 Because the promised performance is in the future,
it cannot be the consideration, only the counter-promise itself can be the
consideration.647 Langdell showed that Williston had, in fact, failed to demonstrate
why the counter-promise itself was consideration, and Pollock called Langdell’s
response a “a masterly reply.”648
Langdell, however, despite having a masterly reply to Williston’s new definition
of consideration, was unable to provide his own explanation of why the counterpromise itself was consideration. He simply argued that he had operated on the
assumption each promise was legally binding,649 and “the decision [of whether the
counter-promise is consideration] will depend upon the judgment of the court on that
question.”650 He asserted that Shadwell v. Shadwell and Scotson v. Pegg were both
authorities for the latter proposition,651 presumably meaning that the courts finding
consideration in those cases was defensible as within the court’s discretion.652 As a
conceptualist/formalist, Langdell should not have simply argued that it was for the
court to decide in each case whether a particular counter-promise was consideration,
particularly when the facts are the same in different cases (if that was his argument).
Judicial discretion of this kind, on a fundamental issue of contract law, was
inconsistent with bringing order and predictability to the common law of contracts and
providing rules for apolitical decisions. He presumably wanted to prove that
Williston’s solution was illogical, but in doing so, he had no choice but to address the
645 Williston, in his autobiography, wrote that Langdell’s attitude caused him regret, but that
it resulted no friction between them. WILLISTON, supra note 72, at 138.
646 Langdell, supra note 608, at 506.
647 Id.
648 Frederick Pollock, Afterthoughts on Consideration, 17 LAW Q. REV. 415, 422 n.2 (1901).
649 Langdell, supra note 608, at 502.
650 Id. at 505.
651 Id. at 505 & n.2.
652 As the leading analyst of the debate notes, Langdell saw little to be done about the
problem, and “Langdell’s answer was, in the end, to say that consideration and detriment were
legal questions to be decided by the courts.” Richard Bronaugh, A Secret Paradox of the
Common Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 193, 204 & n.28 (1983); see also Howard Engelskirchen,
Consideration as the Commitment to Relinquish Autonomy, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 490, 516
n.79 (1997) (“[I]n the last analysis Langdell missed the point and thought it obvious that one
promise given for another was binding unless a defendant could establish some defect in the
promise such as incapacity or illegality.”). If, as Williston believed, Langdell was arguing that
“[i]f the obligation of a promise would be a detriment to the promisor (assuming that the promise
creates a binding obligation) the promise is sufficient consideration” that did nothing to solve
the paradox. Samuel Williston, Consideration in Bilateral Contracts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 503,
518 (1914).
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problem of why mutual promises are binding, and in doing so, he was left to essentially
concede that he could conceive of no logical answer to the question.
But one can only wonder if this really bothered Langdell. Recall that Langdell
acknowledged that law did not have the “demonstrative certainty of mathematics . . .
nor does it acknowledge truth as its ultimate test and standard, like natural science . .
. .”653 If so, surely Langdell understood that at some point logic would run out. Perhaps
this was what Langdell was saying when he wrote that ultimately it would be up to the
courts to decide whether a particular promise was legally binding.
The problem thereafter consumed the energies of other scholars.654 Holmes, who
was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1902,655 watched the debate from afar.
In a 1910 letter to Pollock (after Langdell’s death in 1906), he essentially conceded
that there was no principled reason why an exchange of promises were binding,
writing that “it is a case of jumping in—call one binding and both are,” and that “[i]t
is more convenient to say both bind than that neither does, therefore voilà vous êtes
[“here you are”].”656 Several months later, he wrote to Pollock after receiving
Pollock’s eighth edition of his contracts treatise. In it, Pollock had now written:
In fact there is no conclusive reason, other than the convenience of so
holding, for the rule that a promise and a counter-promise will make one
another binding: for neither of them, before it is known to be binding in law,
is in itself any benefit to the promisee or burden to the promisor. 657
Holmes, in reply, wrote, “I see no answer to what you say as to mutual promises.” 658
It was classic Holmes. If it is more convenient to say that both are binding than to say
that neither is, so be it.
In 1914, Williston wrote an article titled “Consideration in Bilateral Contracts,”
which was published in the Harvard Law Review,659 and which formed the basis for

653 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENTS AND TREASURER OF HARVARD COLLEGE, 1876-77,
supra note 174, at 96–97, reprinted in LAPIANA, supra note 3, at 56–57.
654 See Bronaugh, supra note 652 (providing an extensive analysis of the debate).
655 SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 243
(1989).
656 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Dec. 18, 1910), in HOLMESPOLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK
POLLOCK 1874-1932, supra note 109, at 172.
657 FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT: A TREATISE ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES
CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF AGREEMENTS IN THE LAW OF ENGLAND 191 (8th ed. 1911).
Pollock also wrote the following year, “What logical justification is there for holding mutual
promises good consideration for each other? None, it is submitted.” Frederick Pollock, Book
Note, The Law of Contracts, 28 LAW Q. REV. 100, 101 (1912) (reviewing CLARENCE D. ASHLEY,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1911)).
658 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Mar. 12, 1911), in HOLMESPOLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK
POLLOCK 1874-1932, supra note 109, at 177.
659 Williston, supra note 652.
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the same discussion in his 1920 treatise.660 Williston wrote that he had changed his
mind since writing his 1894 article, and that he now supported the English decisions
that had held that a promise to perform a preexisting duty owed to a third party was
sufficient consideration.661 He wrote: “[N]ow on the ground of legal benefit to the
promisor I support the English cases and such American decisions as follow them in
upholding the second agreement, whether unilateral or bilateral.” 662 But Williston
made no effort to explain why he believed the English cases and what was apparently
the minority rule in the United States was better law. A policy justification was
shouting for recognition, but Williston ignored the shouts.
And more importantly for our purposes, Williston still made no effort to explain
why, logically, an exchange of promises makes each one binding. He attacked
Langdell’s 1901 effort to defend his position, writing that “[t]he question is not here
in regard to disputed facts; all the facts must be taken as known,”663 correctly
recognizing that an effort to bring order to the common law of contract should not give
courts discretion, on a case by case basis, to decide an issue of law. He also made some
progress toward a rationale for explaining why mutual promises were binding, arguing
that “it is the promise in fact which the offeror requests—not a legal obligation.”664
But rather than offer his own answer to the paradox, he simply continued to fiddle
with a test for consideration, one that would fit what he believed were the correct
results in the cases (abandoning his positivism, yet missing the opportunity to do so
for policy reasons, and thus appearing like a conceptualist/formalist whose only goal
was creating a neat structure). Williston even seemed to acknowledge that there was
no logical answer for how mutual promises made each promise legally binding, simply
accepting that courts since the late sixteenth century had so decided, writing: “When
bilateral contracts were first recognized no elaborate discussion was had of the
requirements of a promise in order that it might be sufficient consideration for another
promise. It was simply decided that a promise was sufficient for another promise.”665
Williston did not even see it as a paradox, writing in response to Pollock’s
assertion: “I see nothing paradoxical about it. All that is necessary is to understand
and state that the rules governing consideration in unilateral contracts will not cover

660 WILLISTON, supra note 317, at 192–216.
661 Williston, supra note 652, at 524.
662 Id. The Restatement of Contracts, published in 1932 with Williston as the Reporter,
provided that a promise or the performance of a duty owed to a third party was sufficient
consideration. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 84(d) (AM. L. INST. 1932).
663 Williston, supra note 652, at 509 n.17.
664 Id. at 506; see also George P. Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1263, 1269 (1985) (“Williston approached the problem by conceptualizing the obligor’s second
promise as a natural rather than legal event. Williston called the second promise to perform
‘consideration in fact,’ which could be sufficient to uphold the contract and thereby render the
promise binding.”).
665 Williston, supra note 652, at 518. Farnsworth concluded that Langdell “seems to have
been bested by Williston in [the] debate over Langdell's attempt to apply the notion of legal
detriment to the enforceability of mutual promises.” Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 1411.
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the bilateral situation, and a special rule is required.”666 In other words, the paradox
could be dispelled by simply creating a special rule that avoided any inconsistency: a
promise to perform a preexisting duty owed to a third party is binding because the
general rule is that a promise is binding, but performing the preexisting duty is not
consideration because we have a special rule that says it is not. But Williston missed
the point. The paradox was not that existing legal rules, as so framed, could not
account for the different results, it was that there was no solely logical explanation
why each promise in a bilateral contract was consideration. Williston’s flip-flopping
on the definition of consideration was merely cosmetic and simply proved that logic
could not provide the answer.
It was a remarkable article, one that exposed the inability of Langdellian
conceptualism/formalism to use logic as a way to create a comprehensive body of
contract-law doctrine. As Richard Bronaugh has argued:
The moral of the tale is that classical contract formation, especially of the
bilateral kind (i.e., in which only promises are exchanged), cannot explain
consideration merely from within the force of the contract itself and must—
however little appreciated—depend upon independent notions of obligation
derived from the idea of promising as a moral act.667
One need not agree with Bronaugh’s conclusion about the reason mutual promises are
consideration for one another, to agree that Langdellian logic could not provide an
answer. It also shows that the architects of classical contract law did “not think of
consideration in the same way” and “[t]hat that should be the case in the heyday of
classical contract theory is perhaps the real paradox of the common law.”668
Ultimately, it took Arthur Corbin to point out the obvious. Entering the debate in
1918, he wrote:
Mutual promises create a legal obligation because—in English-speaking
countries, at least—the customary notions of honor and well-being cause men
to perform as they have promised, and the lawmaking powers have decreed
that in such cases promise-breakers shall make compensation. The prevailing
credit system in business requires such a rule. The basis for the enforcement
of bilateral contracts lies in mutual assent and fair dealing.
The fact is that “consideration” is an undefined and nebulous concept. Our
efforts at definition have been inharmonious and unsuccessful for the reason
that a great variety of facts must be included. This is an excellent illustration
of the general truth that we do not have universal principles or mechanical
rules of clean-cut definitions in the beginning. It is evident that we have such
universal and mechanical tests so that we can predict societal action with
greater certainty. Therefore, we continually construct exact definitions and

666 Williston, supra note 652, at 509 n.18.
667 Bronaugh, supra note 652, at 196.
668 Id. at 204.
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general rules. Some thus “lay down the law” with dogmatic vigor, even
asserting an a priori necessity, logical or divine.669
In other words, courts held a promise to be binding when it was given in exchange for
another promise because there were good reasons to do so, whether those reasons were
based on the morality of promising or because the needs of business were promoted,
or both. As Holmes had written, “[i]t is more convenient to say both bind than that
neither does, therefore voilà vous êtes [“here you are”].”670
VII. CONCLUSION
There were two reasons the efforts of Langdell, Holmes, and Williston to create a
foundation for contract law were doomed to fail. First, Langdell and Holmes did not
share the same theory of law.671 Langdell emphasized logic, whereas Holmes
emphasized experience. This was demonstrated in Langdell wanting a preexisting
concept of promise to drive the formulation of bottom-level rules of consideration,
whereas Holmes was willing to expand the concept of promise to serve what he viewed
was contract law’s purpose. Second, although Langdell and Williston agreed on the
primacy of logic, logic alone proved unable to give an answer to one of the most
fundamental questions of all—why are mutual promises consideration for each other?
By the early twentieth century, it was apparent neither Langdell nor Williston were
able to show that logic alone could answer this question. By this point, it was clear
that the architects had failed in their efforts to build a solid foundation for classical
contract law.

669 Arthur L. Corbin, Does a Pre-Existing Duty Defeat Consideration, 27 YALE L.J. 362,
375–76 (1918).
670 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Dec. 18, 1910), in HOLMESPOLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK
POLLOCK 1874-1932, supra note 109, at 172.
671 See discussion supra Part III.
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